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Abstract 
 
A limited process of integration has been occurring amongst the countries of Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, and Turkey.  From the mid-1990s to 2008, integration amongst the three 
countries has occurred in the energy and transport sectors, but not in other sectors, such as 
security, politics or trade beyond energy and transport.  In the energy sector, this 
integration can be explained through neo-liberal institutionalist theory.  Integration in the 
transport sector occurs due to a mixture of elements from the neo-liberal institutionalist, 
security communities and neo-functionalist theories of integration.  In both sectors, 
transnational extra-regional actors (TERAs) are the explanatory variable in the integration. 
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Introduction 
 
 A limited process of integration has been occurring amongst the countries of Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, and Turkey.  From the mid-1990s to 2008, integration amongst the three countries 
has occurred in the energy and transport sectors, but not in other sectors, such as security, 
politics or trade beyond energy and transport.  In the energy sector, this integration can be 
explained through neo-liberal institutionalist theory.  Integration in the transport sector occurs 
due to a mixture of elements from the neo-liberal institutionalist, security communities and neo-
functionalist theories of integration.  In both sectors, transnational extra-regional actors (TERAs) 
are the explanatory variable in the integration.  These theories will be analyzed in greater depth 
below. 
 This process occurred during this thesis’ time period of study (mid-1990s to 2008) 
despite sometimes flaring tensions between Russia and Georgia, which led to a brief but hot 
conflict in 2008, the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and 
a history of non-cooperation between Georgia, an Orthodox Christian country, and its Turkic 
Islamic neighbors.1  This integrative trend possesses characteristics distinct from analogous 
processes in regions such as Western Europe and Southeast Asia, which have helped to transition 
constellations of small countries into dynamic regional trading blocs to their mutual benefit.2  
First, the integration amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey is largely restricted to the high 
value and highly regulated spheres of energy and transport.  It has not spilled over into political 
and economic integration writ large.  In part, this may be a self-perpetuating phenomenon: as the 
energy and transport sectors are treated differently because they are harmonizing, they will 
continue to be treated differently in the future.  This is not the entire story.  Highly regulated 
sectors such as these lend themselves to standardization and therefore harmonization when it is 
in the interests of the countries to do so.  Energy resources, such as oil and natural gas in 
Azerbaijan, are extremely valuable and governed outside the legal-rational state apparatus.  
Consequently, energy as a sector is treated as sui generis by the countries of the region. 
 In addition to this major distinction, the countries of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey 
possess another difference as well: the organic integration that is occurring in these three 
countries is cultivated, that is, it is orchestrated as a top-down process by international 
institutions operating in the region in pursuit of a broader agenda.3  Identified here as 
transnational extra-regional actors (TERAs), these institutions have provided financial, material, 
and legal support of harmonization of the transport and energy sectors not solely for purposes of 
resource extraction and profits, but also for purposes of transparency, proper accounting of state 
finances, good governance, and most importantly a predictable business environment that is 
attractive to foreign investors. 
 This process of integration, even limited to the energy and transport sectors, is 
multifaceted and not necessarily progressive or even unidirectional.  Nor are the two sectors 
themselves proceeding in the same manner.  The energy sector, particularly in Azerbaijan, is a 
                                                 
1 See generally, Thomas De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
2 Compare, e.g., Frank Moller, Thinking Peaceful Change: Baltic Security Policies and Security Community 
Building (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2007); Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in 
Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (New York: Routledge, 2009);  
3 See, e.g., Paul Stephenson, “Let’s Get Physical: The European Commission and Cultivated Spillover in 
Completing the Single Market’s Transport Infrastructure,” Journal of European Public Policy, 17(7), 2010, pp. 
1039-1057 (explaining cultivated integration from the top down in a neo-functionalist framework). 
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shadowy realm governed from the highest levels of government, outside the reach of ordinary 
parliamentary legislation and outside the political constraints of the ordinary electorate.  TERAs 
and other international institutions that attempt to influence energy policy in Azerbaijan must do 
so from the very top—it is here that production and extraction agreements with foreign oil 
companies are negotiated; here where state oil profits are divided and dispersed; and here where 
major foreign policy decisions concerning the export of Azerbaijani oil and gas are made.4  By 
sharp contrast, the transport and communications sector (treated as one for the moment because 
the two components possess similar structural characteristics) affects ordinary lives, shapes 
broad social transformations, and engages highly public regulatory reform such as harmonization 
of customs and border controls, public infrastructure financing, such as the sale of bonds, and 
tariff and trade policy.  This is not to overstate the binary distinction—pipeline security, for 
instance, is an aspect of energy integration that affects local control and requires local 
cooperation—but nonetheless, two separate processes are underway.  While integration in the 
energy sector is almost entirely cultivated by TERAs and international financial institutions, 
integration in the transport and communications sector is a more diffuse process. 
 Why has this sector-specific integration not led to “spillover” in other sectors, to borrow 
the word, analyzed further below, from the neo-functional theory that integration is like a row of 
dominoes that accelerates its own continued momentum?  There is no easy answer to this 
question, but the dynamics of top-down energy reform, cultivated by TERAs and other donors, 
may simply have limited impact on other sectors.  Azerbaijan covetously guards its energy 
resources and views them as integral to its national prestige.  Perhaps by contrast, the transport 
sector may be seen as a highly technical sphere, and one that does not affect national security 
interests.5  In any event, the two sectors appear to be treated autonomously and separately from 
other forms of policymaking, which blunts the broader consequences of their emerging 
integrative tendencies.  These themes form the core of this thesis and will be drawn out in the 
examination that follows. 
 
What is Integration? 
 
 Unlike the traditional realist assumption that a state always acts, and only acts, in its own 
rational self-interest, integrative theory conceives of national interests in mutable and highly 
contingent ways and attempts to explain why, especially after the Cold War, former rivals have 
sought to cooperate with one another even while doing so appears to be at odds with national 
security and hard power interests.  The earliest steps of European integration in the 1950s 
launched the field of integration theory because they identified “one of the most significant 
challenges to realism’s dominance, since they offered a view of international politics that 
stressed precisely how anarchy might be transcended, and a notion of politics that focused on 
governance and consent rather than power relations between autonomous and atomised 
individual actors.”6 At the same time, it would be a logical fallacy for theorists of integration 
in international relations to assume that the most successful case—the integration of Western 
                                                 
4 David I. Hoffman, "Azerbaijan: The Politicization of Oil," in Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus (Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds., Rowman and Littlefield: New York, 2000). 
5 See, e.g., Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western 
Europe,” Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (1966), p. 862-915.   
6 Steve Smith, “International Theory and European Integration,” in International Relations Theory and the Politics 
of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community (Morten Kelstrup and Michael Charles Williams, eds., 
Psychology Press, 2000), p. 34. 
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Europe—is necessarily representative of integration as a theoretical process.  When 
Chryssochoou, for instance, describes European integration as a process of joining together 
“distinctive political units through a politics of accommodation, institutionalized compromise, 
and an informal culture of consensus building at the highest political level,” he is identifying 
characteristics that may be peculiar to the European case.7  While cooperation and consent are 
required for the definition of integration as distinct from coercive processes, the type of 
governing politics is not strictly necessary. 
 The mechanism by which integration occurs has long been debated by international 
relations theorists.  In general, the three main theories posit that integration occurs when popular 
expectations about national self-identity change (security communities theory); when regulatory 
and administrative harmonization at low levels leads to cooperation at higher levels (neo-
functionalism); or when international institutions cultivate and perpetuate integration among 
their member states, with their own organizational agendas in mind (neo-liberal institutionalism).  
Although each of these three theories identifies a different triggering mechanism, and a host of 
additional hybrid theories attempt to divide or combine permutations of them, the three theories 
have a common core: the national interests of states begin to converge as a result of their 
cooperation, and the convergence of national interests changes state behavior accordingly. 
 The first of these traditional theories of integration is security communities theory, 
pioneered by Karl Deutsch in describing the integration of Western Europe in the late 1950s.  
According to Deutsch and his colleagues, integration was a relationship among political units in 
which they are mutually interdependent and jointly possess system properties that they 
individually lack.8  As states delve deeper into cooperative arrangements, the prospect of open 
hostilities between them declines because information is more easily and more widely shared and 
because membership in a common community increases the predictability of state behavior.  As 
the populations of these nation-states, engaged in increasing interactions, economic transactions, 
and communications with one another without regard to borders, their self-identities begin to 
converge and a collectivist identity emerges.  The value of this theory is that it draws attention to 
actors other than the nation-state by focusing on soft power cooperation such as sports, academic 
exchange, technology transfer, and media broadcasting.  These points of contact, taken in the 
aggregate, produce a kind of “we-feeling” or shared sense of community.  Security communities 
theory faced a revival with the constructivist revolt against realism after the Cold War.  
Constructivist theory in international relations posits that anarchy among nation-states is learned, 
and can be unlearned as states increasingly grow to share a collective identity through discourse 
and social practices.9  Rooted in the human sciences, such as sociology, constructivism does not 
take state interests for granted but recognizes that they can change depending on the context.10 
                                                 
7 Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration (Taylor and Francis, 2009), p. 15. 
8 Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of 
Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); see also, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 
Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
9 Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community,” in Security 
Communities (Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 71-72, 
104-107. 
10 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” in Security 
Communities (Adler and Barnett, eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 44.  According to Adler 
and Barnett, social learning plays a critical role in the emergence of security communities, and is facilitated by 
transactions that typically occur in organized settings.  During their transactions and social exchanges, people 
communicate to each other their self-understandings, perceptions of reality, and normative expectations.  As a result, 
changes occur in individual and collective understandings and values.  Ibid. 
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 The second of the traditional theories is neofunctionalism, which was born following the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the late 1950s by the scholars 
Ernst B. Haas and Leon Lindberg, who sought to explain how ECSC’s regulatory harmonization 
efforts had “spilled over” into broader economic integration (through the European Economic 
Community) and energy integration (through Euratom).11  According to neofunctionalism, as 
interest groups began to turn toward supranational communities to realize their demands they 
shift loyalties to the supranational institution, and under the pressure of these groups loyal to the 
supranational organization, the removal of simple technical barriers such as currency and labor 
controls would accelerate and beget broader and deeper political union.  Neofunctionalism ran 
into difficulty in the early 1960s, however, as European integration stalled for several years due 
to political difficulties in countries like France, undermining the central tenet of the theory that 
the integrative process, once it began, would gain momentum and become self-reinforcing.  
However, although the traditional concept of “spillover” is now recognized as being unique to 
the European context and not necessarily transferable to other regions of the world, 
neofunctionalism as a partial theory also gained some traction following the end of the Cold 
War.12  The theory operates more as a lens than as a comprehensive framework: by focusing on 
special interest groups, technocratic change, and low-level cooperation by non-political elites, 
the neofunctionalist theory of integration is able to account for a more diverse array of actors 
than state-centric theories are. 
 The final traditional theory of integration in international relations is neoliberal 
institutionalism, proposed in its current incarnation by Robert Keohane, who argued that nation-
states will form collective institutions to achieve their own interests, but once built these 
institutions will alter state behavior by establishing and enforcing norms, sharing information, 
and reducing transaction costs.13  Participation in collective institutions can help a state build its 
reputation among other member states and can increase the costs of defection or noncompliance.  
Unlike the other traditional theories, neoliberal institutionalism accepts the realist assumption 
that states are the primary actors in international relations.  Realism may well agree with the 
proposition that states will join collective arrangements if it is in their national interests to do so; 
where neoliberal institutionalism departs from realism, however, is by arguing that participation 
in collective organizations will change state behavior and ultimately change those national 
interests. 
 The three theories will be helpful in analyzing the progress of integration in the energy 
and transport sectors in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.  In particular, a major focus of this 
integrative process is the important role played by international actors with broad-based agendas 
for reform, here called TERAs, which can reach the highest levels of government, reduce the 
costs of compliance and increase the costs of defection, and eventually alter popular 
expectations.  TERAs have had particular success in integrating the transport sector (and perhaps 
derivatively, the communications sector) and the energy sector, two highly regulated and 
                                                 
11 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2004, 1968 ed.); Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic 
Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963). 
12 Arne Niemann and Philippe Schmitter, “Neofunctionalism,” in European Integration Theory (Antje Weiner and 
Thomas Diez, eds., New York: Oxford, 2009), p. 63 (describing neofunctionalim as partial theory).  For the 
resurgence of neofunctionalism after the end of the Cold War due to the resurgence of European integration, see 
ibid., p. 45. 
13 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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financially valuable sectors that lend themselves to cross-border transactions in order to reach 
regional and global markets.  The success of TERAs outside of these sectors is very limited, and 
these sectors have been segmented from the rest of the economy (and, in the case of energy in 
Azerbaijan, insulated from the ordinary political process). 
 The failure of integration outside of the energy and transport sectors among Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey belies the traditional neo-functionalist concept of “spillover” in which 
integration in one regulatory sphere would create pressure to integrate related spheres.  In the 
security sector, for instance, Turkey and Azerbaijan were unable and unwilling to come to the 
aid of Georgia when hostilities flared with Russia in August 2008.  The security relations of each 
country have dramatically altered depending on the leader in charge; Azerbaijan and Georgia are 
still dependent in some ways on Russia, and will continue to be.  Even isolation of Armenia, 
supported by Azerbaijan and Turkey after the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1994, is only 
lukewarmly embraced by Georgia.  Similarly, in the political sphere, all three countries have 
ambiguous relations with Russia, with Georgia’s relationship as the most tense.  Azerbaijan, 
largely dependent on oil production for its national wealth, is in some danger of “Dutch disease,” 
which in the political sense refers to the decline in productivity in the manufacturing sector once 
an economy becomes overly dependent on a valuable extractive resource that makes the currency 
so strong that exports grow prohibitively expensive.14  In addition, Azerbaijan’s political system 
is not fully rational, and the democratization process in Georgia following the election of 
Mikhail Saakashvili in 2004 is still young.  It may be partly for these reasons that the security 
and political sectors have shown very little evidence of integration, but that is not the focus of 
this thesis. 
 Likewise, the cultural and economic spheres have also shown virtually no evidence of 
integration among the three countries to the exclusion of their neighbors.  In the cultural sphere, 
the three countries can only count to two: two speak a Turkic language and favor largely secular 
Islam, while one is Orthodox Christian; two have a common history of Soviet Russian 
domination and are currently experiencing a revival of their national languages; and two have a 
generally pro-European sociopolitical orientation and wish to join the European Union.  The 
three countries together have fairly little in common on a cultural level that they do not share 
with their neighbors. On an economic plane, integration is multidirectional and uneven.  Both 
Azerbaijan and Georgia are not completely economically independent of Russia, and even 
Turkey counts Russia as a top trade partner after the European Union.  The best-integrated 
country of the three is probably Georgia given its location as a transit center, but its share of 
trade is only a fraction of Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s.  Travel among the three countries can be 
difficult, and barriers exist to labor migration among the three.  In addition, the informal sector, 
particularly illicit trades in drugs and other regulated contraband, as well as some reports of 
terrorist activities, undermines economic integration to some degree.  The three countries do not 
possess entirely complementary economic agendas and face different market pressures. 
 Integration among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey is occurring because all three 
countries stand to benefit from cooperation as each possesses a resource that the other two lack 
on their own.  In this, they have a natural complementarity.  For Azerbaijan, that resource is oil, 
a high demand and high value good that requires transport to world markets.  Georgia, 
meanwhile, is able to offer a transit corridor (including Black Sea ports) that is strongly linked to 
regional markets and provides the only inlet into Armenia.  Turkey, for its part, possesses links 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Yelena Kalyuzhnova, “Overcoming the Curse of Hydrocarbon: Goals and Governance in the Oil Funds 
of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan,” Comparative Economic Studies, 48, (2006). 
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to global markets, including continental Europe, and strong relationships with international 
donor countries and financial institutions.  The three countries together are more than the sum of 
their individual parts, which is fueling integration in those very sectors in which their 
complementarity is highest: namely, energy and transport.  This may also explain the lack of 
progress in other sectors: they simply lack the structural incentives for integration that exist in 
the energy and transport sectors. 
 
A Definition of Integration 
 
 According to international relations theorist Joseph Nye, integration involves (a) at least 
rudimentary institutional structures among the countries involved; (b) at least some 
interdependence in policy formation and implementation; and (c) at least some collective sense 
of mutual identity and obligation.15  Although Nye is, with Robert Keohane, traditionally 
considered the cofounder of neoliberal institutionalism, his definition includes observable 
characteristics that encompass not only a neoliberal institutionalist characteristic (existence of 
institutional structures), but also a neofunctional quality (policy harmonization) and a 
constructivist or identity-based quality.  The existence of a supranational framework possessing a 
separate and distinct personality from member states can strengthen integrative process forces 
and improve compliance.16  International institutions, however, do not universally improve 
identity-formation or distributional equity among member states, and so judgments must be 
made on a case-by-case basis.  According to Nye, political integration has observable 
characteristics.  On an institutional level, the expansion of capacity in the form of budget and 
staffing and the expansion of legal jurisdiction can signify integration.  On a policy level, the 
scope of the policy and the decision-making locus are likewise measurable.  Attitudinal changes 
can be tracked through elite and public polling and transactions and exchanges across borders.  
Finally, the absence of hostile incidents, as explained by Karl Deutsch, could signify the 
emergence of a security community or a non-war zone.17 
 Integration among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey is an appropriate case study for this 
definition of integration.  The international institutions involved, here identified as TERAs, 
possess a characteristic of extra-regionality in the sense that they are not based in the region or 
even necessarily include the three countries under study here as formal members.  Nonetheless, 
TERAs such as the European Union and the World Bank are able to create a framework in which 
the three countries can predict each other’s behavior, trust in one another’s compliance with the 
institutional norms, and lower the transactional costs of repeatedly engaging one another.  At 
least in the energy and transport sectors, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey have repeatedly 
negotiated policy formation that led to such high cost projects as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline, updated rail networks, and harmonization of customs duties.  Finally, the evidence may 
show a change in attitudes and expectations, particularly in the transport sector which (compared 
to energy) is a sector engaged with a broad slice of the population and not limited to political 
elites.  Because of the natural compatibility of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, with each 
possessing different comparative advantages—Azerbaijan with resources, Georgia with its 
transport corridor, and Turkey with access to world markets—the involvement of TERAs in the 
                                                 
15 Joseph S. Nye, “Multinational Enterprises and Prospects for Regional and Global Political Integration,” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 403(1), 1973, p. 117-19. 
16 Ibid., p. 126. 
17 Ibid., p. 118 (see table). 
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transport and energy sectors are helping to solidify and accelerate integrative process forces as 
predicted by Nye. 
 Integration theory attempts to fill a traditional gap in the realist paradigm of international 
relations, which holds that states act in their own self-interest, and as those interests change state 
behavior will follow.18  Keohane and Nye, however, writing in the early 1970s, saw a more 
complex pattern of actors and issues evolving at least among industrialized nations that tended to 
reduce the importance of military and security matters.19  The three theories under study here 
each identify a causal mechanism that is traditionally not included in the realist toolbox.  For 
Deutsch and security communities theory, popular communications and transactions with a 
neighboring state can ultimately shape the attitudes and ultimately the behaviors of states toward 
one another.  For Haas’s neofunctionalism, supranational elites such as business leaders and 
unions would work toward regulatory harmonization that would place pressure on other sectors 
to integrate and ultimately create self-sustaining momentum toward integration.  Finally, for 
Keohane, building on Nye’s foundation, international institutions proved to be a decisive 
variable in altering state interests and eventually its behavior. 
 Integration, as defined by this study, is not universally a “good” phenomenon, despite the 
efforts by Deutsch and other scholars to emphasize the relative peacefulness of states that 
develop commonalities with their neighbors.  In actuality, integration produces changes and 
stresses that can enhance or diminish values, have unwanted distributional consequences, or 
create conflict between the center and periphery.20  It is an agnostic and an amoral process.  
Similarly, integration is likely a reversible process, and one may expect that as the interests of 
nation-states become unaligned, their behaviors will change and eventually alter the identities 
and the behaviors of a given nation-state in a self-perpetuating process of disintegration.  As used 
in this study, integration will refer to the characteristics of a process of harmonization among 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey that is developing, at least in the energy and transport spheres, 
supranational qualities that are distinct from the local qualities of each of the states’ internal 
sectors.  To this end, a process involving countries outside of these three, or involving only two 
of the three, will not be treated as integrative for purposes of this study unless they produce at 
least a residual benefit for the third country.  The point is simply that these three countries are 
engaged in an integrative process in the energy and transit sectors that unites the three of them to 
the exclusion of all other countries.  The remainder of the study will seek to identify the causal 
mechanisms behind that process. 
  
What is a Transnational Extra-regional Actor? 
 
 Transnational Extra-regional Actors (TERAs) are playing a significant role in the 
integrative processes amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey because they provide incentives 
in the form of financial donations and technical assistance to “cultivate” and encourage 
continued integration.  The definition of a TERA includes two elements obvious from the name 
itself: TERAs are external to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, and they are multilateral 
institutions that possess organizational agendas different from those of a nation-state.  In this 
sense, despite some similarities, TERAs are triggering an integrative process that is different 
                                                 
18 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 9-10. 
19 Michael Suhr, “Robert O. Keohane: A Contemporary Classic,” in The Future of International Relations: Masters 
in the Making, (ed. Iver Neumann, Psychology Press, 1997), p. 91. 
20 Ibid., p. 92. 
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from the hegemonic integration of an external nation-state.21  They possess broad-based agendas 
of transparency, good governance, and the rule of law that are far more comprehensive than 
simple profit-seeking.22  In other words, they stand to benefit from their involvement in the 
integrative process not because they are directly involved in the resource extraction process, but 
rather because their involvement cultivates a broader shift in loyalties. 
 Like hegemonic integration in which an external nation-state attempts to drive the 
integrative process for its own political and economic agenda, TERAs can spur integration by 
providing financial and other rewards, although they lack the coercive apparatus of a state.  In 
other words, they can provide a carrot but not a stick.  If, for instance, integration amongst 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey was being spurred by the Russian Federation, a nation-state, 
rather than by the World Bank or the European Union, one would expect to see an integrative 
process based on Russian interests.  This is not to say that, unlike a nation-state, TERAs 
necessarily act altruistically in their agendas; indeed, both the World Bank and the European 
Union are pursuing a certain economic agenda within their broad commitments to reform, one 
that favors foreign investment and a retreat of state involvement.  Nor is this necessarily to 
suggest that the “extra-regional” nature of TERAs makes them qualitatively different from 
regional actors.  However, the power of TERAs rests in large part on their access to global donor 
and technical assistance networks that regional actors operating in Azerbaijan, Georgia, or 
Turkey may not be able to reach. 
 Two TERAs in particular will be analyzed for their involvement in the integration 
process in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey: the World Bank Group for its involvement in the oil 
and gas sector, and two European Union-sponsored projects in the transport and energy sectors.  
The mechanisms by which the two programs work are slightly different.  The World Bank is 
engaged in a broad-based agenda of economic development and good governance; by imposing 
strict conditionalities on the aid that it proves to recipient countries, it is able to achieve reforms 
in comprehensive fashion.23  The European Union-sponsored projects TRACECA 
(Transportation Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia) and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas 
Transport to Europe) are sector-specific projects that seek to harmonize the regulatory 
frameworks of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey and encourage their economic intertwinement 
with European Union member countries.  In this sense, they operate less broadly but more deeply 
than the World Bank does, although, like the World Bank, the funds come with strings 
attached.24 
                                                 
21 Above, I indicated that “integration” as defined in this thesis is distinguishable from coercive forms of 
amalgamation such as colonialism and military conquest.  But simply because consent is necessary for the theory 
does not necessarily mean that integration cannot be controlled or initiated by a more powerful actor over a weaker 
one. 
22 Howard Stein, Beyond the World Bank Agenda: An Institutional Approach to Development (University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), p. 43-44 (describing the expansion of the World Bank agenda from a state-oriented one 
focused on civil service and parastatal reform in the 1980s to a broad-based one involving governance). 
23  The World Bank adds conditions not only relating to repayment, but also “conditions that the recipient country 
must fulfil by changing some of its previous policies.”  Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye, Aid and Power: 
The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending (volume 1, New York: Routledge, 1995), p. xiii.  For a more critical 
perspective, see Nancy Alexander, “Judge and Jury: The World Bank’s Scorecard for Borrowing Governments,” 
Social Watch, April 2004, pp. 17-23. 
24 Bernard Touboul, "The Central Asia Harmonisation of Border Crossing Procedures in the Perspective of 
TRACECA," Regional Seminar on Trade Facilitation and Customs Modernization, 4-8 Aug. 2003; Damien Helly 
and Giorgi Gogia, “Georgian Security and the Role of the West,” in Statehood and Security: Georgia After the Rose 
Revolution, eds. Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
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 All of the integrative theories described above have implications for the operations of 
TERAs in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.  When viewed from a security communities 
perspective, TERAs regularize and institutionalize contacts among the countries in which they 
work, improving access to information and reducing transaction costs.  The result is that popular 
expectations change and loyalties begin to shift as people become more dependent on the newly 
harmonized system.  This is arguably occurring in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey particularly 
with the transport sector, as rail, highway, port, and border infrastructure is improved and 
standardized.  When viewed from a neo-functionalist perspective, TERAs use their technical 
expertise to engage in regulatory reform in order to improve the legal-rational nature of state 
bureaucratic governance.  While this integration has not produced downward pressure for 
regulation in other spheres (“spillover”), such as how the harmonization of European steel and 
coal production placed pressure on railroad and transport integration in the early 1960s, it is true 
that TERAs are cultivating and accelerating their own continued development in a manner 
reminiscent of original neo-functionalism’s determinism.  Finally, TERAs fit within neo-liberal 
institutionalism because they possess corporate agendas separate from the agendas of their 
member states; they interact directly with governments; and they create a framework for 
continued collaboration among the member states.  Although Keohane wrote that countries 
would join international institutions to achieve national interests, TERAs by definition are 
“extra-regional” and thus do not necessarily include as members the states where they operate.25  
.  In the current case, however, the presence of TERAs in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey is 
based on consent and cooperation even without technical membership.   
 Ultimately, however, neo-liberal institutionalism serves as a kind of “unifying” theory of 
integration in this thesis because ultimately TERAs are driving in large part regulatory 
harmonization, the neo-functionalist mechanism for integration, and in shaping popular loyalties 
and expectations, the security communities mechanism.  Neo-liberal institutionalism, 
recognizing that both regulatory harmonization and the shaping of popular identities can be 
“cultivated” from the top down—and not wholly organic processes working from the bottom 
up—is best able to explain the current integrative process in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.  
However, elements of neo-functionalism and security communities theory provide neo-liberal 
institutionalism with additional depth because they explicitly analyze two different mechanisms 
for integration that are especially important in the transport sector, which is a highly regulated, 
diffuse sector that interacts at many levels with the general population. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The integrative process currently taking place amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 
is in sharp contrast to the historical isolation that separated the mountainous republics and 
produced dizzying diversity in language, religion, and cultural politics.  Like other regions of the 
world that have received significant academic treatment, such as Western Europe, Southern 
Africa, or Southeast Asia, the integration of these three countries is helping to create an 
emerging if limited community of states that have little history of collaboration but that have 
found mutual benefit in cooperative arrangements.  This subregion, however, possesses a 
distinctive pattern of integration that focuses almost entirely on the energy and transport sectors, 
which have several characteristics that may make them particularly amenable to the integrative 
                                                 
25 See Keohane, After Hegemony, p. x-xi.  As noted above, however, the “extra-regional” characteristic of TERAs is 
not analytically necessary for the process described here. 
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process.  First, they are heavily regulated sectors in which the state exercises dominant if not 
monopoly control, which has resulted in a state-centric harmonization process with a finite 
number of actors and strong compliance from participants.  Second, both energy and transport 
are valuable enterprises that promise to bring financial reward as integration reduces transaction 
costs both for state-owned and private enterprises who stand to benefit from the reductions of 
inefficiencies and barriers to export.  Third, the energy and transport sectors possess a natural 
complementarity, with Azerbaijan having the advantage in resource extraction, Georgia 
possessing a political advantage as a transport corridor, and Turkey having deep ties to global 
markets and international financial institutions.  Because of these unique characteristics, 
integration amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey has a distinctive pattern. 
 As noted above, integration has attracted significant scholarly commentary, spawning 
different theoretical frameworks that each emphasizes a different mechanism, or trigger, for why 
and how countries become increasingly interdependent.  Chapter One of this thesis turns to the 
theoretical literature on integration in international relations theory, with an emphasis on the 
three primary comprehensive theories of how and why countries integrate.  According to security 
communities theory, the firsts of the comprehensive international theories, the triggering 
mechanisms involve communications and transactions between populations that increase 
exposure, reduce transaction costs over time, and create a shared sense of common space that 
changes the communal identities of actors and ultimately alters state behavior.  Neo-
functionalism, by contrast, focuses on administrative and bureaucratic harmonization at low, 
technical levels, thereby placing regulatory pressure on larger and more significant sectors in a 
process called “spillover.”  Neo-liberal institutionalism holds that states will become members of 
international institutions to pursue their national interests, but as the institution acquires its own 
corporate presence, they will alter the behavior of states by increasing the costs of defection and 
reducing the costs of compliance.  This produces a top-down integrative process.  While none of 
these theories can account for every case—neo-functionalism in particular has run into doctrinal 
pushback as it attempted to theorize beyond the Western European case—they each seek to fill a 
gap in the realist theory of international relations by explaining why countries engage in an 
integrative process even when the balance of power suggests that they should behave differently. 
 Integration among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey is a process by which certain 
national sectors are increasingly unified into a supranational system whole.  Chapter Two turns 
to the different state sectors in each country and assesses the extent to which the goals and 
expectations of each country overlap in order to determine the prospects for integration in a 
given sector.  Cooperation in certain fields such as transport and energy suggests that the national 
interests of the three states are converging as a result of their cooperation, and this convergence 
of national interests is changing state behavior accordingly.  To this definition it is necessary to 
add another layer of complication to help explain the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey case.  In these 
countries, integration is coordinated and cultivated in part by external actors, specifically referred 
to here as “transnational extra-regional actors,” or TERAs, that provide incentives to integration 
in the form of financial and technical assistance to promote harmonization in the energy and 
transport sectors.  These organizations, including the World Bank and the European Union, 
possess broad-based agendas of transparency, good governance, and rule of law that exceed in 
scope the profit-seeking agendas of foreign oil and gas companies simply seeking access to 
global markets. 
 In analyzing the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey case, neo-liberal institutionalism emerges as 
a controlling theory, particularly as to the energy sector.  Chapter Three is a case study of the 
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World Bank Group’s efforts in the energy sector in Azerbaijan and the development of export 
route through the Caucasus—in particular, the pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan to Tbilisi, 
Georgia, and Ceyhan, Turkey.  Because the energy sector in Azerbaijan is removed from the 
ordinary political system and controlled from the highest levels of government (and, 
geographically, because Azerbaijan’s energy resources are clustered close to its center of power), 
international institutions such as TERAs are best able to access the decision-making process in 
this sector because of the financial and technical rewards that they can supply.  Chapter Four, by 
contrast, focuses on the European Union projects TRACECA and INOGATE, which is 
harmonizing the transport sector among the three countries.  Transport, unlike energy, is a more 
decentralized sector, although it possesses strong state involvement.  Transport is a sector that is 
accessible to large segments of the population, allowing them to shape expectations about it.  
TERAs, in turn, place pressure on state and private enterprises alike to be transparent with 
accounting and profit-sharing in both sectors.  Because both energy and transport require 
assistance from neighbors—Georgia is the transport corridor for Azerbaijan’s oil, while both 
seek Turkey’s access to markets—that TERAs reinforce the natural compatibility among the 
three countries.  The two case studies relate to different international institutions and different 
domestic sectors; at their root, however, an integrative process is common to both. 
 In Chapter Five, the analysis will turn to a counterfactual that possesses similar structural 
characteristics as the energy sector and pipeline network in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey: the 
natural gas export routes from Turkmenistan to China.  Like the pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan, 
the natural gas export pipeline is a high-cost project that traverses several international 
boundaries among countries that do not possess a significant history of cooperation or openness.  
The natural gas pipeline, however, was directed by financing and assistance from the Chinese 
government and ancillary actors, including the state-owned energy company, rather than from 
international institutions such as TERAs.  As a consequence, the secondary consequences from 
the presence of TERAs, such as transparency with oil revenues, objective and non-discriminatory 
regulations, and formalized decisionmaking and dispute resolution mechanisms are absent in the 
Central Asian case.  Although like in Azerbaijan the energy sectors in Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are highly state-centric, they lack the institutional pressure for 
transparency and reform that the presence of TERAs provide to Azerbaijan. 
 Importantly, however, this pattern of integration in the energy and transport sectors has 
not led to integration in other spheres.  The three countries still possess varying foreign policies, 
particularly as to Russia and the European Union, and on a security level Turkey is both unable 
and unwilling to defend Georgia and Azerbaijan from Russian encroachment.  On an economic 
level, while some progress is evident from EU preferences as to all three countries and market 
reform in Georgia since the Rose Revolution, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey still possess 
economic agendas that are not entirely complementary.  Likewise, in the social and cultural 
realm, linguistic, religious, and cultural orientations continue to divide the three countries.  There 
has not been “spillover” in the neo-functional sense.  Neo-liberal institutionalism is better able to 
explain this segmentation: without the existence of TERAs operating in these spheres to provide 
financial and technical incentives to integration and “cultivate” integration from above, then 
comprehensive harmonization along the lines of Western Europe will remain elusive.  The 
following chapters will provide a comprehensive overview of the three primary modern theories 
of integration, compare and contrast their strengths and weaknesses, and assess their 
compatibility with and relevance to the Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey case. 
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Chapter 1 – Toward a Theory of Integration 
 
 As noted earlier, integration is defined as the emergence of (a) at least rudimentary 
institutional structures among the countries involved; (b) interdependence in policy formation 
and implementation; and (c) collective sense of mutual identity and obligation.26  Each of the 
three theories of integration presented in this chapter focuses on different aspects of the 
integrative process as contained in this starting definition: communications or transactions 
among populations (security communities theory); intertwinement of government policies and 
regulatory frameworks (neo-functionalism); and facilitated harmonization by supranational 
agencies (neoliberal institutionalism).  The purported goal of each of these theories is to explain 
what traditional realist theory cannot fully explain: namely, why former rivals have sought to 
cooperate, especially at an accelerated pace after the end of the Cold War, even when doing so 
appears to be at odds with national security and hard power interests while eventually changing 
those interests over time.  Unlike the traditional realist assumption that a state, acting in its own 
self-interest, exists in an anarchic world without a higher authority, each of these theories 
conceives of national interests as changeable and multifaceted, and of the authority structure of 
the international system as more complex than anarchy.  Although the three theories emphasize 
different elements of the integrative process, and the permutations of hybrid theories include 
even more, the three theories have a common core by which the interests of states begin to 
converge as a result of their cooperation, eventually causing state behavior to change.  This 
chapter will explore the origins and development of these three theories of integration and their 
continued relevance in the modern world. 
 To some degree, all three of the traditional integrative theories overlap, and each has 
borne an array of hybrid and descendant theories.  Of particular relevance to this study, however, 
is that the theory of neoliberal institutionalism can be broadened to encompass both neo-
functionalism’s regulatory harmonization pressures and security community theory’s emphasis 
on popular communications and transactions.  Neoliberal institutionalism in particular offers a 
framework for understanding how supranational organizations can cultivate or engineer 
regulatory transformation or reduce transaction costs for communications and other trans-border 
contacts.  This may be especially true among countries that have little common history of 
cooperation but possess strategically important advantages, such as the energy and transport 
sectors of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, the case study under review here.  Because these 
countries are developing at a rapid pace, they are particularly promising targets for international 
institutions that possess funding and technical assistance.  The compatibility of the three 
traditional theories with neoliberal institutionalism makes the latter theory more promising as a 
unifying explanation for integration in the current case study. 
 
Security Communities Theory 
 
 Security communities theory developed during a time of a massive reorientation of the 
field of international relations away from the classical realism doctrine that perceived of states as 
the only unique actors on the international scene.  According to realist theory, sovereign states, 
recognizing no higher authority, exist in an anarchic framework that forces them to exist in a 
                                                 
26 Joseph S. Nye, “Multinational Enterprises and Prospects for Regional and Global Political Integration,” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 403(1), 1973, p. 117-19. 
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condition of mutual competition and conflict.27  Although realist theory was undoubtedly 
dominant in international relations theory by the twentieth century, it was not the only paradigm.  
The most theoretically comprehensive challenge to realism was from sixteenth century thinker 
Hugo Grotius, who viewed the international sphere as a society of nations that possessed a 
common framework of moral and legal norms, and not as anarchic.  During and after the 1950s, 
Grotian theory, always a minority viewpoint, enjoyed something of a renaissance.  Deutsch’s 
publication in 1957 of Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in Light of Historical Experience was the most explicit advancement of the Grotian 
paradigm in this era. 
 Deutsch’s contribution to international relations theory is immense, if underappreciated.  
Underlying Deutsch's belief that violent conflict could be eliminated from international relations 
was his observation that there have always been pairs and clusters of countries who have had 
peaceful relations and whose leaders and peoples did not expect a resort to violence.  Deutsch 
never really conceived of international relations strictly as interactions among states, but rather 
as a world of peoples, communities, or identitive groupings, characterized by 'within and 
without', 'we and they', perceptions and relationships.  Degrees of mutual identification among 
peoples influence probabilities of peaceful conflict resolution among their governments.28  This 
emphasis on identity and community foreshadowed the constructivist revolt against realism that 
blossomed in the 1990s.  Today, much of securities community theory is underpinned to 
constructivist notions of social identity and interests. 
 
 
Deutsch’s Classical Security Communities Theory 
 
 As Deutsch and his colleagues set out in their initial study Political Community and the 
North Atlantic Area, political unions could be divided into two fundamentally distinct groups: 
amalgamated and pluralistic.  Amalgamated political unions, such as the United States or unified 
Germany or Italy, were composed of formerly sovereign units into a single larger unit with a 
common government, while pluralistic political unions are composed of units that retain their 
political sovereignty.  Both amalgamated and pluralistic political unions can form security 
communities, but do not necessarily always do so if the political units fail to integrate.  
Integration refers to the crossing of a threshold, Deutsch wrote, from a situation where war 
between political units was possible and anticipated to another situation where it was neither.29  
Integration involved a fairly broad zone of transition rather than a narrow threshold, and states 
could and did cross and recross that threshold several times, and could spend decades wavering.  
Using this definition of integration, an amalgamated political union such as the Austro-
Hungarian Empire or a pluralistic union such as the Germanic Confederation would not have 
qualified as security communities because they simply did not integrate in a way that would 
prevent conflict among the component parts. 
 While amalgamated security communities, such as the United States after 1865, Great 
Britain after 1701 or the German or Italian states since the second half of the nineteenth century, 
undoubtedly have the potential to form highly well-integrated and stable political units, their 
                                                 
27 Arend Lijphart, “Karl W. Deutsch and the New Paradigm in International Relations,” p. 233-34. 
28 Puchala, “Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations,” p. 151. 
29 Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light 
of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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failure is often bloody, as the U.S. Civil War, the Irish independence struggle, the disintegration 
of Austria-Hungary and other examples clearly illustrate.30  By contrast, pluralistic security 
communities among states retaining their sovereignty almost never disintegrate to the point 
where the political components engage in hostilities toward one another.31  Deutsch’s team 
famously concluded, “[o]n balance, therefore, we found pluralistic security-communities to be a 
more promising approach to the elimination of war over large areas than we had thought at the 
onset of our inquiry.”32 
 Essential requirements for amalgamated security communities include shared values and 
expectations among the communities concerned; unbroken links of social communication 
between political units and politically relevant elites; mobility of persons across political units; a 
fairly wide range of common administrative functions and state services; and mutual 
predictability of behavior among the member political units.  Amalgamation, as Deutsch is 
careful to point out, is a process, one that accelerates as the political units benefit from closer 
union.  Components that increased size, power, and economic strength during the amalgamation 
process undoubtedly contributed to further amalgamation.  Increasing communication and other 
links furthers the process.  In addition, amalgamated political units often developed around core 
areas such as England (Great Britain), Prussia (Germany), Piedmont (Italy), 
Virginia/Pennsylvania/Massachusetts (United States) that were larger, stronger, and more 
advanced in administration, political culture, and economic development.  It was around these 
core units that the integrative process was centered.33  But political amalgamation increases the 
demand upon material resources and decision-making capabilities of the center, since decisions 
over a greater number of people and a wider area are made by a smaller number of institutions.  
Where claims and burdens on the central polity outstrip the polity’s capabilities or political will, 
the amalgamation process will cease and reverse.  The failure of the British Parliament to 
respond adequately to the Irish potato famine in 1846 resulted in disintegrative process.  Irish-
English relations deteriorated between 1880 and 1914 even as the Irish became more “English” 
in matters of education, political rights, language, and economic class structure.  Increasing links, 
in this instance, did not further political integration on the whole. 
 The background conditions and developmental process of pluralistic security 
communities do not differ greatly from amalgamated security communities.  "Members of an 
amalgamated security-community--and, to a lesser extent, of a pluralistic security-community--
must be able to expect from one another some dependable interlocking, interchanging, or at least 
compatible behavior; and they must therefore be able, at least to that extent, to predict one 
another's actions,” Deutsch wrote.34  At least three preconditions were necessary to the formation 
of a pluralistic security community, in common with amalgamated security communities: (1) 
compatibility of values relevant to political decision-making; (2) capacity of the participating 
political units to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly and without resort 
to violence; and (3) mutual predictability of behavior.  Other characteristics are helpful, such as a 
                                                 
30 In later works, Deutsch pointed to non-Western examples as well, such as partition between India and Pakistan 
and the Nigerian Civil War.  Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, p. 194-95. 
31 Deutsch identifies only a single example where this has occurred in the past two hundred years: the disintegration 
of the German Confederation of 1815 that led to war between Prussia and Austria.  However, he indicated that this 
likely was not a true security community.  Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 30-31. 
32 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 31. 
33 Note here a distinction from traditional realism, where states will oppose the rising strength of a core state in order 
to preserve a balance of power. 
34 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 56. 
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distinctive way of life, superior economic growth, broadening of elites—the free movement of 
labor between the United States and Canada during the nineteenth century in particular 
contributed to the formation of a pluralistic security community between them—but these 
considerations do not appear to be required.  Again, the formation of a pluralistic security 
community should be conceived as a process rather than a state of being: although the existence 
of a broad range of social communications between communities can be seen as a background 
“precondition” to the existence of a pluralistic security community, the development of those 
communicative links and transactions is necessary to the formative process of the community. 
 The primary impetus to and characteristic of the formation of a pluralistic security 
community is the increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war among the political units 
concerned.  This is particularly true where warfare would be devastating and indecisive, as, for 
instance, between the United States and Canada after 1815.  While the land forces of the United 
States would likely have overwhelmed Canada, the naval power of Great Britain had the 
potential to devastate the U.S. coast.  In other cases, international complications threatened to 
engulf the contestants.  Warfare between Norway and Sweden after 1905 could have involved 
Britain, Germany, or Russia; the formation of a security community between these two countries 
avoided that risk.  Military alliances alone, however, are poor pathways to the formation of a 
security community; more is required in nonmilitary relationships.  Similarly, foreign military 
threats were helpful to integration but not required.  Undoubtedly, however, the existence of 
stronger and more capable political units, not weaker ones, contributes to stronger pluralistic 
security communities, and improving the range and volume of communication and transactions 
between units increases responsiveness to demands, which contributes to integrative forces.  Like 
amalgamated security communities, pluralistic security communities also form around cores of 
well-integrated countries.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for instance, was 
preceded by smaller groups of well-integrated countries (United States and Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands).  Cross-cutting political coalitions and even broad-based mass 
support are increasingly essential for the existence of pluralistic security communities in an era 
of mass political participation.  Stronger communications, however, remain key to the security 
community development process: communications not only allows greater exchange of goods, 
people, and ideas, but also permits more robust consultations between governments to make 
more unified decisions. 
 In his later works, Deutsch further developed his theory of integration.  Integration, he 
wrote, was a relationship among political units in which they are mutually interdependent and 
jointly produce system properties that they separately lack.  An integrated system is cohesive to 
the extent that it can withstand strain and resist disruptions.  Cohesiveness among German or 
Italian states after unification is underscored by the extent that no component part has attempted 
to secede, even after devastating defeats in war; by contrast, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain-
Ireland were much less cohesive under stress.35  An amalgamated political community is more 
attractive if the common goals are something more than just peace, such as greater power, the 
acquisition of a common identity, or the fulfillment of some specific task.  If the main goal is the 
preservation of peace, a pluralistic security community may suffice and be easier to attain.  He 
also theorized the process of disintegration: a security community could unravel due to steep 
increases in economic, military, or political burdens; rapid increase in political mobilization or 
political participation faster than assimilation in the community’s shared political culture; rapid 
increase in regional, economic, linguistic or ethnic differentiation faster than any compensating 
                                                 
35 Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, p. 158-60. 
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integrative process; serious decline in political or administrative responsibilities of the center; the 
relative closure of the political elites, slowing the entry of new members and giving rise to 
counter elites; or the unstable loss of power by a formerly privileged or dominant minority, such 
as white settlers in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the 1950s.36 
 Functionalism came in for special criticism in Deutsch’s later works.37  As noted above, 
classical functionalism as theorized by David Mitrany is based on the hope that by delegating 
common technical and administrative tasks to supranational organizations nations will grow to 
become administratively intertwined, making war more costly or impossible.  As Deutsch notes, 
however, international administrative bodies are often limited in function and often cannot do 
their own binding rulemaking; they cannot tax, and most cannot sanction violators.  Except for 
technical assistance, these bodies do not interact with the people they claim to serve.  Popular 
loyalty to these agencies at the expense of national institutions is unlikely to grow since visibility 
is so low.  The greater the potential power of an international administrative body, the greater the 
resistance will be of nation-states to the body’s control.  The World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, which possess unusually broad monetary powers and can block access to credit, 
are subject to particularly strong criticism that will prevent further extension of their power.  
Functionalism essentially means partial amalgamation, as specific tasks are handed over to 
common agencies by participating political units.  These tasks are often not very important and 
do not require additional amalgamation to be conducted efficiently.  While some amalgamated 
security communities had functional amalgamation, such as the German Customs Union in the 
German states before unification, others did not: Italian unification, for instance, was not 
preceded by functional amalgamation, and functional amalgamation between Norway and 
Sweden could not ensure their merger.  While functionalism has little effect on the eventual 
success or failure of amalgamated security communities, it can help participating governments 
learn habits and skills that could be useful in more far-reaching integration. 
 Deutsch has called integration an “assembly-line process” in the sense that the essential 
elements need to be present but do not need to develop in any particular order.  The process 
usually begins with coalescence around relatively more highly developed political units.  Early in 
the process a psychological “no war” community develops in which war among the political 
units become illegitimate and lack popular support, and where entangling alliances requires 
conflict, hostilities are often kept to a minimum.  This kind of relationship existed among Swiss 
cantons in the sixteenth century and Italian states in the eighteenth century; it also emerged 
among European Economic Community members in the 1950s.  The most salient political 
divisions within the amalgamated community become weaker and shift away from the 
boundaries of the political units.  Political life then becomes divided by divisions that cut across 
the political units.  The more varied and salient these cost-cutting ties are, the better for the 
cohesiveness of the union.  Conversely, where cleavages among regions and political units are 
reinforced by old or new cleavages of language, social standing, or religion, integration may be 
halted or reversed, as between the North and South in the United States in the early nineteenth 
century. 
 Writing soon after Deutsch, Feldstein applied his theory to labor migration on the 
European continent, concluding that the flow of individuals as a transaction unit is part of a 
                                                 
36 Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, p. 195-96. 
37 Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 166-68, 
198. 
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multidimensional process of political integration resulting in a transfer of loyalties.38  While an 
influx of workers from outside of the EEC could sharpen the division between the “community 
we” and the “foreign they,” the makeup of labor migration among the members of the EEC will 
shift as the economy improves, especially as to emigration from Italy.  As labor migration moves 
away from low-skilled, low-status workers to a broader range of labor migrants, social 
communications increase between member countries as person-to-person contacts could become 
more regular.39  As with any transaction or communication, merely the increased transaction 
flow of European workers does not necessarily spark interpersonal contacts or a “European 
spirit,” because the migration is so fluid and dynamic.  However, programs such as trainee 
exchanges that link labor migration to economic rewards and cooperation among EEC members 
could create meaningful transactions that make integration self-reinforcing.40 
 
 
Refining Deutsch’s Theory At the End of the Cold War 
 
 Deutsch never really conceived of international relations strictly as interactions among 
states; indeed, his writings consistently pictured a world of peoples, identity groupings, and 
communities, shaping perceptions and relationships.  According to Puchala, his most significant 
contributions to the field of international integration are his findings concerning sentimental 
relations among people.41  Today, scholars view Deutsch not only as the original designer of 
security communities theory, but as a foundational voice in constructivism theory, which has 
been ascendant in the field of international relations since the mid-1990s.  Unlike realist notions 
that anarchic relations among nation-states are a basic assumption of the international system, 
constructivists believe that anarchy is learned and ultimately becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy 
as states treat other states according to their expectations.  Consequently, identities and patterns 
of state behavior can be changed over time. 
 Deutsch and his team anticipated many ingredients of the current social-constructivist 
strain of modern international relations theory, challenging the predominant realist framework in 
several ways.42  While in the realist paradigm weaker states will seek to form alliances to counter 
the strength of a more powerful state, in the security communities paradigm weaker states are 
attracted to more powerful “core states.”  By focusing on beliefs rather than on material factors, 
Deutsch rejected realism’s mechanical understanding of state behavior as objectively 
quantifiable, especially in terms of military capability.  Finally, by positing that durable 
expectations of peaceful change could exist between states, Deutsch undermined a central 
element of realist assumptions about the security dilemma of nation-states.  A community 
requires people to believe in and expect peaceful change, forming a sense of community or a 
“we-feeling.”43  Security communities are mental constructions underpinned by individual and 
collective experience and by shared knowledge.  They are also normative constructions in the 
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sense that the collective population affirmatively believes that intergroup relations based on 
peaceful change are “superior” to and more desirable than other forms of intergroup relations.44 
 As Adler and Barnett explain, the security community theory never generated a robust 
research agenda during the Cold War because Deutsch’s conceptualization contained several 
theoretical and methodological problems that distracted from the essential theory.45  Foremost 
among these was Deutsch’s overemphasis on quantifying stages of integration through 
mechanical factors rather than on developing a more abstract security communities framework.  
Consequently, his focus on the volume and quantity of transactions between member states 
rather than a focus on the social relations generated by the transactions ultimately constrained his 
work.  He also failed to develop the role of international organizations, cross-cutting social 
classes, and political elites and charismatic individuals in the integrative process.  Against the 
realist backdrop of the Cold War, a study focusing on security communities seemed overly 
romantic.  His study was frequently cited but generally not emulated.46 
 Adler and Barnett’s revival of Deutsch’s theory with their work Security Communities in 
1998 reinvigorated a concept that threatened to fade into obscurity.47  Adler and Barnett made 
several important contributions of their own to the concept of security communities that 
corrected some of the problems with Deutsch’s original theory.  One weak point of Deutsch’s 
theory was the slippery binary distinction between amalgamated and pluralistic security 
communities, which Adler and Barnett replaced with a spectrum.  Security communities can be 
categorized according to their depth of trust, the level of institutionalization of the governance 
system, and the extent to which they have transformed their anarchic environment, Adler and 
Barnett determined.  These factors provide a basis for distinguishing between two ideal types: 
loosely-coupled security communities and tightly-coupled security communities.  Loosely-
coupled security communities observe the minimal definitional properties: a transnational region 
of sovereign states with dependable expectations of peaceful resolution of disputes.  Tightly-
coupled security communities have a “mutual aid” system in which the units assist one another 
in a collective arrangement.  They also possess a common governing regime that is post-
sovereign, endowed with common supranational institutions and some form of collective 
security.48 
 The next contribution that Adler and Barnett made to Deutsch’s original theory was to 
develop the notion of mutual trust between political units as the linchpin of a security 
community.  Here, Deutsch’s omission of international organizations and multilateral non-
security communities becomes salient.  International institutional arrangements, even those not 
built around security concerns, contribute to the development of mutual trust among community 
members by establishing norms of behavior, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions to penalize 
violators.  Because international institutions transmit shared expectations across borders and 
manage transactions between peoples, they contribute to shared learning among the societies of 
each political unit that help the integrative process.  As shared expectations and self-
understandings are communicated among societies, changes occur in individual and collective 
values.  International institutions can transmit these expectations across borders and generations.  
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While communication and transactions between people and society play a crucial role in the 
development of security communities, the growth of these communities is not organic; it requires 
political elites and charismatic individuals to turn to the propensities into reality.49  By 
explaining how non-state actors such as international organizations and political elites can 
contribute to the formation of a security community, Adler and Barnett have compensated for 
Deutsch’s overreliance on the state as sole actor in security community development. 
 Another way in which Barnett and Adler contributed to Deutsch’s theory was by refining 
the phases of development of a security community in distinguishing between nascent, 
ascendant, and mature security communities.  In the nascent phase, governments seek to increase 
mutual security, lower transaction costs, and encourage further exchanges.  Political units must 
recognize or discover that they have joint interests that require collective action and can mutually 
benefit from some minimal coordination of security policies.  This can happen due to an external 
security threat, due to a desire to capitalize on an international division of labor, or due to 
cultural, political, social or ideological homogeneity.  As Adler and Barnett explain, a security 
community “gets out of the gate” because of push or pull factors that cause states to reconsider 
how they organize their relations.50  A more highly developed core state or group of states can 
provide leadership, protection, material benefits, and sense of purpose, as Deutsch recognized. 
 The ascendant and mature phases are further along the spectrum of developmental 
phases.  The ascendant phase involves increasingly dense networks, the creation of new 
institutions, the decreased fear of threats posed by other members, deepening trust, and an 
emerging collective identity.  Communication between populations increases knowledge that 
each has mutual conceptions of society, culture, and economics in mind, not just self-interested 
material gains.  As these expectations are increasingly institutionalized in the region, war 
becomes improbable and a security community emerges.  Here, the distinction between loosely-
coupled and tightly-coupled security communities becomes relevant.  In a mature loosely-
coupled security community, states identify with one another and proclaim a similar “way of 
life”; there are informal governance structures built around a collective identity; and there is an 
expectation that states will practice self-restraint even during confrontations.  Characteristics of 
these communities include multilateral decision-making, unfortified borders, changes in military 
planning, common definitions of external threats, and using a discourse of conciliation and 
community.  In a mature tightly-coupled security community, mutual aid becomes a matter of 
habit and national identity.  Characteristics of these communities include cooperative and 
collective security, a high level of military integration, free movement of people, and policy 
coordination against threats.51  Fundamentally, Adler and Barnett conclude that pluralistic 
communities are not simply precursors to amalgamated communities, as Deutsch implied.  
Rather, pluralistic security communities are semi-permanent international actors that can be 
highly sophisticated, even moreso than historical amalgamated communities, a radically new 
form of regional governance. 
 At least theoretically, one may wonder whether a community of regionally-based security 
communities operating essentially as proto-states is really less anarchic, and consequently less 
warlike, than a community of states.  Alex Bellamy attempts to answer this theoretical objection 
in a 2004 book, Security Communities and Their Neighbors: Regional Fortresses or Global 
Integrators, which adds an additional layer of complexity to Deutsch’s model.  According to 
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Bellamy, the anarchic state of international relations is not a natural state at all; rather, it is 
learned based on the expectations of states as to how they would be treated by other states.  
States will “learn” to act differently if they perceive their relationships with other states in terms 
of shared membership in a security community.52  Adler and Barnett argued that member states 
will seek legitimacy for their actions from the community by justifying their actions in terms of 
the community’s norms.  This too was a weakness of Deutsch’s original theory; he did not 
emphasize the changes on a state’s behavior as a member of a security community.  In mature 
security communities, the identity of the state itself is shaped by its membership in the security 
community.  State behavior changes as a security community becomes more highly developed. 
 Just as liberal democracies may be more warlike toward non-democracies even while 
they are more peaceful toward one another because they do not recognize the legitimacy of non-
democratic states, so too is it possible that security communities may take the functions of states 
and perceive outsiders as living in anarchic conditions characterized by the security dilemma.53  
Here, Bellamy distinguishes between regional fortresses, ambivalent communities, and 
integrationist communities.  In regional fortresses, the boundaries between members and non-
members are more rigid than those that existed before the formation of a security community, as 
members perceive outsiders as a threat to those norms and identities and act accordingly.  In 
ambivalent communities, the relationships between members and non-members do not change 
after the formation of a security community, particularly when two states (one a member and one 
not a member) already have a well-defined relationship that is not affected by the security 
community.  In integrationist communities, boundaries between insiders and outsiders grow 
softer.  The logic of shared norms, common interests, and elite networks that exists within a 
security community projects outward without immediately incorporating outsiders into the 
community itself.54 
 This is the essential finding of Bellamy’s research: the more mature and tightly-coupled a 
security community is, the less likely it is to be a regional fortress.55  Security communities do 
not simply represent a Huntingtonian nightmare of civilizations in perpetual conflict with one 
another.  Rather, the process of security community formation actually changes the behavior of 
states away from a reliance on conflict.  A more loosely-coupled security community reproduces 
more realist security policies on its borders.  This was true of NAFTA and early ASEAN states, 
in which the community as a whole viewed outsiders in the region with suspicion and even 
hostility.  However, as ASEAN in particular has matured as a security community, non-members 
perceived the community as accomplishing its goals, making it more attractive.  The more the 
region’s leaders talked to each other in informal consultations, the more they realized they shared 
a common set of ideas.  As a security community matures and integrates, realist language 
becomes less prevalent and membership in the community creates its own “common sense.”  The 
high integration of European states among each other spills over to their relations with non-
members, and the internal patterns of conciliation and peaceful cooperation are also evident in 
relationships with outsiders.  Similarly, as ASEAN has matured, the community as a whole has 
helped Vietnam reconcile its difficult relationship with China.  Nascent loosely-coupled security 
communities have much less in the way of independent common sense derived from their limited 
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social interactions, so its members frame their worldviews more in realist terms than in more 
mature security communities. 
 In this way, more mature and more tightly-coupled security communities do indeed 
mitigate and even eliminate violent conflict between states without geographical limits.  The 
very fact that a security community is maturing and integrating implies that it is fulfilling the 
expectations of its members, making membership (or at least dialogue and cooperation) more 
attractive to outsiders.  The changing worldview of the community’s member units changes the 
language they use to articulate their interests and security politics.  These new practices and 
discourses are observed by non-members, socializing non-members into the language and 
practices of the community.  The security community and its neighbors learn not to be threatened 
by each other.  The more tightly-coupled a security community is, the more the boundaries 
between members and non-members become blurred.56 
 Like Bellamy, Moller explains how Deutsch’s original theory does not necessarily lead to 
more peaceful relations overall, because security communities could develop hard boundaries 
that engage in anarchic, security dilemma relations with non-member states.  The relations 
between members and nonmembers could resemble conventional relations among nation-states, 
with mistrust, security dilemma politics, and the threat or use of force.  This is especially true 
where security communities are geographically limited and the borders of the community are 
contiguous with non-members or with another security community.  Moller identifies two 
characteristics that must be shared by security communities if the development of these 
communities is actually to lead to more peaceful relations overall: first, they require soft 
boundaries with non-members, which he calls “frontiers,” rather than hard boundaries with 
military buildup; and second, they cannot maintain of a standing collective army (which 
Deutsch’s original theory contemplated) because it is the existence of these troops that 
nonmembers could find threatening.57  Disarmament, starting with withdrawal of troops from 
common borders, is the ultimate proof of security members’ commitment to peaceful change. 
 
 
Linking Security Communities and Constructivist Theory 
 
 Constructivism is a comprehensive theory of international relations that developed in the 
mid-1990s and is based on many of the same assumptions upon which Karl Deutsch relied forty 
years before.  Constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt challenges the core realist assumption that 
anarchy forces states into recurring security dilemmas.  According to Wendt, whether a system is 
conflictual or peaceful is a function not of anarchy and power but of the shared culture created 
through discourse and social practices.  Because an actor’s self-identity is based on others’ 
diplomatic gestures, states can reshape structure by process and can reconstitute their self-
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identity toward more peaceful relationships.58  Wendt accepts realism’s starting point: nation-
states are the primary actors in the international system and that states have a corporate identity 
and certain essential needs such as survival, autonomy, and economic well-being.  Consequently, 
young states will tend to act in an egoist manner.  However, only if a state continues conceiving 
of its own role in an egoist manner will the system continue.  By casting other states in a non-
egoist manner, states can begin to build collective identities that include other states in their 
definition of “self.”  Concrete interests are not simply given by the system; rather, socialized 
beliefs about what kinds of objectives are worth pursuing or avoiding will shape each state’s 
actual interests. 
 Wendt famously stated that anarchy is what states made of it, and, subverting the realist 
paradigm, he identified three “cultures of anarchy” as ideal-types in the international system.  
The first is “Hobbesian culture,” which characterized relations among states until 1648, in which 
each state perceived of other states as “enemies” with no limits on the use of violence.  In 
“Lockean culture,” which has characterized international relations since 1948, states view each 
other as rivals but in principle accept the fact of one another’s existence.  Finally, a “Kantian 
culture,” which has emerged only in recent times, and only among liberal democracies, states 
play the role of friends, using force to settle disputes and working as a team against external 
security threats.59 
 At the same time, states can differ in the degree to which they internalize behavioral 
norms.  In the first degree, consistent with neorealism, compliance with a behavioral norm is a 
function of coercion due to the power of other states.  In the second degree, consistent with 
neoliberal institutionalism, actors conform to the norm not because they believe it is legitimate 
but because compliance is in their own self-interest.  In the third degree, consistent with 
constructivism, states have internalized behavioral norms and identify with others’ expectations, 
who are incorporated into the state’s own identity.  Given that there are three forms of culture 
depending on the norms internalized by the actors and three degrees of internalization of these 
norms, Wendt crosses the two axes and concludes that the culture in which states find themselves 
at any point in time depends on the social practices that reproduce or transform each actor’s self 
identity and perception of others.  Because egoistic, violent mindsets maintain egoistic, violent 
processes, a culture of realpolitik becomes self-reinforcing.  If over time, actors gesture 
differently and cast other actors in less self-centered manners, over time a Hobbesian culture can 
become a Lockean one, and a Lockean culture can become a Kantian one.60 
 Addressing the same question as Bellamy, namely whether security communities simply 
create their own definition of the anarchic security dilemma of nation-states, Moller uses 
Wendt’s framework to explain the difference between anarchy among nation-states and 
“anarchy” among integrating security communities.  “Deutschian anarchy,” Moller writes, falls 
somewhere between the Lockean anarchy (states as rivals) and Kantian anarchy (democratic 
peace) and is composed of sovereign states that recognize and respect one another but do not 
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bind each other.  Unlike the Lockean paradigm, violence no longer occurs; unlike the Kantian 
paradigm, mutual aid or assistance is unnecessary.  “Mature Deutschian anarchy” is essentially a 
détente among states without violence but also without greater commitment to collective norms 
or values.  Moving beyond a Lockean rivalry among nation-states to a “Deutschian anarchy” is 
an important step toward banning the use of violence in international politics.  Moller explains 
how this could explain the relationship among Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and their neighbors 
Poland and Russia, states that do not have collective security arrangements among themselves, 
that still use the rhetoric of realism in their diplomatic relations, and that have few common 
values, can nonetheless remain relatively peaceful amongst themselves. 
 Moller has criticized Adler and Barnett’s introduction of a values analysis into security 
communities theory, and has advocated a more conceptually pure definition of the theory.61  
According to Moller, Adler and Barnett deviated from the original theory by emphasizing 
compatibility of core values and a collective identity, while the original theory only emphasized 
vaguely compatible values and mutual responsiveness.  In Deutsch’s theory, members do not 
need to have any values in common, such as liberal democratic values, other than the belief in 
peaceful change.  Non-democracies can form security communities with democracies so long as 
they accept the principle of peaceful change and have compatible values that are capable of 
coexistence in a community with liberal democratic values.  Likewise, Adler and Barnett are too 
ambitious when they require mutual aid of security community members.  Security communities 
are not necessarily collective security arrangements, and a security community could exist in 
principle so long as the members are non-violent toward one another even if they do not aid one 
another.  Moller accepts Wendt’s explanation that regional collective security arrangements and 
regional security community can conceptually merge, as regional integration may require a 
commitment to mutual assistance in the case of aggression from outside the region. 
 While Moller has promoted a conceptually purer security communities paradigm that 
removes the normative and highly culturally contingent variables such as shared liberal 
democratic values, other scholars have promoted a definition of security communities theory that 
heavily emphasizes these values.  Goodby, Buwalda, and Trenin, for instance, hold that security 
communities can disintegrate unless they develop a similar sense of identity or self-image, 
transparency (including military-to-military cooperation), and a reasonably healthy economy in 
the member units.62  They refer to this form of security community theory as leading to a “stable 
peace,” and viewed the United States, European Union, and Russia as the obvious drivers of this 
stable peace.  To this, Moller would disagree, in his use of a conceptually purer version of 
security communities theory.  Groups of people may disagree on many major values in terms of 
their identities and interests, but at the same time still accept non-violence and peaceful change 
as the basic principle in organizing mutual relations.  Members of a security community do not 
need to share common core values so long as their values are not mutually exclusive of one 
another.63 
 Not all scholars accept a “constructivist” theory of integration.  As Moravcsik writes, the 
constructivist paradigm may not be comprehensive enough to be empirically useful in 
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determining whether integration is occurring or why.64  Although constructivism as a meta-
theory holds that interests of a governmental elite reflect more general, deeper, collectively-held 
ideas or discourses in the population and that these ideas or discourses only change at rare 
“critical junctures” such as times of crises, this does not easily translate into a testable theory in a 
social science sense.  While constructivism may provide a meta-theory basis for Deutsch’s 
security communities integration theory, it may be an overstatement to say that constructivism 
has “subsumed” security communities theory. 
 
 
The Relevance of Deutsch’s Model in the Modern World 
 
 Cantori and Spiegel explain that “transactionalists” such as Deutsch concentrate on 
contacts, interchange, and communication between peoples and not international institutions or 
bureaucracies as indicators of successful integration.  “In terms of the subject matter, the 
transactionalists—more than the neo-functionalists—have tended to concentrate on Western 
Europe,” perhaps because of a lack of data about developing countries, as security communities 
scholarship has had a strong empirical component.65  If this criticism was true in 1973, it is 
certainly not true today, and indeed security communities theory has shown itself remarkably 
resilient and adaptable to regions outside of Europe. 
 One of the most comprehensive and sustained readings of Karl Deutsch using a non-
European case study is Amitav Acharya’s Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: 
ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (2009).  Integration theory, Acharya wrote, declined 
as the European Community faltered with respect to the Middle East oil crisis and American 
technological challenges in the 1970s.  In addition, the liberal-pluralist explanation for 
integration proved to be a particularly Euro-centric flaw in the theory.66  However, the orthodoxy 
of international relations theory, even more than the overemphasis on European integration, 
caused security communities theory to stagnate until the constructivist revolt against both 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in the 1990s.  Constructivism provides a 
comprehensive theoretical foundation, rooted in human psychology and in sociology, for 
Deutsch’s focus on the development of collective perceptions and identifications among 
populations and the development of a “we-feeling.”  While norms only “regulate” behavior in 
neo-liberal institutionalism, in constructivism (and in Deutsch) those norms can transform and 
redefine state behaviors. 
 When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967, the 
outlook was particularly grim, with many of the postcolonial members having weak socio-
political cohesion, governmental legitimacy problems, interstate territorial disputes, ideological 
polarization and the exportation of Communist revolution, and external intervention.  
Nonetheless, by the 1990s the organization proved to be one of the most successful experiments 
in regional cooperation in the developing world, with none of the founding members ever 
engaging in hostilities against another member.  While the Asian economic crisis in the late 
1990s sparked criticism of ASEAN’s effectiveness, the organization has produced a regional 
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charter and has worked to improve relations with China and India.  As Acharya notes, security 
communities theory provides a framework for interpreting ASEAN integration, viewing ASEAN 
regionalism as a process of interaction and socialization and examining regional identity 
formation.67  In particular, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are insufficient to explain 
the ASEAN case because of the relative absence in the community of formal and legalistic 
methods of cooperation.  Consequently, these other lenses will not be able to assess the extent to 
which a regional identity is forming in the absence of formal institutions and processes.68  These 
emerging regional norms include non-interference in domestic affairs, pacific settlement of 
disputes, regional autonomy, aloofness from military pacts and a reluctance to deal with military 
or security issues, and important cultural norms, including an aversion to formal 
institutionalization and a preference for consensus among members.69 
 At the same time, Acharya’s ASEAN analysis contributes to and expands security 
community theory in several ways.  Again linking security communities theory to 
constructivism, Acharya emphasizes the importance of institutions not in simply developing 
regulations that bind members, but in representing community norms and acting as agents of 
socialization, helping to develop and projected a shared identity.  Acharya emphasizes Deutsch’s 
distinction between “no-war communities,” in which members simply comply with regulatory 
norms banning conflict, and “security communities,” in which the identity of the group 
encompasses peaceful cooperation and “we-feeling.”70  The construction of identity is central to 
Deutsch’s “we-feeling,” and plays a determinative role in state behavior, not a role derivative of 
material interests.  While the founders of ASEAN initially had little conception of a regional 
identity, the organization has played a critical role in developing a sense of regional identity, a 
supranational “imagined community,” in laying down the boundaries of the Southeast Asian 
region, and in drawing upon indigenous traditions of its own members and redefining principles 
of cooperation from the outside world. 
 Although domestic stability may be a necessary precursor to a security community (or at 
least, as Deutsch might say, the stabilization process must occur along with the integration 
process), democratic and liberal economic values likely are not a necessary condition.  Looking 
at ASEAN’s relationship with Myanmar, Kuhonta describes a security community founded not 
on liberal political traditions, but on political stability, regime security, and state sovereignty.71  
ASEAN’s durable peace, dating from the organization’s founding in 1967, has not benefited 
democratic reformers and movements in member states, even for emerging democratic forces in 
Myanmar.  Deutsch did not identify liberal democratic values as necessary to the existence of a 
security community, indicating only that compatible political values were necessary for a durable 
bond among members.  As Acharya indicates, regionalism in the developing world has tended to 
be state-centric, which invites opposition from international and domestic civil society groups on 
transparency issues.72  Liberal democratic values are not required for the formation of a security 
community in the developing world, as the ASEAN case shows, but those values are not 
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irrelevant: increased transparency, often a byproduct of democratization, helps reduce mistrust 
and improve and regularize communications among members.  Developing world case studies, 
unlike European and North Atlantic case studies, may also provide some theoretical perspectives 
as to why security communities unravel, a point not stressed in Deutsch or Adler and Barnett.  
According to constructivist logic, security communities fail not due to shifting external threats or 
the balance of power, but rather due to the same changing identity factors that created them in 
the first place.73 
 Scholars have continued to problematize the notion that a security community is forming 
in Southeast Asia.  As Busse writes, ASEAN’s collective identity may be overstated by 
scholars.74  The concept of Southeast Asia as a region and ASEAN as a subregion are 
uncritically accepted by scholars purely on the basis of geography even though the region was 
sharply divided by colonial powers until relatively recently.  Instead of assuming the existence of 
regions based on their location on a map, regions should be studied as emerging from social 
practice and political interaction.  No nation-state possesses a monolithic national interest; all of 
them are complex mosaics of ethnic and economic diversity.  In the long run, ASEAN may need 
to alter its basic principles such as non-intervention and state-centric development, but the fact 
that it survived the Asian financial crisis without intra-regional tension indicates that collective 
affinities for the organization outweighed the temptation to attack neighboring states.  However, 
ASEAN’s revered principle of non-interference was increasingly criticized by Thailand and the 
Philippines, the two most democratic states in the region.  Democratization is likely to weaken 
some aspects of the “ASEAN Way.”75   
 Besides ASEAN, the potential for the development of security communities on the 
African continent has attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention recently.  In part, the 
debate over whether regional security communities exist on the African continent is dependent 
on how one treats the historically high rate of internal conflict despite the relative absence of 
interstate conflict.  According to Franke, the end of the Cold War marked a period of sharp 
transition in African politics, toppling revolutionary socialist states, American client states, and 
white minority regimes alike, which led to a transformation of intra-African security 
cooperation.76  The transition of the Organization of African Unity into the conceptually stronger 
African Union, as well as successful African interventions such as ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990, 
have helped shape continent-wide and regional frameworks for military intervention, conflict 
resolution, and security coordination among African countries.77  More concretely, the African 
Stability Force and the Continental Early Warning System require sophisticated cooperation 
among national governments to prevent hostilities and contain them when they occur, and the 
adoption of a Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact in 2005 gave the cooperation legal 
status in advance of African Union military interventions in Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, and the 
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Comoros.78  Rhetorical statements by many African leaders are now framed in the language of 
Pan-Africanism rather than in realist terms.  Looking at the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in particular, Franke concludes that a tightly-coupled security community 
has formed in the region around the so-called Front-Line States, which were committed to the 
end of minority rule in Africa and which closely collaborated on support for nationalist 
movements in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.  Moreover, the fact that many African 
countries are members of more than one collective security organization may also have the 
consequence of reducing conflict among them. 
 Franke’s hypothesis that a security community is forming on the African continent, and 
in Southern Africa in particular, has generated a robust amount of commentary.  Although 
Deutsch framed his security communities theory in terms of the absence of interstate war, 
Nathan has written that domestic stability must also be a necessary precondition to the existence 
of a security community.  Drawing on examples from Central Africa and SADC, Nathan argues 
that domestic stability is a necessary precondition of a security community for three reasons.79  
First, given the stress Deutsch placed on communications and transactions among populations 
for the integrative process, a lack of personal security exhibited by gross violations of human 
rights, civil wars, or large scale violence could preclude the existence of a security community 
because they may prevent these exchanges.  Second, internal violence can and does lead to cross-
border violence in the form of rebel attacks or military intervention, and at the very least 
increases suspicion among putative community members, reducing their mutual trust.  Thirdly, 
domestic instability reduces consistency and predictability in state behavior, undermining 
another key element of Deutsch’s security community preconditions.  Nathan ultimately 
concludes that SADC or the countries of Central Africa could not be said to be a “nascent,” 
“emerging,” or “embryonic” security community, particularly given the unexpected hostilities 
shown among members in regard to the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.80  
Structural instability is characteristic of weak states; by contrast, Deutsch himself believed that 
strong states were more effective at establishing security communities.  The absence of 
expectations for peaceful change among African populations belies elaborate formal mechanisms 
of security cooperation.81 
 Nathan is convincing when he questions the usefulness of a theory about the absence of 
interstate war on a continent where tens of millions of people have been victimized by active 
hostilities in the past fifty years.  But Franke may also be correct that the existence of regional 
security mechanisms in Africa have, empirically, changed state behavior and have contributed to 
the development of regional and continent-wide identities.  Deutsch’s theory emphasized 
process, not end results, and it may be that the African context shows symptoms of a slow move 
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toward a peaceful, cooperative end state.  Regardless of whether SADC (or some combination of 
its members) or another regional organization is a nascent or emerging security community, 
Franke’s suggestion that multilayered security cooperation among the African Union, SADC, 
ECOWAS in West Africa, the Community of Central African States, and the East African 
Community may contribute to the absence of interstate war on the African continent is an 
interesting and potentially useful theoretical distinction.82  Unlike NATO-EU cooperation, for 
instance, African regional security communities must coordinate with each other (horizontally) 
and with the African Union (vertically) in an interlocking pattern, constraining the billiard balls 
in place. 
 The relationships of NATO and the European Union, both of which have some 
characteristics of “security communities,” to countries on the periphery of Europe have attracted 
some scholarly attention.  Moustakis, writing about Greek-Turkish relations that have 
historically been contentious until recently, describes Turkish integration into NATO as a 
“hybrid region,” one possessing some but not all of the requirements for a fully-integrated 
security community.83  More recently, Moustakis and German have described the European 
Union’s relationship with the Balkans and the Caucasus as efforts to create “zones of peace” and 
prevent security dilemmas from arising.84  Not all cooperative efforts lead to peaceful outcomes, 
however, and the involvement by NATO and the European Union in these regions could actually 
lead to greater instability if external actors (namely Russia) view the security community as a 
threat.  To that end, greater “integration” could undermine regional security.85 
 
 
A Security Communities Theory of Integration 
 
 Integration in the security communities paradigm is the process by which 
communications and transactions among populations or political elites in different territories 
causes them to collectively identify to the point where active hostility becomes unlikely or 
impossible.  Deutsch’s original definition of integration was the broad zone of transition, from a 
situation where war was possible and was being prepared for, to another situation where it was 
neither.86  Integration is a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent 
and jointly produce system properties which they separately lack.  Political integration is the 
integration of political actors or political units in regard to their political behavior, such that the 
behavior of the units is modified from what it would otherwise be if the components were not 
integrated.87  In order to qualify as a “security community,” groups of people have to expect and 
believe in peaceful change.  They do so when a set of values perceived as compatible is 
translated into a sense of community, a “we-feeling.”  Security communities are to a large extent 
mental constructions underpinned by individual and collective experience as well as by shared 
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knowledge.88  This definition of integration through security communities is rooted in identities, 
interests, and expectations of populations rather than states as unified actors, and the mechanism 
of integration—aggregate communications and transactions between populations—involves the 
creation of weblike links between groups that leads to the formation of mutual trust and a 
common identity.  This theory complements the modern constructivist revolt against realism 
because it views identity as mutable and socially-constructed. 
 The value of security communities theory for a case study of integration is that it draws 
attention to non-traditional actors that realist theory does not reach.  According to this theory, 
integration occurs not just when administrative linkages become more prominent or when 
governmental officials negotiate alliances, but in innumerable other ways: academic and 
scientific exchanges, travel and migration, or increased trade, for instance, all of which create 
points of contact and an increasingly solidifying sense of “we-ness” or community.  By using a 
theory such as this to analyze political integration, a scholar is able to reach a broader scope of 
variables and actors to explain a complex and multidimensional process.  Security communities 
theory has faced a revival since the end of the Cold War, and has relevance to continuing 
integrative processes all over the world, including in the post-colonial developing world. 
 
Neofunctionalism 
 
 Neofunctionalism was first formulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, mainly through 
the work of Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg in response to the establishment of ECSC, in which 
integration in the coal and steel sectors “spilled over” into much more comprehensive integration 
through the ECC and Euratom and again with the formation of a customs union ahead of 
schedule and a common agricultural policy.89  The first edition of Ernst B. Haas’s The Uniting of 
Europe (1958) is a dense empirical study of the early European Coal and Steel Community, but 
it also develops a set of general propositions about regional integration in the European 
experience.  The theory declined in the 1960s, however, as European integration slowed through 
the efforts of French President Charles de Gaulle in paralyzing the governing commission of the 
EEC.  Haas, Lindberg, and later scholars attempted several times to refine the theory, but it 
continued to decline until the close of the Cold War. 
 Neofunctionalism may be regarded as one particular offshoot of the liberal tradition in 
international relations theory, but it has developed into a sui generis theory, explaining in a rather 
ad hoc way the development of the European Union in terms of its own unique, sui generis 
characteristics rather than according to the terms of a general theory of world politics.90  
Neofunctionalism emphasized institutional form rather than socioeconomic content, with rational 
bureaucracy as a central driving force in integration.91  Within ten years following Haas’s The 
Uniting of Europe, the theory was forced to undergo significant revision, with marked changes 
made to the “spillover” principle that posited that pressure from integrated functional or political 
sectors would inevitably and automatically lead to integration in other sectors.  Although 
neofunctionalism no longer operates as a comprehensive theory of political integration, certain 
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aspects of the theory provide partial clues to integration processes outside the European context.  
Among these are neofunctionalism’s emphasis on the role of interest groups, such as organized 
business and trade unions, in perpetuating the integration process, and the role of supranational 
elites of emerging international institutions that cultivate further integration. 
 The chapter will turn first to the classical functionalism of David Mitrany, who pioneered 
the idea of a supranational technical agency that would administratively intertwine certain basic 
functions of the nation-state and assume legitimacy over time from the populations served by the 
supranational agency.  Neofunctionalism, which arose in the 1950s, accepts the essential logic of 
functionalism but makes important deviations.  The chapter will also look at neofunctionalism’s 
attempts to reformulate itself as the process of European integration slowed down in the 1970s, 
as well as the ways in which the theory is of continuing relevance beyond the European 
integration project. 
 
 
Classical Functionalism 
 
 The functionalist challenge to realism imagined a potentially cooperative welfare 
community in place of endemic anarchy.  As O’Neill writes, an implicit assumption existed 
among functional theorists that cooperation in merely technical and commercial matters would 
have positive consequences for political integration, as illustrated by the expanding work of the 
League of Nations and the United Nations.92  Writing at a time of gathering international crisis, 
David Mitrany advocated global integration on the basis of administrative and technical 
cooperation, rather than political cooperation among nation-states or regional federations.  
According to classical functionalism, the only rational reply to the challenge that nationalism 
represents to world peace is the creation of supranational institutions that will gradually take over 
the function which the nation-state has traditionally performed but is no longer able to perform.93  
An international community must grow from the satisfaction of common needs shared by 
members of different nations.  International agencies will develop a loyal community that 
supports the values of the organization.  If such agencies were comprehensive and numerous 
enough, the loyalties to the international agencies and their communities would supersede 
loyalties to the nation-state.94  The specialized agencies of the United Nations are far more 
comprehensive than those of the League of Nations and represent the first signs of loyalty to the 
world community.  In delegating sovereign powers to international bodies, no power is more 
important than that of common security and defense, and the establishment of the Security 
Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency are the first signs that states are delegating 
their sovereign security power to international organizations. 
 Mitrany advocated functionalism, or the administrative intertwinement of nation-states 
through delegation of certain discrete tasks to supranational bodies, over federalism, in which 
nation-states develop a global or regional supranational body while still retaining some 
sovereignty.95  Because functionalism involves only discrete tasks such as interstate airline 
regulation, postal and telecommunications services, monetary policy, and other administrative 
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functions, tricky questions of state equality do not arise in a functional system, as opposed to a 
federalist one.   
 The nation-state’s inability to obtain common interests in interdependent conditions 
manifested itself as dysfunctional or incomplete, generating a demand for new institutional 
arrangements.  Because those common interests could not be obtained with existing territorial 
divisions and national structures, those institutions had to be transcended.96  Institutional form 
followed function, and the shape of the supranational institution depended on the function that it 
served.  Functionalism explains institutional evolution in which common interests or needs are 
the initial motivation for the institution, but the institutional particulars are determined by 
environmental circumstances.97 
 Mitrany’s theory has engendered multiple criticisms beyond simple naivety or idealism.  
Among these is doubt that the administrative tasks of the nation-state could be easily separated 
and dealt with more practically on a more global scale.98  His belief that narrow technocratic 
solutions can exist to complicated political problems may not be a plausible reading of 
international politics.99  Mitrany’s attempt to depoliticize international relations confuses facts 
with values and ignores empirical evidence showing that international relations is, in large part, 
political.100  Functionalism faces a social constructivist critique as well.  The theory does not 
recognize the fact that specific identities of nation-states shape their perceived interests and 
consequently their behavior in the international system.  Functionalism assumes pre-given 
collective interests that lead to the formation of international institutions, and then assumes that 
new identities will form around those institutions.101  However, the functionalist theory as 
conceived by Mitrany had certain durable qualities, however, including emphasis on 
decentralization, technocratic cooperation, and transnational administrative intertwinement, 
which became centerpieces of neofunctional theory.  Neofunctionalism favored regional 
integration over global, and, unlike functionalism, possessed a scientific methodology and did 
not rely on claims of moralism. 
 One of the crucial links between functionalist thought and the theorists who formulated 
neofunctionalism were the proposals for sector integration put forth by Jean Monnet.  Monnet 
was the brainchild of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, framed as a modest 
surrender of sovereignty in exchange for strong economic advantages, but nonetheless part of a 
broader political agenda of European integration by stealth.102  Monnet proved to be intimately 
involved with the European integration project despite several setbacks in the early 1950s and 
the only partial achievements brought about by ECSC.  By the mid-1950s, European integration 
focused more on removing barriers to trade and commercial cooperation rather than on positive 
sectoral and common defense cooperation. 
 As Stefanou and Xanthaki write, Monnet was the link between Mitrany’s functionalism 
and European integration, even though Monnet was not a functionalist per se and did not 
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acknowledge Mitrany’s influence.103  Like basic functionalism, his plan involved the gradual 
transfer of loyalties and authority from the national level to the supranational level via the 
delegation of specific tasks to an international agency and its technocratic secretariat.  However, 
the vision of Monnet and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman was political, even if the 
means—pooling of coal and steel production—were economic, and their specifically intended 
goal of European political integration also shared characteristics with political federation, of 
which Mitrany so heavily disapproved.104  Monnet’s approach to European unity was to 
gradually open the door to political federation by forging specific functional links among states 
in a way that did not directly challenge national sovereignty.  While European integration did not 
proceed precisely in this manner, and, in fact, it may have proceeded much more rapidly as the 
functional approach declined in favor of state-centric efforts, Monnet certainly holds a symbolic 
role as a forefather of the European Union.105 
 In addition to his clear personal philosophy, Monnet possessed personal qualities that 
made him a highly effective proponent of European integration, and his American connections 
forged during World War Two made him widely trusted among the Allied elites.106  While coal 
and steel integration had been proposed many times as a tool for overcoming historic antagonism 
between France and Germany, Monnet alone possessed the star power necessary to turn the 
Schuman Plan into the European Coal and Steel Community, his greatest accomplishment.107  
Although the Schuman Plan, proposed in 1950 and inaugurated as ECSC in 1952, was not an 
economic or technocratic success, it set in motion the process that transformed Europe from a 
continent torn by nationalism to one economically and increasingly politically intertwined.  The 
creation of a single, community-wide area in which coal and steel products could be sold 
competitively was a laudable but unrealistic goal, because coal and steel had been regulated for 
decades and each nation had its own system of control, obscuring real prices.  Monnet knew that 
a true common market was impossible as ECSC lacked the power to correct the root causes of 
market distortion.108  When he resigned as president of the ECSC High Authority in 1954, the 
organization was best by paralysis and its mission increasingly diluted due to a rise in prices 
during the Korean War, objections from technical experts, and competition from the oil 
industry.109 
 ECSC did have technical successes: it regulated European trade in scrap metal, 
harmonized international freight rates, and launched the first major comparative study of taxation 
economics.  However, ECSC was even more successful for political reasons.  The organization 
substituted as a peace treaty between France and Germany, creating the political underpinnings 
of a new international settlement that broke the impasse in Allied policy and allowed Germany to 
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re-enter Europe.110  Although Monnet’s plan for a European Defense Community failed and his 
vision for a customs union and for Euratom, the European Atomic Energy Agency, met with 
only lukewarm acceptance, the European integration project was “relaunched” in a round of 
diplomacy that culminated in the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the European Economic 
Community, formed in 1958.  The EEC specifically rejected the ECSC model, but it likely would 
never have come into being had it not learned from the ECSC experience.  Although Charles de 
Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 ended the opportunity for EEC expansion, especially as to 
Britain and the Nordic countries, de Gaulle did engage closer integration of the six original 
members of the EEC that increased trade among them sixfold and led to the dismantling of 
internal tariffs two years ahead of schedule.111  With the difficulties faced by European and 
American currencies in the 1960s, European integration began to turn toward monetary union.  
Although these events did not directly descend from Monnet’s quasi-functionalist vision and the 
ECSC experiment, Monnet helped change public and elite attitudes to integration that made the 
later efforts possible. 
 
 
Ernst Haas and Neofunctionalist Theory 
 
 According to Haas, regional integration would occur when societal actors, in calculating 
their interests, decided to rely on supranational institutions rather than their own governments to 
realize their demands.  Integration involves progress toward a consensus of the political 
community to impose limitations on intergroup conflict.  This absence of violence within the 
political community is in some ways similar to Deutsch’s security communities theory, but while 
Deutsch wrote that a specific institutional structure was not strictly required for his theory as 
integration could take place among populations through transactions and communications, in 
Haas’s neofunctionalism supranational institutions are a cornerstone of the theory.  Haas’s 
definition of political community as a population expressing loyalty toward central institutions is 
narrower than Deutsch’s pluralistic security communities because central institutions are not 
required, but broader than Deutsch’s amalgamated security communities because it could include 
intergovernmental agencies. 
 According to Haas’s original theory, economic integration as existed in the early 
European Community—characterized by elimination of tariffs, quotas, and exchange controls; 
harmonization of national policies to deal with the consequences; and freer movement of capital 
and labor—begat political consequences.  As the beliefs and aspirations of groups change due to 
the necessity of working in a transnational institutional framework, mergers in values and 
doctrine come about, uniting groups across frontiers, implying the diminution of loyalty to and 
expectations from the former separate national governments.  Political integration occurs when 
political actors in separate nation-states shift their loyalties and expectations to a new central 
authority, whose supranational institutions expand jurisdiction over national institutions.  During 
initial stages of the process, loyalty to national institutions is still supreme, but as integration 
continues, a single political community emerges, superimposed over national political 
communities.  ECSC, a supranational organization, lies on a spectrum between two archetypes, 
federation and international organization.  A federation divides sovereignty between the central 
authority and local governments, while an international organization treats only states as having 
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legal obligations and rights.  Federation decisions are binding while international organization 
decisions are not.  International organizations are created by treaty and can be denounced; 
federations are intended to be permanent.  Supranational institutions like ECSC have some 
characteristics of political federations united by a single sovereign, but still have characteristics 
of international organizations.  ECSC possesses a federal executive, legislature, and judiciary but 
is compelled to act within the framework set by an international conference.112 
 Like functionalism, neofunctionalism emphasizes the mechanisms of technocratic 
decision-making, incremental design, and learning processes, but beyond that the two theories 
diverge.  Whereas functionalists believed that the administrative tasks assigned to an 
organization shaped the organization’s mission, form, and scope, neofunctionalists placed great 
weight on organized interests, including civil society and political elites, in determining an 
organization’s character.  In addition, while functionalism was largely an analytical descriptive 
theory, neofunctionalists were sympathetic to the cause of European integration and intended 
their theory to be as prescriptive as it was descriptive.113  Put in different words, although 
member states set the ground rules for supranational institutions, the direction in which those 
institutions develop is determined not only by member states but by two additional actors: (a) the 
secretariats and professional staff of the supranational institution itself, and (b) the interest 
groups, social movements, and associations that develop around the organization at a regional 
level.114 
 For Haas, realism’s power-centered logic was as problematic as liberal idealism’s 
pretense that a Kantian world order could transcend conflict.  Haas agreed with Mitrany’s belief 
that supranational institution-building is premised on a technocratic engagement with human 
welfare needs.115  According to Haas, key social groups within nation-states would come to 
support deeper and more expansive integration as the integrative process proceeded, which he 
termed “spillover.”  As the ECSC example illustrated, an initial decision to integrate was likely 
to spawn pressures for deeper and wider integration, independently of any overt ideological 
preference for “more Europe.”116  Spillover was suggestive of automaticity—the idea that the 
logic of integration is self-sustaining, particularly as the integrated community itself acted as a 
strategic advocate on behalf of functional linkage and deeper and wider integration (which Haas 
termed “cultivated spillover”).  However, as Rosamond explains, the concept of “spillover” 
unraveled in the 1960s as French President Charles de Gaulle led a reorganization of the 
European Community in an intergovernmental direction rather than a technocratic functional 
one.117  Although spillover likely occurred in the European context, scholars generally agree that 
it has not occurred in other integrative contexts and is not germane to the definition of 
neofunctionalism.118 
 
Haas’s essential assumptions were these:119 
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(a) Rational actors have capacity to learn and change preferences, and as interests of actors 
change as a supranational institution grows in complexity and power, expectations and 
loyalties shift toward the institution. 
(b) Once established, institutions escape the control of their creators, and supranational elites 
encourage further integration by influencing perceptions of national elites. 
(c) Incrementalism, rather than grand designs, drive the integration process, particularly as 
many decisions are taken with imperfect information and under tight deadlines and thus 
produce unintended consequences. 
(d) Collective decision making emphasizes positive-sum games, instead of realist rhetoric 
promoting zero-sum games. 
(e) Emerging functional interdependence between the whole economies and their productive 
sectors inexorably tend to foster further integration. 
 
 Haas refined these points in a study with Philippe Schmitter about Mexico and 
integration in the Latin American context, which was a second-generation attempt to reach more 
universal variables leading to integration outside the European Community.120  To Haas and 
Schmitter, the Western European case suggested that economic integration proceeded most 
rapidly and produced the most momentous political consequences when it accompanies a 
preexisting network of trade, travel, and communication as well as a transnational sense of 
loyalty and social mobility.  Mexico’s involvement with LAFTA appeared to be an aberration.  
Mexico’s contacts ran north to the United States, rather than south to Latin America, which 
accounted for a miniscule fraction of its external trade, due to poor overland communications, 
long sea routes, and infrequent maritime service.  In addition, Mexico possessed a strong 
indigenous culture and internal diversity.  However, reasoned Haas and Schmitter, even though 
Mexico seemed to lack most, or any, of the “preconditions” that seemed to lead to integration in 
Western Europe, it possessed functional equivalents that drove political elites and business 
interests to a consensus in favor regional integration.121  In Mexico, that consensus was driven by 
a strong central state party that co-opted civil society and business interests and a dominant 
government bureaucracy of economic technocrats that could bind the state in ways that European 
technocrats could not.  The existence of a strong administrative elite, articulating a widespread 
philosophy that economic integration would produce material wealth, engineered a top-down and 
state-centric consensus that made LAFTA membership very popular among the political elites.  
Thus, Mexico possessed an intergroup consensus in favor of integration even though it was 
constructed differently than in Western Europe.122 
 Leon Lindberg, who studied under Haas, introduced a conceptually purer theory of 
neofunctionalism with the publication of his book The Political Dynamics of European 
Economic Integration in 1963.  Using Haas’s definition of political integration as a process, 
Lindberg constructs a “more cautious conception of political integration,” one in which 
collective decision-making procedures could achieve a significant amount of political integration 
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without moving toward a “political community” per se.123  To that end, Lindberg accepts 
political integration as a process but removes the reference to an end point.  Lindberg introduces 
a two-part definition of the integrative process: first, nations forego the desire to conduct policy 
independently and instead shift the decision-making process to new central organs; and second, 
political actors shift their expectations and political activities to the new center.  While lacking 
some analytical clarity, Lindberg focuses on measurable expectations and political activities of 
elites rather than the more abstract values and loyalties around which Haas formulated his 
definition.  Lindberg emphasized the process aspects of integration over the background 
conditions that allow integration to occur more than Haas did (and more than Deutsch in his 
security communities theory).  According to Lindberg, for integration to occur, central 
institutions and policies must develop; the tasks assigned to those central institutions must be 
specific and important, and of a type not normally performed by conventional international 
organizations; the tasks must be inherently expansive; and member states must continue to see 
their interests as consistent with the enterprise.124 
 Central institutions are required in order to represent the interests of and manage conflicts 
among the member states, and these institutions are well-suited to uncovering sources of 
conflicts and breaking down the demands of states into more manageable components.  The 
EEC, for instance, isolates issues and identifies common interests in order to promote unity.  The 
tasks assigned to institutions such as the EEC must be inherently expansive and capable of 
overcoming what Haas called “the autonomy of functional contexts,” in which low political 
functions are unbundled and become administratively autonomous.125  This concept of 
“spillover” refers to a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further 
actions, which in turn changes conditions and requires still more action.  Lack of agreement 
among governments may encourage the growth of central institutions to which states can 
delegate difficult problems.  For instance, backlash from non-members against a customs union 
may best be managed by further integration or expanding the role of the central authority. 
 Integration is rooted in the perception of actors that they can better satisfy their 
aspirations in the new institutional framework, Lindberg writes.  What is so striking about the 
EEC, he writes, is the sheer breadth of the tasks assigned to the central institutions and the extent 
to which these tasks are inherently expansive as one functional context spills over into the next.  
An ever-widening circle of actors finds the system to be an effective, logical, and appropriate 
framework in which to pursue a state’s goals.126  The process of European integration could be 
reversed or halted despite the administrative spillover and intertwinement already achieved, but 
doing so would be procedurally costly for a state attempting to withdraw.  Increasing 
membership in the Community to new states that are not as well integrated may be one means of 
slowing down the integrative process, but overpoliticization and reducing the institution to a 
technocracy could be other ways to halt the process. 
 The theory of neofunctionalism has several methodological problems beyond just 
empirical shortcomings with spillover theory.  As Sterling-Folker writes, the continued reliance 
on functionalist assumptions about interests, institutions, and identity led neofunctionalists to 
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overestimate the degree to which elite identities and loyalties could be changed by strategic 
interaction.  Neofunctionalism assumes that elites are motivated by the desire to maximize their 
interest and would transfer loyalties and identities to the institution that provided the greatest 
rewards.127 
 Another methodological problem with early neofunctionalism was the disagreement 
among scholars at identifying dependent variables that could be quantitatively measured.  Haas 
and Schmitter attempted to do this as early as 1964, by delineating nine independent variables.  
Nye criticized the variables because Haas and Schmitter did not explain the relationship among 
them, and their typology reads as a mere checklist with all factors to be weighed equally, even 
though there are strong reasons why some should be weighed more heavily.128  Pointing to the 
East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, Nye notes that political integration 
among the three had stagnated despite the fact that they possessed many of the Haas-Schmitter 
variables.  The Haas-Schmitter framework also diverts attention from extraneous factors that 
cannot be fitted into the nine variables.129  He advocates a theory that includes a “catalyst” or 
trigger to promote integration, beyond just recitation of a list of background conditions that favor 
integration.  For his part, Haas recognized the symbolic nature of integration in the African and 
Latin American contexts.130  In Africa, nation-state expectations are prematurely politicized, 
preventing cooperation even on relatively noncontroversial issues.  In Latin America, size and 
power differentials inhibit economic union. 
 Schmitter revisited his and Haas’s nine variables, categorized as background conditions 
prior to integration, conditions extant at the initiation of the integrative process, and process 
conditions once integration has started, in an article from 1969.131  From this, he deduced three 
hypotheses about how integration proceeds.  The first is a spillover hypothesis, in which 
members of an integration scheme agree on collective goals but are not satisfied with their 
attainment of these goals and thus attempt to resolve this dissatisfaction through either 
collaboration in another, related sector (expanding scope of commitment) or by intensifying 
commitment to the original sector (expanding level of commitment).  “Scope” has two 
dimensions, number of social groups or policy sectors involved, and importance of these policy 
actors for attainment of national goals.  “Level” has two dimensions, continuity of members in 
addressing their mutual obligations, and techniques of the policymaking process.  The second is 
an externalization hypothesis, in which participants find themselves compelled to formulate a 
common policy toward non-members.  This is especially true if the bloc borders on another 
integrating bloc of nations.  The third hypothesis is a politicization hypothesis, in which the 
scope and actions of the collective or supranational actor becomes increasingly controversial, 
which leads to a widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration and a 
redefinition of interests and eventually a shift in loyalties toward the supernational authority. 
 Lindberg attempted to solve this in 1971 by formulating a multivariable theory that 
focused on the breadth and content of the collective decisionmaking in an integrating system, the 
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level of responsiveness between collective decisionmakers and national counterparts, and 
compliance with and distributive consequences of the collective decisionmaking.132  In 
particular, Lindberg identified three categories of variables in his definition: (1) the level of 
collective decision making activity, including the scope of policy areas affected, the range of 
stages involved in the decision process, and the degree to which collective decisions are the most 
decisive ones; (2) a collective decision making body’s response to the flow of demands to it from 
relevant political actors, determined by the level of resources available to the decision makers, 
the way in which leaders make use of them, and the propensity for national officials to 
“consume” resources for the maximization of collective interest; and (3) the consequences that 
collective decisions have for the constituent systems, including the degrees of penetration and 
compliance and distributive consequences.  Such a complex set of variables is required, 
according to Lindberg, since earlier theoreticians focused on only one or a few of the variables, 
taking those variables to be indicative of the entire integrative process without explaining how 
the variables interacted with each other.133 
 The three layers of variables, as Lindberg indicates, exist on spectra and can change over 
time.  For instance, the scope of collective decision making may be generalized over many issues 
or be specialized to a few policy domains.  The range of participation in joint decision making 
may be limited to predecisional stages and information-sharing, or it may involve comprehensive 
administration and enforcement.  The extent to which change occurs in national systems depends 
on how deeply collective decision making processes penetrate into constituent systems.  In some 
cases, collective decisions will be only binding on government negotiators and only during 
negotiations, while in other cases collective decisions will be binding on national governments 
but enforcement left to national authorities, and in still other cases, collective decisions directly 
enforceable on individuals.  The amount of change attributable to collective decisions will vary 
with national authorities’ compliance with the decisions.  The most salient factor, however, may 
be how the benefits of collective decision making are distributed among component national 
units, as the willingness to proceed with further integration is dependent among some balance of 
returns among the participating countries so that none seem disproportionately disadvantaged.134 
 
 
The Decline of “Spillover” Theory 
 
 Neofunctionalism is probably the most heavily criticized integration theory.  While many 
criticisms are based on misreading of the doctrine, one consistent criticism is that 
neofunctionalism cannot provide a general theory of integration in all regional contexts, as it 
overemphasizes qualities characteristic of relatively developed economies and functioning 
democracies such as bureaucratic sophistication.  The portion of the theory that appears to be 
most highly contingent, and consequently most criticized by later scholars, was Haas’s belief in 
the automaticity of the “spillover” process, which caused both Haas and Lindberg to walk back 
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from automatic spillover in later writings at the expense of some of the theory’s theoretical 
consistency.135 
 Generally speaking, traditional “spillover” is shorthand for the process in which 
integration of one sector leads to technical pressures that push states toward integration in other 
sectors due to the interdependence of administrative functions such that it is impossible to isolate 
them from the rest.  Haas identified, for instance, the pressure that integration of coal and steel 
production placed on European transportation networks to deliver the products to markets, 
encouraging countries to cooperate more closely in secondary sectors.  This would be termed 
“functional spillover.”  The spillover process occurred not only in functional sectors, but also in 
bureaucratic interdependence as EU working groups, for instance, worked closely with officials 
from national bureaucracies and civil society, labor, and business organizations worked 
increasingly across national boundaries on issues of broader interest.  This process is termed 
“political spillover.”  Lindberg, with his stress on human agency, believed that supranational 
institutions intentionally drive the spillover process—what he termed “cultivated spillover”—in 
order to augment their own power and scope of action.136 
 Integration theory requires a theory of disintegration, according to Schmitter.137  The 
doctrine of spillover is no exception, and scholars have used a colorful set of words such as 
“spillback,” “muddle-about,” and “spill-around” to describe the phenomenon of disintegration.  
One way in which the integration process could be halted or reversed is through “encapsulation,” 
which is where, in times of a crisis in integration, national governments impose a collective 
intergovernmental solution at the expense of the supranational community.138  “Spillback,” or a 
reverse of spillover, can occur when leaders (such as Charles de Gaulle or Margaret Thatcher) or 
interest groups, lobbies, or opposition parties, or even public opinion, are wary of further 
integration and can stall the process.  Slowness in the EU enlargement process, such as 
opposition to Turkey’s accession to membership, is emblematic of the “spillback” process.139  
With falling growth rates and rising unemployment in the 1970s, the European integration 
process slowed down, and efforts to broaden functional cooperation among states faced 
increasing skepticism.  Spillover began to look like a “fair weather” concept, something that 
simply occurred in favorable economic conditions.140 
 Perhaps the most important condition of spillover is that for the process to occur a 
structural pressure must be perceived as compelling since structures need human agents to turn 
structural pressures into evolving policy.  In that sense, spillover is not “automatic” in a 
mechanical sense; it requires human agreement.  Where the rationale for expanding functional 
cooperation and the support of political elites are both strong, “spillover” is likely to occur.141  In 
this way, for instance, the open movement of labor across borders in Europe placed pressure on 
national home and justice ministries to coordinate immigration and asylum policies. 
 Cultural spillover also figures in to early neofunctionalist thought, and Haas (but not 
Lindberg) identified values and ideas as variables that lead to and promote integration.  Over 
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time, so the theory went, cultural changes would occur in integrating European societies that 
would culminate in the refocusing of popular loyalties away from traditional national 
attachments to a new European identity.  This theory, however, lacked methodological rigor and 
the link between values and behavior was never clearly explained.142 
 Schmitter has written that later scholars misunderstood the concept of “automaticity” in 
the spillover process.  Automaticity did not assume that the process was linear or consistent, nor 
did it assume that the process was entirely unconscious, involuntary, or even effortless.  On the 
contrary, neo-functionalist logic emphasized precisely the opposite: the role of bureaucratic 
practice, organizational ideology, and creative interventions of administrative and political elites.  
Functional interdependence is not enough for integration; the interdependence must be perceived 
and translated into expressions of interest and viable decision making strategies.143 
 The ultimate problem with spillover theory is not that it does not necessarily define a 
genuine phenomenon—empirically, spillover can be used to describe the administrative 
intertwinement of a number of sectors in the European Community and elsewhere—but that it is 
not connected to a deeper integration theory and does not seem to be a condition of or a 
consequence of regional integration.  Consequently, scholars have used the language of spillover 
to describe the growth of the supranational European transport network, energy regulation, and 
immigration policy, among others, but the theoretical use of these concepts is limited.  
Stephenson linked the efforts of the European Commission to prioritize fourteen transportation 
infrastructure projects in Europe in 1994 as a form of cultivated spillover, leading to near 
continent-wide integration proposals for ports, airports, satellites, motorways, and railways over 
the next decade.144  Integration of European transportation networks since the 1980s, one of the 
later sectors to become integrated, was a top-down affair with heavily involvement by the 
Commission itself in controlling information, mediating differences of opinion, and presenting 
broad-based policy proposals directly to member governments.  The concept of cultivated 
spillover helps to describe this type of integration where it occurs, but case studies such as this 
do not provide a theoretical explanation for why it occurs. 
 
 
Revived Neofunctionalism as Partial Theory 
 
 In his 1975 book, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, Haas argued that 
regional integration theory in the European context had become obsolete.145  European 
integration was a “halfway house” in which both the nation-state and the European Community 
proved surprisingly durable.  The authority of the Community is quite strong, and very stable in 
the original issue areas formed by government consensus in the 1950s.  The legitimacy of the 
Community, however, is increasingly questioned as the organization has failed to reach 
agreements on high politics issues that are high on national agendas.  Whether issues are high 
politics or low politics issues depends on the business cycle—military affairs swaps places with 
research and development on the continental agenda—due to the absence of a monolithic nation-
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state or a dominating supranational community that can control the agenda.146  The result is 
disjointed incrementalism and fragmented issue linkage.  This “halfway house” of European 
integration cannot last, Haas wrote, as continuing attitudes toward and expectations of the 
Community shift as the continental agenda changes.  Integration theories are becoming obsolete 
because they are inspired by a sense of orderly process to describe a process of disjointed 
incrementalism.  This inspiration is not wrong, he wrote, but merely incomplete.147 
 The relaunching of the European integration process in the 1980s, and the corresponding 
revival of integration theory, rekindled interest in neofunctionalism.  Contemporary 
commentators acknowledge the partial relevance of “spillover” and provide modest but 
ambiguous analyses of regional integration that are very different from the positivism of the 
early writings of Haas and his colleagues.148  A number of hybrid or syncretic writings use 
elements of neofunctionalism in broader theoretical frameworks to explain integration, but this is 
true for security communities theory and neo-liberal institutionalism as well.  Neofunctionalism 
certainly survives in mainstream integrative thought, but no serious commentators defend the 
original neofunctionalist logic.  By the 1970s, more state-centric, realist-based theories of 
integration, particularly intergovernmentalism, were rising to prominence as European 
integration slowed, but these too had their own theoretical limitations. 
 Given the difficulties neofunctionalists have had in developing a comprehensive and 
theoretically consistent set of principles, despite regular attempts to reformulate the theory, 
neofunctionalism may be best viewed as a partial theory, as Niemann and Schmitter write.149  
Indeed, hybrid theories have appeared regularly in scholarly literature, using elements of neo-
functionalist thought combined with elements of other integration theories.  For instance, Sweet 
and Sandholtz found Deutsch’s theory of social exchange, communications, and transactions 
compatible with Haas’s theory of the development of cross-national elites and interest groups 
and cultivated integration by the supranational entity itself.150 Their hybrid theory of integration 
is a product of rulemaking and policy coordination by central authorities that build on cross-
cutting relationships among elites and form their own center of gravity that becomes its own 
impetus toward further integration.  
 One way in which the concept of “spillover” may be of continuing relevance is in the 
realm of what Niemann and Schmitter call “geographic spillover.”  Neofunctionalism provides 
some explanation as to why a number of non-member countries applied for European Union 
membership: the high level of integration made EU accession attractive and exclusion costly.  
The demand for EU enlargement can be derived from neofunctionalism’s basic tenet: integration 
leads to tensions and demands that can only be resolved by taking further integrative action (in 
this case, geographical reach rather than sector expansion).151  In addition, both the EU as an 
entity and the interest groups involved in EU policymaking have promoted expansion to Central 
and Eastern Europe.  Neofunctionalists predicted that political elites and interest groups would 
favor further integration (here, geographic enlargement) once they became aware of the benefits 
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of existing integration.  That appears to be happening in the European Union case at an abstract 
level.  Member states have to rely on the EU to formulate a policy toward non-members, further 
expanding the power and reach of the organization and making it still more attractive to 
outsiders. 
 This concept of “geographic spillover” has been applied to Turkey’s admission to the 
European Union.  As MacMillan explains, scholars such as Haas and Schmitter recognized that 
increasing regional integration would lead to expansion of the community to include non-
members.152  As the regional organization enlarges, its political weight increases, and the 
economic consequences of non-membership and discrimination from the community also rise.  
The prospect of enlargement will tend to create functional pressures for increased integration, 
and political and non-governmental elites will form coalitions in favor of enlargement.  In 
addition, enlargement as a policy was cultivated by the supranational institution itself.  
MacMillan notes that in the Turkish case, Turkey’s membership in the European customs union 
since the mid-1990s required harmonization of standards and legislation, an example of 
functional integration.  With Turkish accession, the EU will have new borders in the Middle East 
and Caucasus, providing foreign policy challenges and opportunities for the EU as a whole.  In 
addition, political integration occurred as elites in Turkey passed packages of Western-style law 
reforms to meet EU guidelines.  In this sense, the concept of geographic spillover is a lens 
through which European expansion could be measured in neofunctionalist terms. 
 Another way in which neofunctionalism has struggled to remain relevant in international 
relations is the ambiguous relationship the theory has with constructivism, one of the dominant 
and ascendant paradigms of international relations.  As Niemann has written, elements of 
neofunctionalism are compatible with constructivism, such as the foundational principle that 
actors in the international system are capable of “learning” during the integrative process as the 
values, loyalties, and expectations of political elites change and ultimately change actor 
behavior.153 
 Perhaps Haas’s self-critique is the most cogent, characterizing neo-functionalism as a 
lens rather than a comprehensive theory.154  Whereas security communities theory stresses the 
volume and rate of transactions or aggregate data of public opinion or contacts, neo-
functionalists observe bargaining styles and strategies and case studies of growth and decay.  
Neither theory has been predictive in a positive way, but neither has either been disproven.  Both 
have been better at predicting failures than successes—why integration failed rather than why it 
succeeded.  Neofunctionalism never identified a terminal end goal to the integrative process or 
an ideal-type, and consequently has been better at successfully predicting specific cases of 
spillover and bargaining styles than in achieving closure and predicting formation of a 
“community” as such.155 
 One key assumption of early neofunctionism is that integration cannot start with the 
political, but rather begins on low-key economic and technical planes.156  Integration must start 
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with low politics, in other words, rather than high politics.  This division originated with Stanley 
Hoffmann, who argued that technical and low-level cooperation by technocratic and non-
political elites could lead to increasingly relevant cooperation at higher political levels.157  Like 
security communities theory, neofunctionalism has faced criticism for its neglect of high 
politics.158  Indeed neofunctionalism’s failure to predict the challenge posed to European 
integration by Charles de Gaulle was emblematic of this failure to account for high political 
changes.  In any event, the constructivist argument that issues can change priority depending on 
ever-changing state and societal interests has made the distinction between high and low politics 
even more theoretically slippery than it once may have been. 
 
 
Toward a Synthesis 
 
 Scholars who have developed hybrid theories often draw out three aspects of 
neofunctionalism that are both compatible with other theories and empirically helpful in 
understanding integration in a given case.  The first of these is neofunctionalism’s interest in 
certain non-state actors such as transnational business associations and trade unions who benefit 
from reducing barriers on the movement of capital and labor, rather than neoliberal 
institutionalism’s emphasis on states as primary actors and Deutsch’s emphasis on populations 
and political elites.  The second is the emphasis on technocratic cooperation on relatively non-
controversial issues; while administrative intertwinement does not necessarily imply automatic 
spillover to other sectors, cooperation in certain sectors could provide a blueprint for cooperation 
in other sectors.  Finally, the neofunctional belief that supranational institutions develop their 
own centers of gravity and cultivate further integration is a relatively durable aspect that has 
survived original conceptions of the theory.  Some or all of these aspects of neofunctionalism 
have been found compatible with other theories and have produced a staggering number of 
hybrids.159 
 When neofunctionalism was revived in the 1990s, scholars did not reintroduce the 
determinism (in the form of automatic spillover) associated with the original theory, but they did 
emphasize the importance of functional spillover in limited contexts and the role of supranational 
organizations and interest groups.  Since the 1990s, a large variety of hybrid theories lay claim to 
some aspect of neofunctionalist thought, although they do not combine actors and integration 
mechanisms in the same way.  New approaches stressed the multilayer nature of the 
policymaking process; trends and structures of domestic politics; transaction costs in the 
integration process; development and identification of national interests; and national state 
executives and bargaining elites.160 
 As Verdun explains, no single theory best accounts for European monetary integration, 
for example, and taking aspects from several different theories could best describe the process as 
a whole.161  To the extent that changes in the global economy, such as competition from the 
United States and Pacific Basin, motivated European countries to develop a single currency, 
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theories stressing intergovernmental cooperation and national policy agendas rather than 
neofunctionalism are most relevant.  Likewise, intergovernmentalist theories are best-suited to 
explain how member states supported economic and monetary union as a way to make unpopular 
welfare and public finance reforms that would otherwise have been politically costly.  However, 
neofunctionalist thought, unlike government-driven theories of integration, can explain how the 
presence of societal groups made economic and monetary union easier and faster by adding 
additional legitimacy to national governments’ surrender of sovereignty to the supranational 
level.  The support of trade union confederations and national and continent-wide employers’ 
associations very actively promoted the European objective.  Economic and monetary union was 
possible from a neofunctional perspective because it involved highly technical matters better 
coordinated at the supranational level rather than national levels, and from an intergovernmental 
perspective because the states involved had converging policy objectives that made union 
beneficial.  This example illustrates how neofunctionalist thought, in conjunction with other 
theories, may still make a contribution to integration literature.162 
 
 
A Neofunctional Theory of Integration 
 
 In neofunctionalist terms, integration is the process of transferring exclusive expectations 
of benefits from the nation-state to some larger entity through the process of administrative and 
bureaucratic intertwinement of government policies and structures.  It encompasses the process 
by virtue of which national actors of all sorts—including government officials, interest group 
spokesmen, politicians, and ordinary people—cease to identify themselves and their future 
welfare entirely within their own national government and its policies.163  This is not to confuse 
the process with the end result.  A “political union” exists when the politicized decision-making 
process acquires legitimacy and authority.  Integration, on the other hand, is only the analytical 
term to describe evidence of increasing politization (i.e., formation of a polity), of shifting 
expectations, and of adaptation by actors to a new process of mutual accommodation.  It need not 
be consistent or unidirectional.164  The theory shares several important similarities with security 
communities integration theory, namely the emphasis on identity and loyalty shifts among a 
population.  The mechanism, however, is different: instead of weblike transactional and 
communications linkages, integration in neofunctional terms involves technocratic and 
administrative intertwinement that becomes more complex and sophisticated over time. 
 Although neofunctionalism as a theory is no longer defensible in its original terms due to 
its empirical inability to explain the course of European integration and the difficulty at 
transferring the theory outside of the European context, as a partial theory it is useful because it 
emphasizes variables that the other theories do not.  Two basic qualities of neofunctionalism 
have appeared repeatedly in recent scholarly literature.  The first is the emphasis on the 
development of transnational elites that would encourage integration, such as business and labor 
interests who profit from open access to markets and workers.  This is an important distinction 
from state-centric theories of integration.  The second is neofunctionalism’s recognition that the 
supranational technocratic elites who depend on the emerging institution cultivate continued 
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integration through, for example, coordinating national government officials to conform to the 
supranational body’s agenda.  Even if “spillover” per se is not consistent or automatic, the 
motivations of supranational elites are expansionist as they seek greater power and promote the 
supranational identity.  Although neofunctionalism today is a complementary lens through which 
to view integrative processes rather than a comprehensive theory, it continues to possess some 
relevance for the study of integration, not only in Europe, but elsewhere as well. 
 
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism 
 
 A third type of integration theory argues that states form collective institutions in order to 
achieve their own interests, but, one built, these institutions can alter state behavior by 
establishing and enforcing norms, by sharing information, and by regularizing contacts and 
communications.  Neoliberal institutionalism describes a pattern whereby states construct 
cooperative relationships around centers of mutual interests along institutional lines.  While 
neoliberal institutionalism became more prominent in the 1990s, the best representation of its 
core principles is After Hegemony by Robert O. Keohane (1984).  Accepting as fact the existence 
of interdependence between states, Keohane notes the potential for strife and the problem for 
international order that this creates.  The existence of institutions—defined by Keohane as 
“persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, 
constrain activity, and shape expectations”165—can explain not only the development of 
customary and repetitive practices among states, but broader cooperative behavior.  Because of 
complex interdependence among states, potential cooperation among states existed more often 
than the realist paradigm would suggest.  Since the survival of most states is not constantly at 
risk, states are more interested in maximizing gains rather than in preventing gains by other 
states.  Consequently, opportunities for collaboration exist beyond what a realist paradigm would 
posit by focusing instead on a state’s relative gains. 
 After World War Two, realism emerged as the dominant paradigm among international 
relations scholars where it encountered the idealist challenge from David Mitrany and later the 
neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas, which spawned numerous studies of regional European 
integration.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the debate between realism and liberal institutionalism 
began to take more definite shape.  Three especially important works, explored further below, 
appeared during this time that laid out many of the fundamental tenets of neoliberal 
institutionalism before Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony.166  The first of these was a special 
issue of International Organization in 1971 on the topic of “Transnational Relations and World 
Politics,” which challenged realist assumptions of state centricity in international relations by 
looking at various transnational non-state actors such as the Catholic Church, the Ford 
Foundation, and multinational business, each of which had some impact on state behavior.  The 
second book was Keohane and Joseph Nye’s Power and Interdependence in 1977, which 
explicitly challenged realism with respect to the state-as-actor assumption, the relative 
importance of military security on foreign policy agendas, and the role of military force in 
international politics, among other issues.  The third work was a special issue of International 
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Organization in 1982, edited by Stephen Krasner on the topic of “International Regimes,” which 
set forth both realist and liberal views on international cooperation and institutions.167 
 Perhaps more than the other theories analyzed here, neoliberal institutionalism developed 
in part in a back-and-forth debate with neorealism to define the points of disagreement and to 
clarify essential aspects of each respective theory.  The most seminal works in this exchange are 
summarized below.  The initial section outlines Keohane’s theory of neoliberal institutionalism, 
followed by a more nuanced and parsimonious theory of international institutions themselves and 
the different roles they could play.  The neorealist critique of neoliberal institutionalism follows, 
as do Keohane’s efforts to refine his theory and respond to some of the criticisms.  Finally, this 
chapter concludes with a neoliberal institutionalist definition of integration that could be of 
general application. 
 
 
The Theory of Neoliberal Institutionalism 
 
 Unlike security communities theory or neo-functionalism, neo-liberal institutionalism as 
delineated by Robert Keohane is formulated on a realist foundation rather than a constructivist 
one.  That is, the growth of international institutions occurs not because of affinities, 
communications, or shifting loyalties among populations, but because institutionalization is in 
states’ interests as it reduces transaction costs and encourages sharing of information.  States do 
not cooperate out of altruism, empathy, or loyalty to the international project—an assumption not 
shared by security communities theory or neo-functionalism—but rather because states want to 
advance the wealth and security of their own people and appropriate for themselves the power to 
do so.168  States build international regimes in order to promote mutually beneficial cooperation, 
such as in reducing transaction costs for states, alleviating problems of asymmetrical 
information, and limiting uncertainty among members.  At the same time, the existence of 
international regimes can change state policies through changing the costs and benefits of 
various alternatives.  Institutionalization does not replace state self-interest; it complements it. 
 Realism provides a taut logical structure and pessimistic assumptions that prevent wishful 
thinking.  However, the theory of realism needs revision.  Unlike realist paradaigms, Keohane 
did not perceive of the international order as constructed solely around the distribution of power.  
Rather, the distribution of information is also a variable, and international institutions can 
provide information, increase credibility, and build mutual trust between states.  International 
systems that have institutions that generate a great deal of high-quality information for major 
actors are more cooperative than systems that do not have these institutions, even if the state 
interests are comparable in both.169  This is the reason that international institutions have 
proliferated and strengthened after the end of the Cold War, despite realist predictions that 
institutions would wither with the end of superpower conflict.  In short: the existence of 
international organizations is still in state self-interest even though their existence is not as 
necessary in an anarchic distribution of power sense because of the information-sharing and 
trust-building nature of institutions.  Cooperation can even take place without hegemony, as 
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American aloofness from the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court attest.170  
Regimes do not need to be universal to be successful; indeed, they can be especially successful 
when a small number of like-minded countries both makes rules and enforces them.171 
 Traditional realist theory of international relations can explain alliance cooperation in the 
context of a balance of power but cannot explain system-wide patterns of cooperation that 
benefit many countries without being tied to an alliance system.  During the 1950s, both realists 
and functionalists could interpret the proliferation of international institutions in the context of 
their own views; realists pointed to American hegemony while functionalists pointed to desire of 
a rules-based world system.  The rise of Europe’s economic power during the 1960s after 
recovery from war, according to realists, caused international organizations to wane as American 
hegemony was challenged.  In the modern world, it is unlikely that a hegemon will appear, either 
the United States or another country, and consequently realism should predict the end of 
international institutions.  Indeed, Keohane highlighted realist thinker John Mearsheimer’s 
prediction that NATO would not survive the end of the Cold War because of the removal of the 
Soviet threat to Europe as emblematic of a larger theoretical flaw in realist doctrine.172  To the 
contrary, NATO survived and expanded geographically and functionally after the Cold War.  
States invest heavily in institutions, and the broad generalizations of realist theory do not 
successfully explain why. 
 Interdependence in the global political economy generates conflict.  To limit discord, 
cooperation is necessary to align government policies to prevent economic shock or political 
turmoil on other governments.  While the existence of a hegemonic power can drive this 
cooperation, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the modern world (which distributes power 
among non-hegemonic states) will ensure that cooperation in the future will be non-hegemonic.  
Although states are driven by their self-interest rather than their devotion to a common good, 
world politics is not a state of perpetual war, and states do have complementary interest.  As 
Keohane explains, international institutions create the conditions for orderly multilateral 
negotiations, legitimate and delegitimate different types of state action, and facilitate linkages 
among issues within regimes and between regimes.  They increase symmetry and improve the 
quality of information governments receive.  They help to bring governments into continuing 
interaction with one another, reducing incentives to cheat and enhancing the value of 
reputation.173 
 Like in neofunctionalism, neoliberal institutionalism requires that states delegate 
authority to supranational organizations that will later become capable of acting against the 
subsequent preferences of governments.  Even more than that, however, institutions help states 
reach a collectively superior outcome by reducing the transaction costs of further negotiations 
and by providing the necessary information for reducing state uncertainty about the future 
behavior and preferences of other states.174  States, through supranational organizations, establish 
rules for the distribution of gains, reduce the costs of coordinating their activities, monitoring the 
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behavior of other states, and mutually sanctioning non-compliance.  The structure of an 
international institution depends in part on the severity of distributional conflict, enforcement 
problems, and uncertainty about the preferences of other actors. 
 The theory of neoliberal institutionalism uses a similar definition of “international 
regime” instituted by political scientist John Ruggie, which defined regimes as sets of “mutual 
expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, 
which have been accepted by a group of states.”175  Krasner used a slightly different definition 
when he and his colleagues began to lay the foundations for neoliberal institutionalism: “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”176   Neoliberal scholars did not 
question the definition of anarchy as the absence of an institutional hierarchy capable of 
enforcing rules in world politics; they questioned the frequent implication that in anarchy, 
institutions based on rules were absent.  Chiefly by providing information to actors—and not 
necessarily by enforcing rules in a centralized manner—institutions could assist states to achieve 
their own objectives more efficiently, such as by monitoring compliance and enabling retaliation 
against cheaters. 
 Keohane’s theory has been criticized on several grounds.  To Keohane himself, the 
theory has an unavoidable weakness because it treats all states as generic units, without taking 
into account variations in domestic politics among them.  Rather than treating states in terms of 
the populations that inhabit them, as Deutsch does, Keohane treats them as billiard balls.  As he 
notes, however, there simply was no way to incorporate theories of domestic politics in a cogent 
and parsimonious way.  He also admits his over-optimism at the time of the original publication 
of his book in 1984.  Far from necessarily benefiting all nations, especially the least developed 
ones, organizations such as the World Trade Organization and GATT (especially the extension to 
intellectual property rights envisioned at the Uruguay Round) have pursued an agenda that is 
most favorable to wealthy, highly-developed states.  This does not mean that cooperation is not 
desirable, even though some players have reduced bargaining power relative to other players.  
However, it does suggest a moral imperative for institutional systems to reallocate more 
resources to poorer countries and direct those resources toward some of the world’s least 
advantaged people. 
 The empirical research program of neoliberal institutionalism remained limited to a 
handful of successful Western institutions such as NATO, World Trade Organization/GATT, or 
the European Union at the expense of other institutions such as the Warsaw Pact or the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.177  As Hemmer and Katzenstein have 
written, pure formulations of both liberalism and realism are less convincing than hybrid theories 
that also incorporate important insights from constructivist theory.  To liberalism, constructivism 
contributes an understanding of the consequences of personal and group identity to international 
institutions.  To neorealism, constructivism adds consideration of ideational and non-material 
structures and the effects of identity on national interests.178  Neither pure liberalism nor pure 
neorealism can explain why NATO has not been replicated in Asia.  Constructivist theory 
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suggests that the Asian continent lacked some components of a common identity that NATO 
countries shared.  For neoliberal institutionalism, culture matters as to how information is 
distributed and interpreted.  From a realist perspective, it is inexplicable that a strong state would 
join a common institution with weaker states and thereby bind its own future courses of action, 
as Germany did in supporting economic and monetary union.179  NATO is viewed by its 
neighbors as a concrete manifestation of western civilization, and consequently enlargement that 
was controversial at the time, such as Italy’s inclusion, now seems natural.  The Asia Pacific 
region also lacks a history of institutionalization compared to Western Europe and North 
America.  In this way, some aspects of neoliberal institutionalism may be compatible with 
aspects of constructivism. 
 At the same time, syncretism between neoliberal institutionalism and neofunctionalism is 
possible in large part because the two theories share basic presumptions and indeed common 
theoretical origins.  Neoliberal institutionalism rests on a functionalist logic that assumes pursuit 
of and maximization of profit was a primary motivating factor for nation-states.180  Neoliberal 
institutionalists, like functionalists, assume that institutional development would rest on the 
ability to deliver on collective goals in given environmental circumstances, and as circumstances 
changed, so too would institutions.  According to neoliberal institutionalism, environmental 
circumstances were constantly evolving, and even diffuse institutional patterns could be 
explained with this same functional logic.  The difference is that neoliberal institutionalism 
works within the nation-state paradigm rather than opposed to it, so that states could be partners 
in a process that, rather than replacing the state, would help it meet its own interests.  Both 
theories view the state as an obstacle to work around, but neoliberal institutionalism retains a 
place for the state. 
 
 
Developing a Theory of International Institutions 
 
 State actions depend to a considerable degree on the flow of information and the 
opportunities to negotiate, and the ability of governments to monitor others’ compliance and to 
implement their own commitments and expectations about others’ commitments.  With these 
considerations in mind, international institutions can take one of three forms: first, formal 
intergovernmental or international non-governmental arrangements; second, international 
regimes, or in Oran Young’s terms, “negotiated orders” such as the Bretton Woods system and 
the Law of the Sea regime; and third, conventions, which are informal institutions with implicit 
rules and understandings.181  All three types overlap.  According to Keohane, the level of 
institutional sophistication can be measured along three dimensions: first, commonality, or the 
degree to which expectations about appropriate behavior and understandings are shared by 
participants in the system; second, specificity, or the degree to which those expectations are 
clearly detailed in terms of rules; and third, autonomy, or the extent to which institutions can 
alter their own rules rather than relying on participating members to do so.182 
                                                 
179 Ibid., p. 601. 
180 Sterling-Folker, “Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather?,” p. 103. 
181 N.J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory, and the Problem of Order: Beyond International 
Relations Theory? (NY: Routledge, 2000), p. 128. 
182 Ibid. 
 55 
 Another theoretical ancestor of neoliberal institutionalism was the interdependence 
theory of the 1970s.  In 1977, Keohane and Nye anticipated the theoretical background for a 
theory that ascribes significant influence to international organizations.  According to Keohane 
and Nye, interdependence is created by reciprocal efforts resulting in mutual dependence among 
countries or actors in different countries, resulting from international transactions across 
boundaries.183  Governments and transnational actors will strive to increase their share of the 
gains from these transactions, even where they both profit in absolute terms.  Less dependent 
actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of bargaining power because 
changes in the relationship will be less costly to that member.  In a world in which security 
issues are dominant and war threatens frequently, international institutions will play a relatively 
minor role.  However, in a world where multiple issues are imperfectly linked, in which 
coalitions are formed transnationally and internationally, the potential bargaining role of 
international organizations is greatly increased.  They can help set the agenda, act as catalysts for 
coalition-building, and provide an arena for initiatives by weak states.184  International 
organizations, by bringing government agencies and officials together, can create explicit 
coalitions founded on direct constitutions.  In this way, a world characterized by complex 
interdependence looks different from a realist world. 
 In an earlier book, Keohane and Nye elaborated on the role that transnational 
communications (and international institutions as facilitators of such communications) play in 
the international system by linking groups in different societies and promoting attitude 
changes.185  Here, he defines these organizations broadly to include not only intergovernmental 
organizations but also transnational civil society organizations and multinational corporations.  
These international institutions can create new symbols, myths, and norms to provide legitimacy 
for their activities.  The very existence of international institutions and other organizations 
operating across borders implicates technological changes in communications, travel, and 
transportation, producing new connections that have formed the basis for neo-functionalism and 
security communities theory.  Another major effect of the internationalization of institutions is 
the creation of dependence and interdependence.  States may become dependent on international 
scientific, transportation, or financial networks, or even on international organizations that 
provide certain goods and services, which may alter domestic patterns of political relations to 
make otherwise feasible policies more costly, such as setting an autonomous monetary policy.  
Among unequal states, transnational organizations and networks may put additional means of 
leverage into the hands of more powerful states to the disadvantage of those that are already 
weak.186  In short, transnational relations provide different sets of incentives or payoffs for states, 
because they alter the choices open to statesmen by affecting relative costs of different policies.  
Transnational organizations have become large and powerful actors capable of consciously 
attempting to shape the world to their interests.187 
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 In a later collection of essays, Keohane elaborates on the nature of international 
institutions.188  Institutions have both constitutive and regulatory aspects: they affect the 
understandings of state leaders about their own interests and the interests of others, and at the 
same time they affect state behavior, even if evasion is possible.  However, international social 
structures and organizations defined broadly exert much less pull on state policy than domestic 
institutions.  Keohane distinguished his version of neoliberal institutionalism from liberal theory, 
indicating that cooperation, even among democracies, is not automatic; rather, it requires 
planning, negotiation, and the exercise of influence.  Neoliberal institutionalists accept a version 
of liberal principles that avoids determinism and that emphasizes the pervasive significance of 
international institutions without denigrating the role of state power.189  International regimes, 
and the institutions and procedures that develop in conjunction with them, perform the function 
of reducing uncertainty and risk by linking issues and improving the quantity and the quality of 
the information available to participants.  Linking issues is important because it prevents 
deception or cheating, which is less profitable in an institutionalized relationship where the 
cheater’s behavior is closely monitored by other participants and interaction among them is 
continuing.  Institutions benefit communications among participants also, but they cannot make 
it perfect: knowledge among bargaining parties is asymmetrical and government officials rarely 
fully reveal their preferences in international diplomacy.190   
 Considering these qualities of international institutions, it is possible to make some 
distinctions among different types of international regimes.  International policy coordination 
depends not only on interests and power, but also on expectations and information, which are 
functions of domestic political structures and elites.  Intergovernmental relationships 
characterized by ongoing communication among working-level officials are inherently more 
conducive to informational exchange than are traditional transnational relationships controlled by 
members of a government bureaucracy.  Regimes with highly regularized procedures and rules 
will provide more information to participants than less regularized regimes; where information is 
in demand, these regimes will be more highly valued, as will regimes characterized by open 
government arrangements.191  Creating international regimes creates risk that another state will 
fail to carry out its commitments, but they mitigate the consequences arising from rapid and 
unpredictable changes in world politics.  Keohane also distinguishes between “control-oriented 
regimes” in which member states create institutionalized arrangements to monitor each other’s 
behavior, and “insurance regimes” in which member states pool resources and risk, such as oil-
sharing regimes.192  While control-oriented regimes seek to control externalities, insurance 
regimes spread risk around when externalities cannot be controlled.  Because control-oriented 
regimes require more stringent membership conditions, whether a member state chooses one 
form over another depends on how the benefits of regular, institutionalized contact weigh against 
the organizational and autonomy costs of submitting to the institution’s rules.  The optimal size 
of a regime will increase if there are increasing rather than diminishing returns to regime scale or 
if the marginal costs of organization decline as the regime size grows.  In dense policy areas, 
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demands for overall frameworks of rules to cover clusters of issues (and consequently, demand 
for international regimes) will increase.193 
 Martin has expanded this typology even further.194  Different cooperation problems, she 
writes, lead to different institutional structures.  She uses a type of game theory to distinguish 
among four types of problems: collaboration (where the equilibrium outcome is bad for both 
parties); coordination (where each actor has a different preferred outcome); suasion (where a 
more powerful member persuades a weaker one to adopt a less-favored outcome); and assurance 
(where both sides seek to benefit from cooperation).  In collaboration problems with many 
actors, high incentives to engage in undetected cheating should trigger the emergence of a strong 
institution in the absence of a hegemon who can enforce compliance.  In these types of regimes, 
“free-riders” will need to face some sort of punishment in order for the regime to work (as with 
the World Trade Organization).  Coordination problems, on the other hand, do not present 
significant advantages to concealed defection from established conventions, so multilateral 
norms may be sufficient to establish cooperation.  In any event, institutions established at the 
early phases of the dispute may be quite successful.  In suasion problems, cooperation is 
achieved through issue linkages, and an institution could work if it binds the dominant power and 
persuades smaller powers to join.  Suasion problems, unlike the others, involve the core problem 
of asymmetry.  In assurance problems, the institution will work to increase transparency, as the 
exchange of information is the crux of the contentious issue.195  
 As noted above, reciprocity between states requires the ability to recognize and retaliate 
against defectors.  One way to do this is to establish a hierarchy whereby more powerful states, 
which are more committed to the regime, could deal effectively with weaker states who are in 
danger of defecting.  These types of hierarchies exist, for instance, where international banking 
networks could facilitate rescheduling of developing world debt.  Another way to do this is 
through establishing international regimes, which have become ubiquitous after World War Two 
in, for instance, the international trade regime (GATT/World Trade Organization) or the 
international monetary regime (IMF and partners).  Since the use of power could be channeled 
into either establishing a hierarchy or establishing a regime, the two forms of conditional 
cooperation should be seen as complementary.  Regimes, including international institutions, do 
not enforce rules in a hierarchical sense, but they do change patterns of transaction costs and 
provide information to participants so that uncertainty is reduced.196 
 International regimes do not substitute for reciprocity between states; rather, they 
reinforce and institutionalize it.  Regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity make defection 
illegitimate and therefore more costly.  Because they define reciprocity in the given issue area, 
they make it easier to establish a reputation for practicing reciprocity consistently.  Such 
reputations are themselves important assets, because other states will be more willing to make 
agreements with governments that could be expected to respond to cooperation with cooperation.  
Since governments with good reputations can more easily make agreements than governments 
with bad ones, international regimes can help to facilitate cooperation by making it both easier 
and more desirable to acquire a good reputation.197  In this sense, international institutions 
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possess a kind of creditworthiness function.  Occasionally, international regimes have been used 
to attempt to develop new norms, but they have not always been successful, such as international 
financial institutions with norms of lending and repayment.  Establishing hierarchies or 
institutional regimes change the context within which actors operate by changing the very 
structure of their interaction.  They have been experimental, trial-and-error efforts to improve the 
current situation, and they have occasionally failed.198   
 
 
The Neorealist Critique of Neoliberal Institutionalism 
 
 Neoliberal institutionalism appeared in the early 1980s after international tensions during 
the 1970s caused other liberal international relations theories to decline.  As realist scholar 
Greico explains, neoliberal institutionalism accepts a number of core realist propositions, 
including an assumption that systemic anarchy impedes cooperation, while remaining faithful to 
the liberal belief that international institutions promote cooperation and reduce conflict.199  
Greico surmised that neoliberal institutionalism misconstrued the nature of international anarchy 
and consequently, the theory’s optimism about international cooperation would be proven 
wrong.200  According to Greico’s analysis of neoliberal institutionalism, states seek to maximize 
their absolute gains, and international institutions can improve compliance so that all states can 
benefit.  However, realism also posits that states may not cooperate even where cooperation 
would be beneficial for all parties if one state benefits more than another state; both absolute and 
relative gains can determine whether cooperation succeeds or fails.  Unlike in neoliberal 
institutionalism, in neorealism states must give serious attention to the gains made by other states 
because they are potential enemies, a major source of state inhibitions toward cooperation that 
neoliberal institutionalism is unable to identify. 
 As Baldwin explains, six focal points characterize the debate between neorealism and 
neoliberalism: (1) the nature and consequences of anarchy, which have different conceptions in 
the two theories; (2) the ease and likelihood of cooperation, which neoliberal institutionalists 
believed contained unrealized potential; (3) relative versus absolute gains, with neorealists 
tending to focus on the former and neoliberals on the latter; (4) the priority of state economic 
versus state national security goals, with neoliberals emphasizing the former and neorealists the 
latter; (5) an emphasis on interests, intentions, and information (neoliberalism) versus 
distribution of capabilities (neorealism); and (6) the importance of institutions and international 
regimes.201  Keohane did acknowledge in a 1993 essay that neoliberal institutionalists 
underestimated the importance of relative gains under certain conditions, but he emphasized the 
need to identify what those conditions are, since empirically it is difficult to tell when states are 
pursuing absolute or relative gains.202 
 Although neoliberal institutionalism claims to accept the premise of realist anarchy, 
neoliberal anarchy is characterized by the absence of a supranational body that could enact rules 
of behavior and force states to cooperate.  In other words, states may wish to cooperate so that 
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they all may benefit, but they lack a central agency to coordinate their expectations.  For realists, 
on the other hand, states are not driven by a desire for well-being, but rather a desire for survival, 
and consequently states view other states’ gains with suspicion.  States are driven to maintain 
their position in the system more than they are driven to maximize their own power and well-
being.203  A state may avoid cooperation with other states if it believes its partners are achieving 
relatively greater gains even if cooperation would have won it large absolute gains.  A state may 
even forego cooperation even if other states’ do not cheat, transaction costs are low, and 
compliance is assured, the central variable of neoliberal institutionalists.  In neoliberal anarchy, 
the worst case scenario is a state’s loss of gains due to the failure of cooperation; in realist 
anarchy, the worst case scenario is a state’s loss of its relative position and possibly a lack of 
survival in the international system. 
 The neorealist response to Keohane’s theory of neoliberal institutionalism produced 
seminal works of its own.  Kenneth Waltz laid the theoretical groundwork for the revival of 
realism in the 1970s, through his article “Theory of International Relations” in 1975 and a full-
length book in 1979 entitled Theory of International Politics.  Joseph Greico’s “Anarchy and the 
Limits of Cooperation: A Neorealist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in 1988 
provided a comprehensive response to Keohane’s theory from a realist perspective.204 
 Neorealist scholar Waltz, who engaged in an academic back-and-forth with Keohane over 
several years, described the international system as a “self-help” regime because, unlike the 
governments of nation-states, no single entity possessed a monopoly of violence.205  As a 
consequence, actors must prepare to defend themselves because hostilities could break out at any 
time.  In a self-help system, each unit spends a portion of its effort not in promoting its own 
welfare, but in providing the means to protect itself from others.  While specialization in a 
system of divided international labor may benefit everyone, inequality in the expected 
distribution of the benefits may make states skeptical of cooperation.  This is similar to Greico’s 
conclusion: if one state may acquire a disproportionate benefit, even if both benefit, the 
uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions deters cooperation.  Although the well-
being of the system as a whole would benefit if states engaged in a more elaborate and 
specialized division of labor, doing so will make them ever more closely interdependent, and that 
makes them more vulnerable to external disruptions.206  Consequently, even though they may 
benefit in absolute terms, states have an inherent tendency to avoid cooperation, especially if 
they are relatively small or weak in the global balance of power. 
 Self-help is a necessary principle of action in an anarchic order, and actors in an anarchic 
system must rely on the means they can generate in order to maintain their security.  A self-help 
system is one of high risk, both of economic bankruptcy and of war, but organizational costs are 
low.  Within an international order, risk can be mitigated through erecting agencies that possess 
effective authority and extend a system of rules.  In hierarchic orders of supranational agencies, 
organizational costs are much higher, and the means of control becomes an object of struggle.  
States cannot entrust managerial powers to a central agency unless that agency is able to protect 
its client states.  The more powerful the clients and the more powerful a threat each client 
appears to be, the stronger the central authority must be.  The greater the power of the central 
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authority is, the stronger the incentive for states to struggle to control it.207  In a society of states 
with little coherence, attempts at world government would founder on the inability of an 
emerging central authority to command resources to coerce compliance with the system.  The 
prospect of world government is an invitation to world war.  Units in an anarchic order act for 
their own sake and not for the sake of preserving an organization; consequently, states are free to 
leave one another alone.  The system is peaceful in some sense: states are better able to aim for a 
minimal agreement that will permit their separate existence rather than a mutual agreement for 
unity’s sake.  “If might decides, then bloody struggles over right can more easily be avoided.”208  
Wars among states cannot settle questions of authority or right; they can only determine the 
allocation of gains or losses for a time. 
 Keohane’s response to Waltz and other neorealist critics is that, while an understanding 
of power dynamics in the international system is essential for any theory of international 
relations, realism does not provide a set of plausible and testable answers to questions about state 
behavior under specified conditions.209  Realism helps determine the strength of the trap but does 
not provide assistance in escaping from the trap.  In order to promote peaceful change, an 
international theory must not only determine the structure of world politics independent of 
individual decision-makers, but must include variables that can be manipulated by human action.  
Since international institutions, norms, and patterns of cooperation can affect calculations of 
interest, and can also be affected by political decision-making, they provide a natural focus for 
attention by scholars and policymakers.210 
 Keohane also points out a broader ambiguity in realist thinking.  Assuming power to be 
tangible resources that can be used to induce other actors to do that which they could not 
otherwise do, balance of power theory is inconsistent with the realist assumption that states 
consistently seek to “maximize power.”211  States concerned with self-preservation do not seek 
to maximize power when they are not in danger.  Rather, they recognize a trade-off between 
aggrandizement and self-preservation; they moderate their positions when their positions are 
secure, and they intensify them only when threatened.  The realist assumption that states seek to 
“maximize power” does not explain why states weigh competing goals that are generated by 
their own internal social, political, and economic characteristics and only sometimes choose to 
“maximize power.”212 
 The theoretical division between relative gains and absolute gains was synthesized to 
some degree by Powell in an article that argues states are more sensitive to relative gains than to 
absolute gains when the possible use of force is implicated.213 In this model, states are assumed 
to be trying to maximize their absolute gains, as a state’s utility depends on the absolute levels of 
economic welfare the state gains. But the use of force may be at issue because states are trying to 
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maximize their economic welfare within the constraints of an anarchic international system.214  If 
the use of force is no longer at issue, however, a state’s relative loss will not be turned against 
that state.  When the cost of using force is sufficiently low that the use of force actually is at 
issue, cooperative outcomes that offer unequal absolute gains cannot be supported as part of the 
equilibrium even though the states' preferences are defined only over their absolute level of 
economic welfare.  This inability to cooperate is in accord with the expectations of structural 
realism, though the assumption that states are maximizing their absolute gains is not in keeping 
with its usual formulations.  If the use of force is not at issue because fighting is too costly, then 
the results are more in accord with neoliberal institutionalism.215 This model suggests that 
cooperation, at least in the circumstance where the use of force is an option, may be especially 
difficult to achieve because cheating on the agreement would bring large relative gains.  
However, the model suggests that cooperation in other circumstances would be more promising 
than structural realists indicate.216  Many aspects of neoliberal institutionalism and structural 
realism are actually special cases of the model. 
 Neorealist John Mearsheimer has criticized neo-liberal institutionalism, believing that 
institutions have “minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting 
stability in the post-Cold War world.”217  To realists, institutions are basically a reflection of the 
distribution of power in the world, based on the self-interested calculations of the Great Powers, 
and consequently have no independent effect on state behavior.  They are not important causes of 
peace and only matter at the margins.  Because realist conceptions of cooperation are centered on 
absolute versus relative gains and on concern over cheating, cooperation is difficult to achieve 
and always difficult to sustain in a realist world.218  The most powerful states create and shape 
institutions so that they can maintain or increase their share of world power, and institutions 
simply reflect the prevailing balance of power.  Mearsheimer is likewise critical of Keohane’s 
relative neglect of security issues in favor of environmental and economic issues, noting that 
neoliberal institutionalists overstate the propensity of states to cooperate because they exclude 
military issues from the analysis.219  Cheating is a much greater obstacle to cooperation in the 
military realm than it is in the economic realm.  In addition, other liberal counterarguments are 
not empirically sound.  For instance, it has not been shown to be true that curing the “cheating” 
problem necessarily resolves the “relative gains” problem (on the theory that states would have 
nothing to fear from each other if they could trust one another not to cheat), and arguing that 
“cheating” is linked only to military affairs and not to economic ones creates a false separation 
between the two when military preparedness is so closely linked to economic strength.  Scholars 
such as Keohane have been largely unable to point out instances where cooperation would not 
have occurred but for institutions. 
 Jervis has found similar fault with Keohane’s theory, but he walks back from 
Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism,” which posits that states are continually trying to maximize 
power.  “Defensive realists” such as Jervis argue that states are often willing to settle for the 
status quo and are driven more by fear from other states than desire to maximize their own 
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power.220  Conflict can be caused where goals among states are truly incompatible, or it can be 
caused where states take self-defeating measures or engage in an interactive process that 
generates conflict.  Consequently, at least a subset of conflict may be unnecessary, because not 
all conflict represents real incompatibility in states’ goals.  However, neoliberal institutionalism 
is too optimistic when it posits that institutions increase cooperation, because their very existence 
in the first place occurs only when they would benefit from the institution in reaching their 
goals.221   The difference between realists and neoliberals in this sense would be whether 
institutionalism is a cause or an effect of cooperation; neoliberals would choose the former, and 
realists the latter. 
 Keohane and Martin have responded to these criticisms.  Institutionalist theory makes no 
distinction between security issues and political economy issues, because information transfer is 
the crux of the theory.222  Realists contend that in an uncertain, anarchic world, states must 
assume the worst about others’ intentions, but access to greater information could lead 
policymakers to policies that more nearly maximize utility.  Institutionalist theory also has 
implications for distributional issues.  States are often torn not only between whether to 
cooperate or not cooperate, but the form that cooperation should take, and the existence of 
institutional frameworks may help states realize maximum potential gains from cooperation.  
Just as institutions can mitigate fears of cheating in the international system and allow 
cooperation to emerge, so too can they alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation.223  
Furthermore, realism simply cannot explain why states have invested so heavily in institutions 
such as GATT, NATO, and the European Union, if indeed these institutions are “marginal” to 
international politics.224  Presumably, states would not support organizations that they believed 
to make no difference.  Martin’s research showed that states used the framework of the European 
Community to reduce fears of cheating by subverting sanctions on Argentina during the 
Falklands War.225  European states generally refrained from sanctions busting even though they 
had the opportunity to profit from it.226  Institutions do not just prevent or discourage cheating; 
they also allow for effective retaliation against cheaters and allow gains to be distributed among 
those who resist cheating.  
 
 
A Neoliberal Institutional Theory of Integration 
 
 Integration in neoliberal institutional theory occurs when supranational institutions 
become autonomous enough of the self-interest of member states to encourage their own growth 
and begin to change state behavior toward further cooperation.  Neoliberal institutionalism is the 
theory that cooperation among nation-states can be facilitated through the workings of 
international regimes or (more formally) supranational institutions, because both of these 
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frameworks prevent defection, ensure access to greater information, and preserve reputations.  
Adopting the realist assumption that states have survival and self-interest as core motivations, 
states stand to benefit from joining international institutions.  Institutions help states reach 
qualitatively more beneficial goals because they reduce transaction costs over the long term and 
allow for fruitful, cooperative relationships to develop among states.  Even where an 
international regime is characterized by repetitive norm or practice rather than by a physical 
structure, such as the Law of the Sea regime, states can still benefit over the long term because 
they can set expectations based on the practices of other states.  Finally, institutions can alter 
state behavior over time by making cooperation less costly, by punishing defectors through 
sanctions and other penalties, and by reinforcing norms of good behavior. 
 In the context of the integrative process among states, a neoliberal institutionalist 
perspective will look at the roles played by international institutions in encouraging integration 
through the reduction of transaction costs, penalties and compliance, and reputational benefits, 
such as maintaining creditworthiness.  Like the other modern theories of integration, neoliberal 
institutionalism is not deterministic in its end goal, and it must account for reversal or 
disintegration.  As state interests change, institutions may grow obsolete.  Having developed 
through a long-running scholarly debate with revived neorealism, the realist/neoliberal 
institutionalist debate has helped both theories narrow points of contention and sharpen their 
essential elements.  Because of increasing interdependence in the international sphere, Keohane 
indicated that realism understated the value and potential for cooperation among states.  In an 
empirical study, a neoliberal institutionalist perspective will focus on the efforts of international 
institutions at encouraging interdependence among states, and at the response they receive from 
state officials and wider populations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The three theories analyzed above share common theoretical origins in the project of 
Western European integration during the Cold War period, but each has attempted to refine its 
generally applicable principles so as to encompass regions outside of Western Europe.  With the 
constructivist revolt of the 1990s, security communities theory has faced a resurgence in 
scholarly literature that underpins the theory in sociological conceptions of individual and 
collective identity.  The theory has been especially active in scholarship related to Southeast Asia 
and Southern Africa.  Neofunctionalism has not fared as well in transitioning outside of the 
Western European context, but certain elements emphasized in neofunctional scholarship, such 
as administrative and regulatory intertwinement and harmonization of policy across borders, 
continues to be useful in measuring the extent of regional integration in a particular case.  
Finally, neo-liberal institutionalism is of more recent origin, developing in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, but the theory benefited from the circumstances of the end of the Cold War in which 
international institutions strengthened rather than withered with the end of the bipolar 
international system.  Neo-liberal institutionalism as a consequence may help explain why some 
international institutions have grown quite powerful and are able to shape state interests in 
varying degrees over time.  The study that follows, of integration amongst Azerbaijan Georgia 
and Turkey, will continue to draw on these elements in analyzing the empirical evidence of 
integration. 
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Chapter 2 – Evaluating Integration Amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey 
 
The three integrative theories presented in the past chapter provide a framework for 
assessing relations amongst Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, three countries that have become 
increasingly entangled in certain areas since the fall of the Soviet Union.  Representing highly 
distinct populations and varying greatly in terms of economic stability and political and legal 
capacity, an organic process of integration is nonetheless occurring, especially in the energy and 
transit sectors.  This is no accident: energy and transit are highly regulated fields, and the 
intertwinement of the regulatory and administrative capabilities of all three countries reduces 
transaction costs and improves profits. The “spillover” process first delineated in traditional neo-
functionalist theory, however, has not occurred.  While regulatory reform undoubtedly improved 
transparency and legal capacity, it does not appear to have placed significant integrative pressure 
on other sectors, such as security or economic integration.  At the same time, evidence is mixed 
of increasing communications amongst the Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Georgian populations to an 
extent greater than their communications with other countries in the region and with the 
world.227  The involvement of Transnational Extra-regional Actors such as the European Union 
and the World Bank as facilitators of integration provides a more promising thesis.  Nonetheless, 
all three theories of integration examined above provide a helpful framework for understanding 
relations amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  The following chapter will evaluate 
integration amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, during the period from the mid-1990s to 
2008, in the spheres of security, politics, society and culture, economics and trade, energy, and 
transport.  It will demonstrate that during the above time period, integration only occurred in the 
energy and transport sectors, before ending with an introduction to the role of TERAs in these 
processes, which will be more fully discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
Security 
  
 The limits of integration amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are evident in the 
security sector.  During the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, for instance, Turkey did not 
have the capacity to serve as a counterweight to Russia, and while quietly supportive, Azerbaijan 
very much remained on the sidelines.  All three countries have maintained multiple security 
alliances and preferences, and all three have ambiguous political and economic relations with 
Russia, their largest trading partner during the time period examined.  Similarly, the isolation of 
Armenia appears to be a higher priority for Azerbaijan and Turkey than it does for Georgia, 
while Azerbaijan’s ambiguous relationship with Iran complicates the security alliance among the 
three countries even further.228  Indeed, using Deutsch’s definition of a security community, it is 
not clear at all that among Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey an exclusive “we-feeling” and sense 
of common identity have developed.  Instead, each country’s security position has varied 
depending on the political leadership at the time. 
Among the South Caucasus countries, Azerbaijan seemed the most likely to sustain long-
term economic growth at the time of independence.  In part, this was because Azerbaijan had the 
potential to use its oil revenues to sustain a military challenge, although war broke out in 
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Nagorno-Karabakh before the Azerbaijani oil sector was developed enough to fuel a military 
victory.  Nonetheless, oil remains vital to Azerbaijani security and, as the progress of war with 
Armenia showed, Azerbaijan possesses a powerful weapon in cutting off gas supplies and 
blockading food and consumer goods along the Baku-Yerevan railway line with devastating 
results for Armenia.  Georgia, on the other hand, did not have Azerbaijan’s resource potential, 
and possessed ambiguous relations with Armenia since independence.  Georgia does not 
maintain an economic blockade on Armenia and in many ways acts as a quiet thoroughfare 
between Russia and Armenia, despite its important energy relationship with Azerbaijan.  Georgia 
may in fact view Armenia as a strategic mediator of sorts its own conflict with Russia.  In 2008, 
Armenia maintained “constructive neutrality” toward Georgia during the Russia-Georgia War, 
but suffered after the war when Georgia and Russia failed to reopen border crossings to permit 
the export of Armenian produce.229  Armenian-Georgian relations have been characterized as 
grudging détente, but in fact there is little that pits Tbilisi and Yerevan directly against one 
another on security matters.230 
Russia’s relationship with the countries of the South Caucasus is complex, ambiguous, 
and inconsistent.  While Russia has tried to establish a security system with the independent 
states of the South Caucasus, it has only succeeded to a significant degree in Armenia, the only 
former Soviet republic to have a combined air defense system with Russia.231  Surrounded by 
hostile neighbors, Armenia does not need to be pressured to convince Russian troops to remain 
on its soil.  Georgia was initially reluctant to permit a base for Russian troops, given Russian 
support for separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but it later signed an agreement allowing 
Russia to police the border with Turkey and hosted Russian military facilities until the lead-up to 
the 2008 war.232  For the first decade after Azerbaijan’s independence, Russia pressured the 
country to allow Russian military bases on its soil, to closely monitor borders with Turkey and 
Iran, and to lease the early-warning station at Gabala in north-east Azerbaijan.  Azerbaijan, 
however, has consistently rejected the stationing of Russian troops on its soil due to perceived 
Russian support of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.  Azerbaijan has attempted to use 
the early-warning radar station at Gabala as a bargaining chip to obtain Russian support on 
Karabakh, but without much success.233   
Russia’s own security concerns in the South Caucasus are intimately tied to cross-border 
ethnic and clan linkages in the North Caucasus region, which was incompletely “colonized” by 
Moscow during Soviet times.  Azerbaijan’s proximity to Chechnya, a restive autonomous region 
in the North Caucasus region, and border with Dagestan, another potentially explosive region, 
threaten Russia’s careful security policy. Similarly, the war in South Ossetia in Georgia created 
the conditions leading to arms trafficking and organized criminal activity in North Ossetia and 
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Ingushetia in the Russian Federation.  The Georgian war in Abkhazia generated unrest in the 
ethnically related Russian autonomous republic of Adyghe.234  As a consequence, Russia 
vigilantly monitors its southern border with Georgia and Azerbaijan.  While Dagestan may be 
less likely to suffer a Chechen-style ethnic conflict, the Russian pipelines from Baku to 
Novorrossisk and from Baku to Tikhoretsk pass through the Dagestani capital of Mackhachkala.  
The strategic importance of these routes is even greater than the Chechen routes: while a loop 
around Grozny is feasible, transit through Dagestan is unavoidable as it is the only border Russia 
possesses with Azerbaijan.235  A Chechen scenario in Dagestan could have dire consequences for 
the viability of Russian routes for the export of oil from Azerbaijan. 
To the extent that a Russia-Armenia-Iran axis exists in the South Caucasus region 
(exclusive and exhaustive of a Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkey axis), it is also the product of 
ambiguous relations between Iran and Azerbaijan.  While Iran took a more ideological approach 
toward Azerbaijan shortly after independence and emphasized an affinity for the Muslim Azeri 
population during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Iran has been increasingly vigilant of 
destabilization and ethnic unrest among Azeri populations in northern Iran.236  The more Baku 
expressed a desire for ties with Iran’s Azeri populations, the more Iran expanded its cooperation 
with Armenia.237  When President Elchibey of Azerbaijan, for instance, called for increasing ties 
with “South Azerbaijan” (northern Iran), Iran established diplomatic relations with Armenia and 
improved natural gas and transportation links with Armenia at the height of the Nagorno-
Karabakh war.  By transporting Russian oil through Iranian territory, Iran broke the Azerbaijani 
blockade and Turkish embargo and sustained Armenia’s war effort.238 
The expansion of Russian influence in the South Caucasus has fueled in large part the 
potential for an Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey axis.  Turkey in particular is concerned that Russia 
may use the conflict in Chechnya as a pretext to re-establish greater influence, if not control, 
over the Southern Caucasus.  This would place Turkey in a security dilemma of sorts, 
exacerbating the country’s security fears by endangering an important land corridor between 
Turkey and Central Asia and threatening plans to build a Transcaucasian network of pipelines.  
Turkey is not an equal counterweight to Russia.  Although Turkey would not be able to single-
handedly prevent Russian encroachment on the Caucasus, Ankara would object to an expansion 
of Russian influence and would fear damage to Turkey’s strong economic relations with 
Russia.239   
Turkey’s close relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia have resulted from not only a more 
nuanced foreign policy, but also the resolution of significant internal crises that plagued Turkey 
during the 1990s.  Turkey’s improved relations with its neighbors and the European Union 
foreshadowed a rise of influence for the country in the Caucasus.  In 1997, Turkey and Georgia 
signed a defense cooperation agreement that led to, for instance, Georgian troops serving under 
Turkish command in the United Nations force in Kosovo.240  Turkish support following a 
                                                 
234 Hadjian, “Azerbaijan’s Energy Policy,” p. 135. 
235 Hadjian, “Azerbaijan’s Energy Policy,” p. 136. 
236 “Several ethnic Azeri activists arrested in Iran,” Turan News Agency (Baku: 31 Jul, 2008) 
237 Brenda Shaffer, “Iran’s Internal Azerbaijani Challenge: Implications for Policy in the Caucasus,” in The Caspian 
Region Volume 1: A Re-Emerging Region (Moshe Gammer, ed., New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 125. 
238 Shaffer, “Iran’s  Internal Azerbaijani Challenge,” p. 127. 
239 Gareth Winrow, Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 2000), p. 1. 
240 Mithat Celikpala, “From a Failed State to a Weak One? Georgia and Turkish-Georgian Relations,” The Turkish 
Yearbook, 36, 2005 p.. 189. 
 67 
renewed cooperation agreement in 2000 included $2.8 million for the construction of military 
training centers in Kodori and Gori and a shooting range outside of Tbilisi, as well as training of 
Georgian pilots in Turkish airspace.241 Turkey spent $1.5 million modernizing the Marneuli 
Military Air Base outside of Tbilisi, opening in 2001, which had symbolic value of being the first 
modern base to be established in Georgia without Russian assistance.242 As a consequence of this 
period of emerging stability in the Caucasus, by the year 2000 Turkey was seeking a major 
expansion of influence in the region by pursuing a détente with Russia.  Turkey has sponsored 
several regional strategic initiatives in which Russia was also included, such as the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) program and a possible Caucasus Stability Pact, although the 
latter has not progressed beyond a notional vision.243  The Caucasus Stability Pact, proposed by 
then-Turkish president Suleyman Demirel, was revived by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan in 2008 after the Russia-Georgia War as the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation 
Platform, but that was also unrealized.244  Similarly, although many Turkish politicians 
individually possess a sense of kinship with the Central Asian Turkic republics, “pan-Turkism” 
has not been official government policy to avoid friction with Russia and China.245 
Azerbaijan and Turkey have grown closer on security issues as the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue continues to fester and dominate Azerbaijani politics and as Azerbaijan attempts to 
construct a professional military and security force with its newfound extractive resource wealth.  
For Azerbaijan, one of the most serious negative consequences of Soviet rule was the lack of 
military experience, as highlighted by Azerbaijan’s serious military defeats in the Nagorno-
Karabakh war.  Moscow distrusted the Azeris more than the Armenians, who were provided 
better training, equipment, and field commanders.  President Mutalibov was sluggish in 
organizing a national army, and a major Armenian offensive against Shusha and Lachin led to 
devastating defeats for the Azerbaijani army, including the offensive at Khojaly in which scores 
of people were killed in a final wave of ethnic cleansing from the oblast.  The Mutalibov regime 
could not survive the grisly images produced by the massacre.246 
Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan has the luxury of completely eliminating their economic 
dependence on Russia in some areas.  Western priorities toward Georgia do not always align 
with Georgian perceptions of Western priorities.  Western security policies toward Georgia have 
come to focus on three main objectives: securing energy supplies, achieving regional stability 
and integration through the resolution of local conflicts, and strengthening Georgian sovereignty 
and governance transformation.247  While Georgian leaders have heightened expectations about 
joining the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO priorities are for Georgia to engage in legal and 
economic reform and push for resolution of its internal conflicts.248  From the standpoint of 
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many NATO members, Georgia will remain dependent on Russia in many areas, and must 
develop durable solutions to internal and regional problems in cooperation with Russia. The 
same is likely true of Azerbaijan, although the country has broader range of motion because of 
its natural resource wealth. 
 
Evaluation 
 
To evaluate the extent to which integration has occurred amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey, it is necessary to emphasize what security integration is not: a realist-style alliance 
erected in response to an external threat.  While the presence of a stronger, latently hostile 
neighbor such as Russia may nonetheless spur the creation of an integrated security community, 
supranational agency, or neo-functionally intertwined cluster, an external hostile neighbor is not 
a necessary or sufficient condition for security integration.  Using Deutsch’s definition of a 
pluralistic security community, namely (1) shared values, (2) capacity of the participating 
political units to respond to one another’s crises, and (3) mutual predictability of behavior, it is 
clear that the South Caucasus states fall far short.  The unilateral behavior of Georgia in 
particular in triggering the 2008 Russia-Georgian war, and Russia’s vigorous and 
disproportionate response, was far from the predictability of behavior that Deutsch envisioned.  
Likewise, Turkey’s tepid response to Russia, by now its largest trade partner and energy 
supplier, undermined any realistic security arrangement among the three countries.249  With 
important implications for neo-functionalist theory and neo-liberal institutionalism, both the 
multinational oil companies that possessed a vested interest in regional peace and had worked so 
closely at developing an intertwined energy and transport sector, as well as the supranational 
agencies that had laid so much of the groundwork for economic integration stood helplessly 
aside when war broke out in 2008.  If security integration had occurred amongst the three 
countries to any extent, the Russia-Georgian war proved that it was superficial, even trivial. 
Turkish-backed aspirations at creating a security alliance of sorts with Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, expressed through the proposed Caucasus Stability Pact and other theoretical 
initiatives, lay in ruins after five days of hot hostilities between Russia and Georgia.  As 
Torbakov explains, the war wrecked Turkish policy toward the Caucasus, of encouraging large-
scale cooperation with Russia while engaging in subtle competition for control of resources and 
the transport of resources through Russia’s neighbors.250  Turkey had signed a limited defense 
cooperation pact with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and had given Georgia $1.8 million in military 
aid in 2006 and provided some military training for Georgian officers.   As of 2005, Turkish 
military aid to Georgia amounted to about $70 million, and was seen as an attempt to integrate 
Georgia into the European and Atlantic security networks.251  This aid was used in restructuring 
the military apparatus, training personnel in technical infrastructure and equipment that comply 
with NATO standards, and reforming military academies.  It has also been used to improve 
border security.252  Likewise, Turkey’s military assistance to Azerbaijan has exceeded $200 
million as of 2010, including long-term military training and, most recently, a helicopter 
                                                 
249 “Azeri Daily Criticizes Turkey’s Handling of Georgian-Russian Conflict,” Zerkalo (Baku: 21 Aug, 2008). 
250 Igor Torbakov, The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey Relations (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 
2008). 
251 Celikpala, “From a Failed State to a Weak One?” p. 188. 
252 Ibid. 
 69 
reconnaissance project.253  By 2008, however, these efforts at security integration were simply 
too marginal to change the status quo in the region.  Indeed, security cooperation amongst the 
three countries may be increasingly undermined by Turkey’s growing dependence on Russia for 
its energy needs and by Russia’s increased leverage over Turkey due to its favorable balance of 
trade. 
In addition to the obvious absence of a security community amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey, neither the neofunctionalist perspective nor the neoliberal institutionalist perspective 
evidence any significant movement on integration amongst the three countries.  This is in sharp 
contrast to Armenia, which shares a common air defense system with the Russian Federation.  
Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s security links with Turkey are less extensive than Azerbaijan’s with 
Russia, due to the Gabala radar station, or Turkey’s with Western European countries through 
NATO.  Georgia has NATO membership aspirations, but its security realities are in fact dictated 
by the Russian troop presence within its borders, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Russia may 
also have been involved in the coups d’etat that brought Eduard Shevardnadze and Heydar 
Aliyev, the dominant post-independence national leaders in Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively, 
to power, even though both leaders developed ambiguous relations toward Russia.254  Even on 
the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, arguably the neutralization of Russia’s pro-Armenian position 
may have had a greater impact on the establishment of and preservation of a ceasefire than 
Turkey’s more confrontational policies.  Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia are all 
members of the OSCE, but otherwise none of the countries share common membership in a 
security organization such as NATO or regional organizations governing the use of chemical, 
nuclear, or biological weapons.255  Security cooperation is hampered by the lack of a common 
security strategy, or even compatible security goals, amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.  
Azerbaijan’s security objectives are not necessarily as pro-European as Georgia’s or Turkey’s, 
and it does not aspire to NATO and EU membership to the same degree.  Turkey does not relish 
the opportunity to become the security guarantor of Georgia and Azerbaijan, two countries in 
somewhat unstable security situations.  On the issue of security integration, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
and Turkey have not fulfilled even the most basic prerequisites of cooperation, and it is not clear 
that the three countries are even moving in the same direction. 
Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have a considerable way to go before security 
integration is empirically noticeable.  Although Turkey has been a sponsor of military aid to both 
Azerbaijan and Georgia consistently since the fall of the Soviet Union, it was unable to play 
more than a marginal role at the most critical point, that is, during the Russia-Georgia War of 
2008.  Security goals among the three countries overlap but do not completely coincide, as is 
evidenced by Georgia’s ambiguous relations with Armenia.  While hostilities among Turkey, 
Georgia, and Azerbaijan seem to be unlikely in the current geopolitical situation, the 
unmistakable reality is that Georgia was very much on its own when hostilities flared with 
Russia.  Beyond a superficial layer of military aid and aspirational security promises among the 
three countries, little actual security integration has occurred.  Certainly, the “we-feeling,” the 
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sense of mutual trust among the three countries’ populations described by Deutsch in the prior 
chapter has not developed.  Even a “loosely-coupled security community,” described by Adler 
and Barnett as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain 
dependable expectations of peaceful change, fails to describe the security situation in the region.  
At a fundamental level, as the 2008 hostilities showed, the three countries do not possess a 
common perspective toward belligerent outsiders that is contemplated by even the loosest forms 
of a security community. 
 
Political 
 
 This section will focus on the integration of political structures in Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
and Turkey, including harmonization of foreign relations, geopolitical orientations, and affinities 
with supranational political organizations.  The three countries undoubtedly share some overlap 
on each of these variables, but the results are mixed and it is difficult to discern a single trend.   
As with security integration, the relationship among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey reveals 
little evidence of political integration, though with less clear-cut results.  Each country maintains 
divergent foreign policy positions not only with Russia but also with Armenia and Iran.256  
Georgia alone has an open border with Armenia after the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and 
Azerbaijan possesses a kindred spirit but somewhat ambiguous relationship with Iran that differs 
from the more Western-oriented policies of Georgia and Turkey.257  From a neoliberal 
institutionalist perspective, it is also important to note that the three countries are not united in 
geopolitical orientation.  While they each possess common memberships (or aspirant 
memberships) in supranational communities, this is not universally true, and indeed the most 
salient of these communities such as the European Union, NATO, or the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, excludes one or another of the three countries studied here.  At the same 
time, these three countries are at different points in democratic development.  Certainly, 
administrative and bureaucratic reform and anti-corruption efforts have helped integrate 
transport, telecommunications, and energy sectors, and have lowered trade barriers.  However, 
this increased regulatory transparency has not fundamentally altered the political orientation of 
the Southern Caucasus states or their foreign policies. 
Politically, the three countries have an ambiguous relationship with Russia and with the 
West, and this relationship heavily influences their relations with one another.  A common 
aversion to Russia may unite the three countries at the broadest level, but the similarity is 
superficial, as all three countries have quite distinctive relations with Russia.  Georgia’s recent 
history with Russia has been especially combative, and the Russian relationship with Georgia is 
seen as among the worst of any former Soviet republic, leading to hostilities in 2008.  Azerbaijan 
has pursued a middle path between Russia and the European Union, strategically playing them 
off against each other and using its strong energy resources as leverage.  Turkey, by contrast, has 
seen its relationship with Russia improve over the past decade as trade rapidly expands between 
them.  Undoubtedly, political and legal reforms in all three countries have helped to curtail illicit 
border flows and corruption, which facilitated the integrative process, particularly with regard to 
energy and transport.  However, whether a shared political identity is developing among the 
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three countries is a more difficult question, given their divergent interests and relationships in the 
region. 
Undoubtedly, Turkey and Azerbaijan have grown politically closer for sentimental 
reasons, including –at least until very recently – a shared commitment to secular Islam and 
Turkic culture, as well as realpolitik reasons—in particular, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Writing shortly after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Cornell notes that Turkey was Azerbaijan’s 
most significant defender, explaining and promoting the Azeri view of the conflict and jointly 
with Azerbaijan placed an embargo on Armenia.258  Turkey also refused to normalize relations 
with Armenia as long as Armenia occupies territories in Azerbaijan.259  This cooperation, 
however, has had its limitations.  “However, despite its support for the Azeri cause, Turkey has 
largely stopped short of furnishing Azerbaijan with weapons or affluent financial aid which 
would enable it to buy any; nor has Turkey even threatened to intervene militarily on 
Azerbaijan’s side.”260 Despite its support for Azerbaijan’s position in the conflict, in other 
words, Turkey was not an entirely free agent. 
Western powers perceived Turkey as a pivotal state for increasing Western influence in 
Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics, due to its ethnic kinship with the Muslim peoples of 
the former Soviet Union and its pro-secular model of democracy for the newly-independent 
states.  As a consequence, the first Bush administration in particular favored expansion of 
Turkish influence, in part as an antidote to a hostile Iran.261  Turkey has an enviable geographic 
position, as a natural link between Europe and the South Caucasus and Central Asia, through the 
natural gateway of Azerbaijan.  Turkey hailed the independence of the Central Asian republics, 
envisioning a Turkic common market of 60 million people, stretching from the Aegean Sea to 
China. Azerbaijan was a critical link to this goal, as it lies within geographical proximity to 
Turkey, shares an ethnic and linguistic kinship, and possesses enviable natural resources.262  
Turkey was the first country to recognize independent Azerbaijan and initiated high-level 
government contacts and economic relations with Baku, including an emphasis on cultural links 
through education and television broadcast programming.   
However, Turkish aspirations at leadership of the Turkic world encountered real 
limitations in Turkey’s own political willpower and influence.  During the late 1990s, Turkey 
went through internal crises with Kurdish separatists and economic recession at a time when 
Russia was attempting to expand its influence over the same areas championed by Turkey.  
Turkey is cut off from the rest of the Turkic world except for a short border with Nakhichevan, 
the Azerbaijani enclave, and was unprepared for the independence of the five Turkic republics.  
Turkey was indifferent to Soviet Turks for decades, and developed little expertise or research 
institutes on Soviet or Turkic affairs, and consequently, most Turkish aid to the new republics 
has been in the form of cultural ties.  Despite a strong industrial base and Turkey’s traditional 
status as a bulwark against Iran and Islamism and model Muslim democracy, Turkey has not 
provided the level of investment and aid that the Turkic republics have sought.263  In particular, 
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when Turkish support and influence faced its most critical challenge—keeping the Turkish-
backed Elcibey in power in Azerbaijan in the face of a coup—Turkey faded.  The strong, pan-
Turkic vision expounded by Turkish leadership eventually wore down as geopolitical realities 
dampened the early enthusiasm. 
Immediately after independence, Azerbaijan indicated a determined desire to break with 
old Communist structures and adopt democratic institutions.  In contrast with the more 
conservative Central Asian states, prospects for democratization in Azerbaijan seemed especially 
promising, as Azeri nationalism was well-developed in its conceptual, political, and 
psychological aspects.264  The events of summer 1993 indicated the resiliency of an authoritarian 
trend, as well as a turn away from newly-established democratic ideals to long-existing clan and 
local ties.  Aliyev’s rise, however, was not a return to Communism, and he was welcomed across 
the political spectrum and from many major political groups in Azerbaijan.265  Azerbaijani 
foreign policy has grown more sophisticated to the point that the country now tries to balance 
Western and Russian interests to its own benefit.  The country expressed to Russia that it had no 
ambition to join NATO, unlike Georgia, and made overtures to Russian President Dmitri 
Medvedev shortly after taking office, while United States Vice President Richard Cheney faced 
an arguably cooler reception later in 2008.266 
Almost immediately after independence, Azerbaijan faced an existential threat that 
determined the course of its development over the next two decades.  Armenian military 
victories weakened the government of Azerbaijan.  The fall of Shusha, the last town under 
control of Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, led to the resignation of President Mutalibov and 
the election of Elchibey in June 1992.  Espousing pan-Turkish sentiment, Elchibey refused to 
join the CIS and called for the removal of all Russian troops; he also signed the first accord for 
the establishment of a Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, to the irritation of Russian interests.267  Elchibey 
was forced out of office in a Russian-backed coup, and replaced by Heydar Aliyev, a former 
member of the Soviet politburo. 
Relations between Turkey and independent Azerbaijan predated relations with and 
political and economic interest in Georgia.  In spring 1991, Turkish President Turgut Ozal was 
the first Turkish president to visit Baku, partially in an effort to make amends over Ozal’s earlier 
comments that highlighted the differences between Sunni Turkey and Shi’a Azerbaijan.  
Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov visited Ankara in January 1992 to sign a treaty of 
friendship and cooperation.  In May 1992, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel opened a bridge to 
connect Turkey to Nakhchevan and spoke to the Azerbaijani parliament in Baku.268  Although 
Azerbaijani leaders have looked to Turkey and the traditional secular Turkish model of 
development, the closeness of the two countries reached a zenith under President Elchibey.   
Turkey and Russia were headed for a collision course over Azerbaiijan.  After Elchibey 
was overthrown by a Russian-backed coup and Aliyev took power, relations between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan were initially cool, particularly as Azerbaijan joined the CIS in return for Russian 
support on Nagorno-Karabakh, and Aliyev withstood a coup attempt that was linked to some 
Turkish officials.  Turkish citizens were obliged to obtain visas before entering Azerbaijan, and 
                                                 
264 Yuri N. Zinin and Alexei V. Maleshenko, "Azerbaijan," in Central Asia and the Caucasus After the Soviet Union: 
Domestic and International Dynamics, Mohiaddin Mesbahi, ed. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), p. 
114. 
265 Zinin and Maleshenko, “Azerbaijan,” p. 114. 
266 De Waal, The Caucasus, p. 182. 
267 Kasim, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” pp. 187-88. 
268 Winrow, Turkey and the Caucasus, p. 8. 
 73 
Turks without visas were rounded up and deported.269  In addition, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
dispute caused some strain with Turkey.  While Turkey sent 1,600 Turkish military experts to 
Azerbaijan, officials preferred an even-handed approach to the dispute so as not to inflame the 
Armenian diaspora lobby in the United States or spur a direct confrontation with Russia.270  
Aliyev dismissed some of the Turkish military experts and cancelled an agreement committing 
Azerbaijan to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.  However, a ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Aliyev’s refusal to station Russian troops in Azerbaijan improved relations with Turkey.271  In 
general, the difficulties between Azerbaijan and Turkey were ephemeral episodes however, and 
Turkey remained Azerbaijan’s foremost ally in the region. 
Elchibey’s overthrow was undoubtedly a setback for integration amongst Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey..  Turkish support for Elchibey and for the opposition in Azerbaijan 
alienated the new rulers and encouraged them to look to Russia for support, and the Turkish 
failure to keep Elchibey in power signaled weakness to the other Turkic republics in Central Asia 
and undermined Turkey’s image as counterweight to Russian influence.272  The Western-backed 
Turkish model of promoting secularism and market-oriented economics had some success, 
especially for cultural support and occasional summits among the Turkic republics.  In general, 
however, Turkey’s economic weakness during the 1990s hampered the country’s efforts to be a 
trendsetter, and grandiose Turkish ideas such as a Turkic common market proved to be more 
utopian than realistic.273 
Though relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey are not as idealized as Azerbaijan’s 
early independence period because Azerbaijan sought a closer relationship with the United States 
and direct Turkish influence waned under President Aliyev, the stable relationship between the 
two countries has grown much more sophisticated and deep.  Turkey has increasingly become a 
consumer of Azerbaijani gas and Caspian hydrocarbon exports.  In a conflict-ridden region, more 
importantly, the relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan in particular was able to attract 
Western investors, who needed guarantees from the host governments that they would support 
freedom of oil transit and pipeline security.  These commitments were in place in the inter-
governmental agreement underpinning the BTC pipeline even before extraction began in the 
Caspian.  Cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey have also kept the issue of Russian 
bypass pipelines higher on the American agenda.274 
The geography of oil in Azerbaijan contributes to political disintegration.  Unlike 
Kazakhstan, where major oil deposits lay hundreds of miles away from the country’s political 
and financial centers, Azerbaijan’s richest oil fields are concentrated in and around the Absheron 
Peninsula, where Baku is situated.  In an economy with a single valuable resource such as 
Azerbaijan’s, the presence of oil in the political center prevents resource-based bargaining 
between Baku and the provinces, and consequently more peripheral regions of the country have 
suffered greatly without any voice in the ruling elite, including lack of basic government 
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services.275  Energy resources in Azerbaijan thus reinforce central authority, contributing to the 
zero-sum nature of domestic politics and the bitterness of political opposition.  As a 
consequence, in the absence of resource-driven incentives to cooperate and share resources, 
political conflict focuses more on seizing and maintaining power.  The consequence of this 
process for political integration in the region is that it creates resentment from the periphery and 
accentuates already-existing fault lines in Azerbaijan on the basis of geography, minority status, 
and distribution of wealth.  Overshadowing Azerbaijani politics, however, to a degree far greater 
than energy or center-periphery relations, is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.276  
Despite the prospects for political integration in the South Caucasus, Georgia in 
particular has faced a political volatility not shared by Azerbaijan or Turkey.  The new source of 
development and revenue for Georgia in the form of oil and gas transit has not boosted prospects 
for democratization.  Although Georgia briefly had a parliamentary system after independence, a 
strong presidential system has dominated politics in that country, with opposition forces 
generally weak or non-existent since that time.  Georgia was among the wealthiest republics in 
the Soviet Union in terms of per capita consumption and real income, but suffered what was 
almost certainly the greatest economic decline of any former Soviet republic after 
independence.277 
Russian influence has, at times, drawn Azerbaijan and Georgia apart.  Azerbaijani-
Georgian relations have thawed since Putin came to power in Russia, and he developed relatively 
close relations with Heydar Aliyev, who, like Putin, was a former KGB officer, in striking 
contrast to the cool relations between Putin and Shevardnadze.  In 2000, Russia placed stricter 
visa requirements on Georgia while waiving them for Azerbaijan.  In 2003, Russia’s warm 
congratulations to Ilham Aliyev, son and successor to the previous president, who was elected in 
disputed elections, was in sharp contrast to Russia’s cold ten-day silence when Saakashvili was 
elected in Georgia in an undisputed election in January 2004.278 
Similarly, relations between Turkey and Georgia were initially cautious as political 
turmoil in Georgia—stabilized only when Shevardnadze took the chairmanship of the state 
council in March 1992—delayed Turkish recognition until May 1992.  Officials in Tbilisi 
suspected Turkey of supporting the possible ambitions of Muslim-populated Ajaria in Southern 
Georgia.279  At the time, Georgia’s role as transit country for Caspian oil and gas was not yet 
recognized, but Shevardnadze encouraged regional cooperation by inviting Iran, Russia, and 
Turkey into a cooperative pact.280  Turkey maintained a strong interest in the Abkhazia dispute 
and dispatched officers to participate in the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
(UNOMIG), which monitored the cease fire line.281  Turkish diplomats emphasize the 
importance of Georgia’s territorial integrity, particularly with the investment in pipeline transit 
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that Turkey has made.282  However, Turkey’s relationship with both Azerbaijan and Georgia has 
stagnated in recent years.  The Rose Revolution in Georgia raised the prospect of Georgia 
becoming a competitor with Turkey for EU membership, and the war in Iraq soured relations 
between the United States and Turkey.  In Azerbaijan, the succession crisis at the death of 
President Heydar Aliyev caused unease in both Turkey and Russia, although both countries 
supported Azerbaijan in a period of heightened tension with Iran in 2001.283 
The building of the BTC pipeline did not lessen and may have increased tension between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia.  While some Western observers superficially favored a “peace 
pipeline” that would cross Armenia, the dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were far too 
risky for a large commercial project.  In addition, domestic political opinion in Azerbaijan was 
too hostile to a route that rewarded a hostile state or invited sabotage.  The construction of the $3 
billion project gives BP and other investors a stake in a peaceful resolution of the conflict, 
especially since the pipeline runs just twelve kilometers north of the ceasefire line, but fears 
about Armenian attacks on the pipeline overstate Armenia’s hostile intent and destructive 
capacity and understate the security measures that the pipeline investors have constructed.284  
Armenians are also aware that any sabotage of the pipeline by elements associated with Armenia 
would be an international diplomatic catastrophe. 
 
Evaluation 
 
As with security integration, political integration is largely lacking amongst Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey.  All three countries fundamentally lack a shared political orientation, with 
Georgia and Turkey sharing a predominantly pro-European perspective, while Azerbaijan has 
more complex motivations and would not hesitate to use its wealth to play Russia, the United 
States and the European Union, and Central Asia states against each other for its own benefit.  
As a corollary, Azerbaijan is less enthusiastic about joining the European Union or NATO than 
are Turkey and Georgia.  Georgia’s relations with Russia, from before the 2008 war, are 
profoundly troubled, while Azerbaijan maintains a kind of détente with Russia and Turkey’s 
relationship with Moscow tended to improve during the period in question.285  The three 
countries have overlapping memberships in political organizations, with Azerbaijan a member of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, Georgia suspended from membership, and Turkey a 
non-member.  Azerbaijan and Turkey are also members of a number of Pan-Turkic and Pan-
Islamic political organizations that exclude Georgia.  Nonetheless, the potential for political 
cooperation is high, as this section suggests: with common challenges in environmental 
protection of the Black and Caspian Seas, resource sharing, foreign occupation, and terrorism 
and the drug trade, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey are not without incentives for political 
cooperation in the future. 
At the present, however, Deutsch’s conditions for the existence of a security community 
are as yet unfulfilled.  Deutsch wrote that a security community forms when political units 
become mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties that they separately lack.  
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While this may be occurring in other highly regulated sectors, at least in the South Caucasus it is 
not yet occurring in foreign policy, in goverance, or in the rule of law—at least not yet.  As 
discussed above for the security sphere and below for the political sphere, the countries share 
only the most superficial of common memberships in supranational organizations, and these 
organizations do not have supranational judicial or parliamentary powers.  No common regional 
court yet exists, for instance.  Indeed, the populations of the South Caucasus have no more than a 
very rudimentary sense of shared political identities.  Certainly, overwhelming majorities in 
Azerbaijan and Georgia do not identify as European.  When asked about identities, 71% of 
Azerbaijanis stated that they identified as Azerbaijani only, compared to 13% who would 
identify as Azerbaijani and European, and 1% who would identify as European only.  Statistics 
from Georgia were almost identical.286  However, large majorities in Georgia favored 
strengthening ties with Azerbaijan: 44% answered it was “very important” and 38% answered 
“rather important,” with identical numbers for Turkey and comparable numbers for Russia.287 
The intention for future political integration amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey may be 
there, but at the moment, it is not any stronger than the wish for integration with Russia.   
While high-profile political exchanges have occurred among all three countries, and 
while political rhetoric in both Georgia and Azerbaijan emphasizes certain shared values with 
Turkey (such as pan-Turkism in Azerbaijan and pro-European sentiment in Georgia), these 
shared values do not yet encompass all three countries to the exclusion of others.  Deutsch wrote 
that contacts and transactions among politically relevant elites, such as diplomatic exchanges, 
election or ceasefire observer missions, common membership in and leadership of supranational 
political organizations, and a common foreign policy, could all help determine the shared 
political orientation of a multiunit polity such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  At the 
present, however, these contacts are too diffuse and contradictory to evidence a common “we-
feeling.” 
Using the lenses of neofunctionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism leads to 
substantially the same conclusions.  Undoubtedly, regulatory integration and a standardization of 
customs, transport, and energy production have not “spilled over” into more robust political 
integration, but even using the more fundamental logic of neo-functionalism, it is not clear that 
political spillover is occurring either.  Turkey sought to broaden its sphere of influence in Central 
Asia by emphasizing a common Turkic identity, and while it has had some success with 
Azerbaijan, it is not clear that this success is improving the prospects for pan-Turkism more 
broadly.  Indeed, Turkey is becoming closer to Georgia than it is with its Turkic brethren.288  The 
one exception to this is Armenia.  As Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia grow closer even in 
purely regulatory fields such as transport and energy, they do produce one major political 
consequence: they solidify Armenia’s exclusion not only from regional markets but from world 
ones.  This may be a form of limited political spillover, in which resource competition produces 
economic exclusion, which in turn produces political exclusion.  However, it is unlikely that the 
three countries will be able to develop a common political union based solely on opposition to 
Armenia’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, or else, after twenty years, they would already 
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have been successful.  Georgia, while not sympathetic to the Armenian position in the conflict, 
benefits from being one of the only geographical connections between Armenia and the outside 
world. 
Finally, although all three countries de-facto exclude Armenia, even from a neoliberal 
institutional perspective, it is not clear that membership in supranational organizations is 
necessarily drawing the three countries closer together.  In fact, survey data shows that there is 
little interest in forming a common identity based around supra-national organizations such as 
the EU.  Although organizations such as the Council of Europe promotes common human rights, 
democracy, and rule of law norms in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, the Council cannot make 
binding law.  Even the common ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the acceptance of European Court of Human Rights jurisdiction by all three countries has not 
ensured compliance.  Not all of the three countries have ratified the Council of Europe’s 
terrorism, cybercrime, or democratic reform conventions.  Differing orientations toward the 
European Union and to the Commonwealth of Independent States likewise divide Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey, and the three countries participate in a broad array of overlapping 
supranational political arrangements.289  As with membership in the Council of Europe, the real 
impact of these organizations on the ground, considered in the aggregate, has been quite limited. 
 
Social and Cultural 
 
 The three countries in question are extraordinarily diverse for their size.  The complexity 
of the relatively small region is defined by a mountainous landscape that has created a swirl of 
relatively insular linguistic and cultural minorities, even though the region’s geography is 
actually quite varied.290  Languages and religions differ substantially.  Azerbaijan has a Shi’a 
Muslim cultural ancestry with close links to communities in northern Iran, and speaks a Turkic 
language.  Georgia is historically Orthodox Christian, with a population that speaks a language 
unrelated to neighboring languages in the region.291  Although a natural link exists between 
Azerbaijan and Turkey due to their common linguistic background and at least traditional 
commitment to secular Islam, Georgia does not share in this common link.  Both Azerbaijan and 
Georgia have experienced strong revivals of their traditional languages and cultures and “de-
Russification” following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Whether this process of cultural and 
linguistic consolidation will draw these countries closer to Turkey is an open question. 
Despite its position on the periphery of three historically important empires, the Ottoman, 
the Persian, and the Russian, the South Caucasus possessed a rugged terrain and sizable rural 
populations that prevented large scale colonization by ethnic Russians, as had occurred 
elsewhere in the empire.  The expansion of the British Empire and its sphere of influence into 
Central Asia in tandem with the decline of the Ottoman and Persian Empires effectively halted 
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the Russian advance.292  After World War I, the Allied powers supported a return to the status 
quo of Russian dominance after German-backed Ottoman expansionism was defeated in the 
region.  The briefly-independent states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia were reincorporated 
into the Soviet Union.293  Arguably, strong national identities only began to emerge in the three 
countries of the South Caucasus during the Soviet era, when a consolidation of national identity 
in the three countries homogenized their populations somewhat and caused many of the minority 
peoples to begin a process of assimilation.294 
Although Azerbaijan and Iran possess religious and cultural affinities, relations between 
the two countries have never been friendly, particularly given Azerbaijan’s strategic links with 
Turkey and the United States and the political activities of ethnic Azeris in Iran.295  American-
backed exclusion of Iran from the Azerbaijan Republic Oil Consortium, despite the support of 
Azerbaijan and the American oil companies involved in the project, ultimately worsened 
relations between Iran and Azerbaijan.296  Iran has feared that the United States would seek to 
use Azerbaijan as a military base, and was skeptical of American military aid designed to be a 
warning to Iran.  On the other hand, Iran was an important early mediator between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, although its role in this position has declined 
over the succeeding years.  The most serious tensions have flared over the Caspian Sea region, 
and an Iranian warship forced an Azerbaijani exploration vessel to leave the Alborz oil field in 
July 2000, sparking protest not only from the United States and Turkey, but from Russia as 
well.297  These cool relations may be changing slowly over time.  As Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Azerbaijan have engaged in closer cooperation over Caspian Sea management, Iran has 
expressed a desire to become further involved in the multilateral efforts to partition the surface 
and the seabed.298 
The secularism of Muslim Azeris is another factor that may naturally draw them toward 
Turkey instead of Iran, even though religious and clerical Azeris have reached high levels in 
Iran’s religious elite.  Azerbaijan’s 1995 constitution sharply delineates a separation of church 
and state, and anti-clerical sentiment is found not only in Azerbaijan but also among Azeri 
populations in northern Iran.  Azerbaijani subjects under Russian imperial rule had access to 
secular education, and religious elites were heavily restricted in favor of secular intellectuals.  A 
disproportionate number of secular Iranians have been Azeri and have found refuge in the 
Caucasus during periods of persecution. 299  The Azerbaijani population was subjected to six 
decades of anti-religious propaganda during the Soviet period, as well as a ban on the teaching of 
Islam and disseminating religious literature.  Despite the persistence of nominal or cultural 
adherence to Islam in much of Azerbaijan, these efforts by the Soviet state were remarkably 
successful.300  In addition, because Azerbaijan is connected to both the Turkic and the Shi’a 
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worlds, Azerbaijanis have played important roles in advocating ideologies that bridge Shi’a and 
Sunni Islam, such as pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic philosophies.301 
 With independence, Islam was no longer officially suppressed in Azerbaijan, and the 
country has been a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Islamic 
Development Bank since 1991.  In a spirit of religious revival similar to Central Asian republics, 
the country has seen the revival of old mosques and the building of new ones, as well as the 
establishment of religious societies and educational institutions.  The liberal strata of the 
intelligentsia, the backbone of the ruling authorities, fear the rise of Shi’ite Islam and prefer the 
Turkish brand of moderate Islam.  These elites have a strong European orientation and have 
developed notions of religious tolerance and modernization.  However, the Azerbaijani brand of 
Islam was isolated under Soviet rule, and consequently the caliber of Islamic educational 
institutions is still debated.302  Scholars in both Iran and Azerbaijan have focused on revitalizing 
the Azerbaijani language, including publishing works previously written during periods of 
oppression and helping to standardize the alphabet and vowel markers.  Although Azerbaijani 
was not the primary language of many Azeris in Iran and Azerbaijan prior to independence, a 
concerted effort at expansion of the language helped to define Azeri post-independence 
identity.303  The early 1990s in particular saw an outpouring of writing in the Azerbaijani 
language.  
 Technological changes have altered intergroup dynamics in Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey, both encouraging and discouraging collective or complementary identities.  In 
Azerbaijan, interaction with non-Azerbaijanis has usually augmented Azerbaijani identity, due to 
profound differences with the Russian population and lack of opportunity for social assimilation.  
By contrast, Azeri populations in Iran have assimilated into Persian culture and intermarried at 
higher rates.  Television broadcasts from Turkey have had a striking impact on Azerbaijani 
identity, rapidly helping to make the Azerbaijani language more similar to Turkish and 
expanding awareness of a greater Turkic affinity.304 
Unlike the largely homogeneous Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are both very 
heterogeneous states and consequently vulnerable to outside manipulation in support of 
separatist movements and anti-government forces.305  Nor are the two countries without their 
own bilateral ethnic problems: the Azerbaijani population of Marneuli in Georgia has agitated 
for incorporation into an independent Azerbaijan.  Meanwhile the Georgian nationalist press has 
trumpeted the cause of ethnic Georgians living in north-west Azerbaijan, who have been 
subjected to oppression and linguistic assimilation.306  In Azerbaijan, similarly, the Talysh, an 
Iranian-speaking people to the south, have resented being submerged in Azeri Turkic culture, 
especially given the Soviet language education policy that forced a choice between Azeri (the 
language of the autonomous republic) and Russian without regard to minority languages.  The 
Lezghin, a Dagestani group to the north of Azerbaijan, were similar but their misgivings were 
less openly expressed.307  Georgians abroad represent a very small diaspora, and the descendants 
of the Georgians who migrated to the West after Georgia’s incorporation in the Soviet Union 
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after 1921 have had little impact in the present era.  The only semi-diaspora is made up of 
Georgian Jews who have migrated to Israel but still possess some ties to the country.308 
Since independence, in all countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, there has 
been a trend away from Russian language education and study abroad at Russian universities.  A 
number of alternatives have gained currency, including study at universities in Turkey and the 
Middle East, as well as religious education, emphasizing cultural ties with these regions.309  As a 
consequence, teachers and teaching materials used during the Soviet period were suddenly 
obsolete or irrelevant, and in many cases, funds or professional capacity in the new languages 
and scripts have lagged behind.  Coupled with endemic corruption in the education system and 
physical deterioration of infrastructure, the crisis in educational policy in a number of post-
Soviet independent states has led to brain drains to the West and disillusionment and political 
activism among youth.  The deterioration of secular state-sponsored educational systems in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia have led to an erosion of social cohesion, resulting in intolerance and 
xenophobia, religious extremism, and lack of respect for state authorities.310 
 
Evaluation 
 
From a sociocultural perspective, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia share some important 
similarities, but are not integrating amongst themselves in a single regional unit apart from their 
neighbors.  While all three countries are undoubtedly more globalized than at any point in their 
histories, each possesses complex relationships with societies and cultures on their peripheries. 
Georgia and Azerbaijan are in the process of developing modern national languages, literatures, 
and educational systems already possessed by Turkey, and both countries are undergoing a 
transition away from the Russian model.  Beyond this, the similarities end.  The Azeri and 
Turkish languages may become more similar as they are globalized due to the telecom revolution 
in the region, but the Georgian language is highly distinct and does not even possess a common 
script with the latter languages.  Likewise, Azerbaijan and Turkey are a model for secular Islam, 
particularly as contrasted to Iran, even though Azerbaijan is a Shi’a country while Turkey is a 
Sunni one.  However, Georgia is an Orthodox Christian country that shares many religious 
traditions with Russia.  While both Georgia and Azerbaijan are in a post-independent nationalist 
period in which arts, literatures, and scientific and university elites are helping to develop a 
national identity and standardize the national language, Turkey is far more developed in this 
regard and undoubtedly has a unitary and hegemonic (if often contested) national culture.  In 
addition, it must be remembered that Turkey dominates the three-country grouping with a 
population of 73 million people, many times larger than Azerbaijan (9 million) or Georgia (4.5 
million). 
Some commentators argue that at the broadest level, all three countries seem to be 
moving toward a more European or Western sociocultural orientation311, although Azerbaijan in 
particular seems less unidirectional or consistent than the other two in this regard, and certainly 
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does not share Georgia’s or Turkey’s enthusiasm for joining the European Union or Georgia’s 
enthusiasm for joining NATO.  This accords with Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalist theory, 
because this “Europeanization” of identity would in part be facilitated by European supranational 
actors working in the region.  But, there is some evidence to suggest that this definition of 
Europeanization and integration do not necessarily go hand in hand.  European-sponsored 
institutional change has helped to preserve existing elites in power rather than change them, and 
incumbent regimes have selectively used anti-corruption and democratization efforts against 
their political opponents.312  Existing elites often have control over the strategic resources that 
the European Union seeks (gas, oil, transport corridors), and have a natural advantage in 
cultivating European support.  This is the ambivalence at the heart of neoliberal institutionalism: 
should supranational agencies, or other Transnational Extra-regional Actors, funnel resources 
through official state channels, they have the consequence of strengthening the existing state; 
should supranational agencies funnel resources around official state channels, they weaken the 
state.  It may be the case – although it is beyond the scope of this study – that Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey may be collectively moving toward a more pro-European worldview.  
However, should the legitimacy of their regimes come into question, this pro-European tendency 
could be reversed. 
Although socio-cultural integration is central to security communities theory, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey also fail to fulfill the prerequisites for neofunctional or neoliberal 
institutional cooperation.  All three countries are members of regional scientific, educational, and 
cultural organizations and participate in scientific and academic transfers, but they do not 
participate in these activities to the exclusion of other countries such that an integration process 
could be said to exist.  Azerbaijan and Turkey are members of the Turkic Council in Istanbul, 
formed in 2009, and the Joint Administration of Turkic Arts and Culture in Ankara, formed in 
1993, but Georgia is not a member of either organization.  Likewise, Azerbaijan and Turkey are 
members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, but again Georgia is not.  Georgia and 
Turkey do have significant academic exchange, just as Turkey does with Azerbaijan, and the 
International Black Sea University (IBSU) was founded in Georgia in 1995 by Turkish 
companies in an attempt to bolster Georgian-Turkish relations.  Instruction is in English.  
Georgia maintains a pro-Western orientation and has even established academic programs on 
American studies at IBSU.313  However, from a neofunctional perspective, this scientific and 
academic cooperation does not seem to have produced significant regulatory changes, such as 
lowering the barriers for student visas, although all three, as members of the Council of Europe, 
have signed the Lisbon Convention regulating degree qualifications and periods of study. 
Short of the vague and diffuse process of Europeanization (especially as to Georgia and 
Turkey), societies and cultures increasingly overlap amongst the three countries, but are not yet 
interdependent.  The swirl of linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups amongst Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey, still remain insular, even as the newer nation-states try to consolidate their 
linguistic and cultural identities.  The telecommunications revolution, discussed in more detail 
below, may make some impact, but in every case the integrating units can only count to two: the 
Turkification of the national language (Turkey and Azerbaijan); the secularization of Islam 
(Turkey and Azerbaijan); the post-Soviet consolidation of new national cultures (Azerbaijan and 
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Georgia); and affection for European civilization (Turkey and Georgia).  A sociocultural core 
common to all three countries, such as a common language or religion, or even a common 
commitment to principles of governance and the rule of law, has not yet formed amongst 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. 
 
 
Economics and Trade 
 
 Economic integration in the South Caucasus, like political and sociocultural integration, 
is uneven and multidirectional.  Azerbaijan’s role in world trade is dominated almost exclusively 
by fossil fuels, accounting for about 96% of the country’s exports.314  Given the country’s 
distance from Europe and its generally less enthusiastic European partnership compared to 
Georgia, it may be surprising that the European Union is by far the country’s largest trading 
partner, receiving nearly half of Azerbaijani exports and accounting for about 25% of the 
country’s imports, more than Russia.  Georgia, by contrast, has a far more diverse portfolio, with 
manufactured goods accounting for more than half of Georgian exports, and the rest evenly 
divided between agricultural goods and fuels and mining products.  Georgia’s main export 
partners are the European Union (18.5%), Azerbaijan (15.4%), and Turkey (13.6%), which may 
be predictable given the country’s strategic location.  Similarly, the overwhelming majority of 
Georgian imports arrive from the European Union, Turkey, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan.  Finally 
Turkey’s trade is primarily with the European Union, the Russian Federation, China, and the 
United States.315  These raw numbers are misleading, of course, as Turkey’s trade volume is, in 
aggregate monetary terms, ten times the trade volume of Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan’s trade 
volume is at least five or six times that of Georgia.  Given Georgia’s geographic proximity to 
Turkey and Azerbaijan and its role as a conduit for the high value resources coming from the 
Caspian basin, it is little surprise that it is the South Caucasus state that is the most economically 
well-integrated in the region, but also that its trade constitutes a fairly minor proportion of the 
total. 
Trade patterns among the countries of the South Caucasus have greatly changed since 
independence.  Improved relations between Turkey and Russia have led to an expansion of 
growth in the South Caucasus, halted only briefly by hostilities such as the 2008 war between 
Russia and Georgia.  Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, trade volume among 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey has been constantly increasing: as between Georgia and 
Turkey, from $241 million in 2002 to over $830 million in 2007; as between Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, $296 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2007; and as between Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
$76 million in 2000 to $411 million in 2006.316  Since 2006, Russia has become Turkey’s largest 
source of imports, with natural gas and crude oil figuring prominently: about half of Turkey’s 
crude oil and 65% of its natural gas come from Russia.  The trade balance between the two 
countries heavily favors Russia and was expected to reach $38 billion in 2008, up from $27 
billion the prior year.317  By contrast, Turkey’s trade with Georgia and Azerbaijan is much less.  
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For its part, Azerbaijan has had unprecedented economic growth since the mid-1990s.  While the 
GDP growth rate was negative in 1995 and only one percent in 1996, it soared to 26.4% in 2005 
and is expected to climb even higher.  The trade account has also been positive since 2000 due to 
increasing export of oil and decreasing import of machinery and inputs for the oil and gas sector.  
Government spending in the form of energy subsidies, pensions, and wages has also increased, 
boosting private consumption.318 
When compared to the greater political integration in postwar Europe due to free trade 
and open borders, the South Caucasus countries are painfully estranged from one another.  The 
semi-isolation of Georgia from either Azerbaijan or Armenia is most obvious at the borders: 
travel can take hours; commercial travel is subject to high tariffs and substantial bribes; traffic 
police often target for harassment and bribes cars with foreign license plates.319  Significant 
legitimate trade between Georgia and its neighbors is limited to timber, wheat, and energy 
products.  The political economy of economic isolation in the South Caucasus is significant and 
deeply-rooted; it is not simply a matter of corrupt local officials sabotaging the entrepreneurial 
plans of political elites.  This structural political tendency to favor short-term political interests 
over long-term economic development provides strong disincentives to joint ventures let alone a 
Caucasus common market.320  The political vulnerabilities of porous borders and corruption are 
not limited to organized crime and black market trade.  In 2001, the presence of several dozen 
mujahedeen, several with ties to Al-Qaeda, made Georgia a haven for international terrorism due 
to the weakness and corruption of security forces.  In Pankisi, a disastrous expedition by 
Chechen commander Ruslan Gelayev to the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia further undermined the 
peace process and Georgian statehood.321  
Remittances are important for all three South Caucasus states, particularly Armenia 
which has a small resources base and a moribund manufacturing sector.  The annual income of 
one million Azerbaijani citizens in Russia ranges between $700 million and $1 billion, while 
more than 500,000 Georgian workers in Russia contribute one quarter of Georgia’s GDP before 
the 2008 war.  Azerbaijan and Georgia stand to benefit from Turkey’s economic links to the 
West, particularly as Turkey is a transportation hub for a region that has suffered from closed 
markets due to political instability, a dearth of transit routes, and high tariffs.322  Turkish-Russian 
cooperation expanded due to Turkish exasperation with United States policy in Iraq, and a 
rapprochement between the two countries included high profile meetings between the presidents 
of Turkey and Russia, a new gas pipeline under the Black Sea, and negotiations on future energy 
deals.  Turkish construction and consumer goods companies have major ventures in Russia, and 
Turkey is the top destination for Russian tourists, over 1.7 million in 2004.  By contrast, Turkish-
Georgian relations since the Rose Revolution have stagnated over Georgia’s contentious 
relationship with Russia and close relationship with the United States.323  As Turkish-Russian 
relations improve, economic intertwinement between Turkey and Georgia may slow. 
As early as the mid-1990s, Western countries have viewed Georgia as the most 
progressive post-Soviet country outside of the Baltic states, and double digit growth between 
1996 and 2000 and the influence of young reformers such as Zurab Zhvania, the speaker of 
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parliament, provided at least a superficial positive picture.  However, Georgia remained a weak 
state captive to political factions, with corruption in important agencies such as the interior 
ministry and unholy alliances with warlords and rebel factions.  The final three years of 
Shevardnadze’s rule, until his resignation in 2003, saw sharp erosion in public legitimacy due to 
corruption and a Chechen refugee crisis.324  Election irregularities in November 2003 led to 
massive public outpouring of support for Saakashvili’s National Movement, whom exit polling 
had shown had won first place in the elections.  The Rose Revolution proved to be a sea change 
for economic integration in the region.  Despite the more authoritarian aspects of Saakashvili’s 
presidency, he succeeded in overhauling the customs service and tax police, simplifying tax 
rates, slashing red tape, and forcing companies to declare their incomes.  New roads, hospitals, 
and schools were built; wages and pensions increased; and foreign direct investment was also 
aided by a public relations campaign.  Saakashvili also ousted the corrupt regime in Ajaria and 
reintegrated the autonomous province back into the Georgian state.325 
At least until the Rose Revolution, economic integration in the South Caucasus was 
hampered by the informal economy.  In Georgia, widespread poverty, an informally privatized 
economy, and weak and corrupt law enforcement made the black market all-encompassing and 
have endangered attempts to build a properly funded and functioning state.  The informally 
organized private interests who control timber in northern Armenia and western Georgia, 
hazelnuts and cigarettes in Ajaria, many kinds of petroleum products in Azerbaijan, or scrap 
metal all over Georgia have much to lose from free trade. 326  Upon taking office, Saakashvili 
pledged to tackle corruption and border issues and showed commitment by arresting corrupt 
figures in the former Shevardnadze regime, conducting operations against smuggling in Ajaria 
and on the Georgia-Azerbaijan border, and attempting to clean up the customs services.327 
In addition to these economic reforms, the democratization process in Georgia greatly 
changed the propensity for corruption and black market operations since the Rose Revolution, 
the first widespread democratic movement in a former Soviet state outside of the Baltics.  When 
Saakashvili took power, he faced daunting economic problems due to massive corruption and 
economic mismanagement.328  Under Saakashvili, budget revenues grew from $432 million in 
2003 to nearly $3 billion in 2008, and both services such as security and energy distribution and 
infrastructure projects flourished.  However, although Georgia succeeded in strengthening state 
institutions, increasing their nationwide presence and projecting power outside the capital city, 
all preventing the political crisis from escalating to the degree that it did in the early 1990s, the 
transformation alienated local autonomous political leaders and worsened relations with 
Russia.329  Initial Turkish opportunism has been replaced with increasing direct Turkish 
investment and trade with Georgia.  Cooperation leading to the BTC project has contributed to 
the standardization of certain economic regulations, and investors additionally required certain 
business, human rights, and environmental standards to be in place before committing money to 
the project.  A transnational business such as the pipeline required standardized accounting, 
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wage, and other formal business practices.  Additionally, Turkey has replaced Russia as 
Georgia’s largest trading partner.330  
For most of the independence period, the porousness of borders in the Caspian region has 
caused undesirable forms of trade to expand with the desirable ones, including narcotics 
trafficking.331  Drug trafficking distorts healthy economic forces, and dealers in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus have found ready markets.  Drugs seep into the Caucasus from Iran.  Georgia is 
particularly hard hit by the international drug trade, particularly heroin and raw opium bound for 
the European market from Afghanistan via Iran, or from Turkmenistan over the Caspian Sea.332  
Russian troops stationed in Armenia discovered a drug channel in 1997 and in 1998 Georgian 
police confiscated opium grown in Pakistan; also that year, more Iranians were arrested on drug 
charges than citizens of any other country.  Security forces in the Caspian region stage hundreds 
of drug busts per year, but these efforts are insufficient to halt the narcotics trade.333 
Azerbaijan and Georgia are not strategic competitors; rather, they are emerging as 
strategic partners.  Azerbaijan has a powerful resource in its energy supplies, and Georgia has 
one in its transit value and location.  As a consequence, the absence of economic rivalry between 
the two countries belies their commitment to capitalism and market reform; rather, the 
partnership has interregional competitors, and the association of the two countries will prove 
attractive to investment in the long-term.334 
 
Evaluation 
 
Economic integration in the South Caucasus has achieved more success than political or 
security integration, and regional trade patterns have undoubtedly shifted away from Russia and 
toward Turkey and the European Union over the past twenty years.  The fragility of this 
integration, however, was underscored by the Russia-Georgian War of 2008, which reminded 
potential trade partners that the energy and transit route through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 
is exposed and vulnerable to Russian influence.  The region as a whole has generally shown 
strong economic growth.  Azerbaijan’s real GDP grew at least 200% between 2005 and 2010, 
and Turkey’s much larger economy also registered overall, consistent growth from the mid-
1990s to 2008.  While Georgia’s real GDP grew somewhat between 2005 and 2010, it actually 
declined in 2009.  As is fitting of a transit country, Georgia’s trade in commercial services, 
including transport, is robust, and rivals Azerbaijan despite Azerbaijan’s larger economy and 
population.  Even this sector, however, suffered considerably in 2009 after the Russia-Georgian 
war.335  Additionally, as with sociocultural and political integration, the extent to which 
economic integration has occurred bears some evidence of cultivation by supranational 
institutions such as the World Trade Organization (of which Georgia and Turkey are members) 
and the European Union.  In this process, Georgia is much further ahead, towards negotiations 
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over entering into a comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union.  Azerbaijan 
cannot yet benefit since WTO membership is a prerequisite for these agreements and 
Azerbaijan’s membership in the WTO is still pending.336  All three countries benefit from the 
EU’s generalized system of preferences for the EU market.337 
Despite efforts at economic integration amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, the 
process is as yet incomplete.  From a neoliberal institutional perspective, the three countries 
possess conflicting memberships in international organizations and do not necessarily share the 
same economic integration strategies, particularly as to how to manage the relationship with 
Russia.  Turkey and Azerbaijan are members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), 
founded in 1985 by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and Turkey heads the ECO Trade and 
Development Bank based in Istanbul.  Azerbaijan is a member of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, while Georgia is suspended from membership and Turkey is not a member; 
none are members of the Eurasian Economic Community.  Georgia and Azerbaijan are members 
of the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) Organization for Democracy and 
Economic Development, and Turkey is an observer.  The organization was created in 2001 and is 
seen as a way of countering Russian influence, in investments as well as politically, in the Black 
Sea region. Despite initial setbacks, the organization has had limited success in cooperation on 
issues of electricity and power, transportation, telecommunications, and organized crime and the 
drug trade.  GUAM is an apt analogy for economic integration in the amongst Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey generally: limited success in highly regulated and high value fields such as 
energy and transportation, an ambiguous role for Russia, and only partially-shared economic 
goals among the member states.338 
 
Energy 
 
Baku has a long history of involvement in the production of commercial oil, and was 
even the world’s energy capital in the late nineteenth century when the region produced more oil 
than the United States.339  From 1871, when the Russian government permitted the drilling of the 
first private oil wells, the Baku region has been the center of an enormous industry, transformed 
in a single generation “from a forgotten desert citadel into a modern metropolis.”340  Almost 
immediately the problem of transportation surfaced.  While oil was transported for centuries with 
camels and yaks and, when not stormy and dangerous, transported across the Caspian Sea to 
Russia, the opening of the first railway from Baku to Batumi, Georgia in 1883 opened 
Azerbaijani oil to the Black Sea.  In 1906, a kerosene pipeline opened between Baku and 
Batumi.341  Azerbaijan’s oil production stalled after joining the Soviet Union in 1920, peaked 
during World War II when it accounted for about 70% of the USSR’s production, and relapsed 
again in the postwar years after Russia shifted its attention to the Volga-Ural region.  When the 
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USSR disintegrated, Azerbaijan was producing about 60% of Soviet extraction machinery and 
spare parts, but only about 2% of its oil.342 
Although Azerbaijan became the first former Soviet republic whose borders threatened to 
change as a result of warfare when it became independent, a broad combination of factors made 
investment attractive despite some concerns over the country’s stability.  The Caspian region is 
generally attractive to Western oil companies due to proven reserves of nearly twenty billion 
barrels, with the Azerbaijani section of the Caspian Sea alone conservatively estimated at four 
billion barrels.343  The prospect of joining the vast Caspian oil and gas reserves with those of 
Turkmenistan and Central Asia in a unified pipeline network that was open to European markets 
was particularly attractive to Western oil companies.  In addition, the opening up of the 
Azerbaijani economy coincided with both the Clinton Administration’s desire to reduce 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the transfer of the Russian state monopoly on oil to 
private oligopoly with limited participation by Western oil companies.  Unlike in the Persian 
Gulf states, Western oil companies have secured a major foothold in the Caspian region.344  Oil 
from Azerbaijan profited significantly from the oil embargo on Iraq, although in general OPEC 
states such as Iraq possess a greater proportion of the world’s proven oil reserves while non-
OPEC states such as Azerbaijan for a greater portion of the global market.  As a consequence, 
non-OPEC output will begin to decline sooner than OPEC output.345 
Among the South Caucasus countries, Azerbaijan is undoubtedly the leader in the energy 
sector.  Since 1992, Azerbaijan has consistently prioritized development of its offshore fields in 
developing the country’s oil resources through the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan 
Republic (SOCAR), despite regime changes since independence.  Unlike early onshore 
exploration and development contracts, the offshore agreements were framed as production-
sharing agreements (PSAs), which boast a significant advantage over other contractual 
arrangements: ratification by the Azerbaijani parliament and consequently the force of law.346  
This provides increased levels of contract security, and insulation from notoriously invasive 
changes in Azerbaijani domestic law.  PSAs are better than traditional tax-and-royalty schemes 
at providing a mechanism for providing the Azerbaijani state with its share of the profits without 
endangering the private investment, and they allow participants who invest capital and operating 
costs a share of crude production, with the remainder of an oil field’s output divided between the 
state and its foreign partners. 
Aliyev helped secure Azerbaijan’s fate by securing strong multinational commercial 
interests and using the revenue to fortify himself and Azerbaijan against foreign and domestic 
enemies.  BP’s signing of massive, multi-decade offshore contracts with the government of 
Azerbaijan and other foreign partners helped to draw major Western governments strategically 
closer.  The wide-ranging offshore PSAs ensured hard currency revenues for the economy over 
the long term as well as substantial and immediate payments to the Azerbaijani government.347  
SOCAR has a virtual monopoly over the Azerbaijani oil sector, including relations with foreign 
companies, negotiation and implementation of projects, and international marketing.  A web of 
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informal networks linked top officials in SOCAR with Aliyev to create a nucleus of decision-
making power outside of formal government hierarchies, which gave Aliyev great control over 
the distribution of revenues.  In conflicts with other state regulatory bodies, including those that 
control investment, privatization, or customs, SOCAR has almost unfettered influence and is 
especially resistant to administrative restructurings and leadership changes.348  Seen as a “one 
stop shop” by foreign investors, the sheer bureaucratic power of SOCAR and its near-total 
dominance over the oil sector is a mixed blessing, as SOCAR contracts are negotiated outside of 
official channels and have the force of law with little oversight by parliament.  While this may be 
profitable for an oil partner, it can also expose foreign companies to irregular legal, tax, and 
regulatory scrutiny by removing all effective means of oversight.349 
By 2010, the Turkish economy was expected to depend on energy imports for about 90% 
of its needs.350  Unlike Azerbaijan, Turkish energy policy is decentralized among several 
overlapping government agencies, which has led to institutional rivalry and duplicity, 
particularly with clashes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Energy Ministry.  
Energy issues have both technical aspects and political aspects, and attempts to resolve some of 
the rivalry have led to, for instance, the creation of the Baku-Ceyhan Working Group composed 
of various energy officials and experts from both agencies.351 Given the increasing closeness of 
Georgian and Azerbaijani relations, Georgia’s territory was highly suitable for the transit of oil 
from Azerbaijan, which led to the opening of a pipeline from Baku to an oil terminal at the Black 
Sea port of Supsa, Georgia, in April 1999.352 
The BTC Pipeline had evident political benefits for Azerbaijan and Georgia.  For 
Georgians, the pipeline had an overwhelmingly political character and has come to symbolize 
Georgian independence as a state, while Azerbaijan benefited from the cooperation of a 
politically weak transit country such as Georgia in place of dependence on Iran or Russia.  The 
BTC pipeline now has near-universal backing in Georgia and Azerbaijan, and no significant 
political voices have been raised in opposition in either country.  The notion that the pipeline will 
help Georgia become an east-west transit corridor independent of Russia has almost universal 
acceptance.353  Despite initial skepticism from oil companies at its inception, the viability of the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was boosted greatly by the additional oil discoveries in the 
Kashagan offshore oilfield in Kazakhstan in 2000, which will require additional outlets for oil 
transit.354  Kazakhstan, with American urging, came to officially support construction of the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. 
The BTC pipeline may have helped provoke Russia into an antagonistic posture.  The 
project certainly polarized the region between an Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey axis, supported by 
Western backers, and a Russia-Armenia-Iran axis on the other.355  Armenia has turned to Russia 
for its energy needs and signed a deal with Iran to construct an Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, 
completed in 2006, with Russian gas giant Gazprom as majority stakeholder.356  In Russia, a 
major difference exists between the oil and gas sectors.  Oil is handled by a number of semi-
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privatized companies.  Gas is controlled by the wholly state-controlled giant Gazprom, a 
powerful instrument for the government to impose its will on natural gas production and export, 
a power that has been used and occasionally abused.357  In the mid-1990s, Russia placed political 
pressure on Kazakhstan to sign large, long-term delivery contracts with Gazprom in an effort to 
isolate Azerbaijan and prevent Turkey from gaining ground in oil and gas export lines.  
However, the sheer size of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian forced Russia to make occasional 
concessions, such as allowing Turkmenistan to deliver natural gas to Turkey via Iran.358 
The exclusion of Iran from American-backed oil transport schemes has ultimately 
increased in importance a Caspian Sea pipeline route, despite the earthquake prone nature of the 
region and the existence of other environmental hazards.  Undoubtedly, the most attractive oil 
transit routes could well be through Iran to the Persian Gulf, but sanctions on the country prevent 
development of perhaps the  most cost-effective and profitable arrangement.359  The Iranian 
sanctions are a gift to Georgia, which became, by default, the only avenue for Caspian oil to 
avoid Iran and Armenia.  Even the ports of Poti and Batumi, under the control of the Russian 
navy, were doubtful.  As a consequence, in late 1998 Georgia built a terminal at the obsolete 
tourist resort of Supsa.360  The facilities at the Ceyhan terminal are superior to those at 
Novorossiisk.  Ceyhan is able to handle up to 120 mt/y while Novorossiisk only has a loading 
capacity of 36 to 38 mt/y, with only another thirty possible after a second terminal is built, 
although this has already been allocated to the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan.361 
The natural gas crisis of 2006, when Russia shut down supplies to Ukraine in the middle 
of winter, revealed just how precarious Europe’s dependence on Russia as supplier of natural gas 
was, and the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and a second Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in January 2009 
reinforced these perceptions.362  Azerbaijan became a world gas player when BP discovered 
natural gas in Shah Deniz in 1994, and the South Caucasus (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) gas pipeline 
was constructed alongside the BTC oil pipeline for most of its route.  While the country 
possesses about 1.2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, about one-sixth of Turkmenistan’s 
supply, Azerbaijan benefits from a Western-run gas pipeline already connecting the Caspian Sea 
to Western markets.363  However, efforts to connect the gas pipeline at Erzurum to Central 
Europe have met with competition from Russia.  Project plans for a Western-backed pipeline 
from Erzurum to Austria, named Nabucco, has sparked a Russian alternative to run across the 
Black Sea to Bulgaria, which may produce oversupply for Central and Eastern Europe’s demand 
and render both pipelines economically infeasible.364  Azerbaijan has the potential to be a major 
gas producer for the next twenty years, and to be the conduit for an even bigger world gas power, 
Turkmenistan.  However, given the current political climate and the instabilities of the Caspian 
Sea region, it is unlikely that a natural gas pipeline will be built connecting Turkmenistan to 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey in the near future.365 
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By 2010, Azerbaijan was, by far, a much wealthier and more confident country than it 
was fifteen years prior, with GDP growing spectacularly from $1.3 billion in 1994 to $25 billion 
in 2008.  However, current projections are that production from the ACG fields that fills the 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will start to decline steadily after 2012, forcing the country to begin 
contemplating a post-oil economy.  Under heavy international encouragement, Azerbaijan has 
set up an oil fund to help the population deal with a decline in revenues, but diversification of the 
economy is especially difficult in countries that have a high dependence on oil wealth, and the 
industry is notoriously frugal in creating employment for local populations.366 
Since 1999, the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) has been the main mechanism for 
managing the country’s oil wealth, with assets that reached $1.5 billion in 2006 and are expected 
to exceed $50 billion in the next 18 years.  A portion of the assets are used for investment and 
social projects, including the construction of housing for refugees and internally displaced 
persons, which accounted for about $40 million of the $373 million that the fund spent in early 
2006.  In addition to transfers from SOFAZ, tax payments to the state oil company SOCAR 
accrue to the state budget, totaling $320 million in 2002.367  Azerbaijan has received some praise 
for its redistribution of oil profits in mitigating the losses of vulnerable population segments in 
order to avoid social tensions, increasing both the amount of state benefits and the number of 
beneficiaries.368 
Azerbaijan has not been wholly separate of Iran, another potential outlet for Caspian Sea 
oil and gas.  In May 1995, Azerbaijan announced that crude oil produced by the Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC) would be exported to the Persian Gulf in an Iranian-
Azerbaijani oil swap, leaving open the possibility of further shipments of oil through Iran to the 
world market.  Moreover, that year Iran also formed an exploration company with Russia and 
Azerbaijan to prospect for oil in the Caspian Sea, and Azerbaijan and Iran agreed to drill jointly 
in Iranian territory according to at least one of the contracts.  Baku and Tehran also cooperate on 
hydro projects on the River Alas on the Iranian-Azerbaijani border.369 The Caspian Sea basin is 
rich enough in oil and gas to serve many routes of transportation for the distant future.  Apart 
from a network of Soviet-era pipelines serving Russian and Kazakh oil fields, a pipeline also 
passes from Baku via Grozny, Chechnya to the tanker terminal of Novorossiisk on Russia’s 
Black Sea coast.370 
 
Evaluation 
 
Undoubtedly, some integration has occurred in the energy sector amongst Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey, in contrast to the security, political, and socio-cultural spheres.  As noted 
above, energy is a high-value resource in a well-regulated field, and the actors who stand to 
make a profit from energy exploration, exploitation, and delivery to world markets have 
incentives to reduce transaction costs by removing traditional barriers erected by the nation-state 
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such as customs and tariffs.  Pipeline finance and construction requires comprehensive 
government commitments and contracts that are immune from political pressure.  In limited 
ways, pipeline construction also places pressure on regulatory reform efforts to prevent 
corruption in regards to concessions and licenses, promote transparency in the distribution of oil 
revenues, reduce trade barriers, and increase pipeline security.  This is not spillover in the 
traditional neo-functionalist sense, and many of these reforms do not extend out of the energy 
sector.  Nonetheless, empirical evidence strongly suggests that a process of integration is actually 
occurring amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. 
Energy integration may reveal some of the limitations of each of the integration theories 
explored in the prior chapter.  Undoubtedly, harmonization of energy regulatory regimes is 
occurring amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to the exclusion of their neighbors, forming 
a distinctive community, at least in that sphere.  As noted, this has not led to “spillover” in the 
classical sense, and in some ways the reverse may be true: energy policies in each of the three 
countries may be treated as sui generis cases, separate from other regulatory policies.  This is 
particularly true in Azerbaijan, where decisions about energy resources are made outside the 
formal bureaucratic structure.  As energy policies grow more harmonized among the three 
countries, energy policy itself is becoming further removed from ordinary policymaking and 
legislation.  Couched in special agreements and contractual relationships, energy policy is treated 
differently from other forms of policy.  This not only limits the potential for “spillover” into 
other sectors, but subverts the spillover process.  As energy policies become more harmonized, 
they become more distinct.  Neo-functionalist theory cannot completely explain this 
phenomenon.  However, neo-functionalism’s emphasis on reducing transaction costs is relevant 
to energy sector integration. 
Security communities theory similarly does not fully account for energy integration 
amongst the three states.  Decisions about energy policy are made far from the public sphere, and 
multinational energy companies are particularly notorious for their opaque deal-making, which 
lends itself to corruption or at least over-personalization of contacts.  Transactions or 
communications among populations across borders seems to have little relevance to the process 
of energy integration, although public perceptions and expectations become self-reinforcing as 
energy integration takes place.  Rather, energy integration by its nature is a more top-down 
phenomenon, certainly more so than transportation, as explained in the next section.  
Transnational business interests and international financial institutions play a considerable role in 
facilitating energy integration through resource exploitation and pipeline planning, construction, 
use, and security.  As the neo-liberal institutional model would predict, Transnational Extra-
regional Actors have placed pressure on the three national governments to change their patterns 
of behavior, reduce transaction costs, ensure compliance, and maintain creditworthiness and 
reputational value.  This has helped to facilitate harmonization among the three countries without 
yet at least causing spillover in other sectors. 
 
Transport 
 
Transport is one area in which integration among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, to the 
exclusion of their neighbors, has led to integration of national sectors into a sub-regional whole.  
In many ways, this was dictated by resource constraints and environmental realities.  The 
Bosporus Strait, which connects the Black and Mediterranean Seas, dictated Turkish policy 
toward pipeline construction and tanker shipping from the South Caucasus to world markets.  
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Increased shipping volume through the Bosporus, such as would occur if Caspian oil were 
transported in greater quantities to the Russian port of Novorossiisk, could have grave 
environmental consequences.  Turkey sought to curb the prospect of an oil spill with a Vessel 
Tracking System to facilitate safe passage through the straits, but it would not eliminate the risk 
entirely.  Some 19 miles long and a mere 700 meters wide at its narrowest point, the Bosporus is 
one of the most difficult waterways in the world to navigate, with tankers having to change their 
course at least twelve times along the route.  Although 45,000 vessels pass each year, accidents 
are relatively frequent.371  The Montreux Convention, adopted in 1936, requires free passage of 
the straits and severely constraints the ability of Turkey to monitor safety of passage.  The year-
round, warm water Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean can handle many times the 
capacity of the Russian port of Novorossiisk, and without endangerment to the Bosporus 
Strait.372  If all Caspian oil output by 2002 were to travel through the Bosporus by tanker, it 
would require closing the straits to all other maritime activity for 360 out of 365 days of the year.  
Today, many experts believe that the Turkish political leadership may have overstated the issue 
of environmental fragility in the Bosporus to place pressure on Russia to accept a BTC 
pipeline.373 
Just as the BTC oil pipeline and the BTE gas pipeline are connecting the energy 
infrastructure of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, a new railroad between Baku, Azerbaijan, 
Tbilisi, Georgia, and Kars, Turkey is “another step in the definition of the South Caucasus” and 
another component in the emergence of the region as a major transit corridor between Europe 
and Asia.374  Following the closure of an earlier route that traversed Armenia, attempts at 
connecting the three cities by rail in a single line floundered until the presidents of Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey floated the project idea at the inauguration of the BTC pipeline project in 
May 2005.375  The railroad is expected to open in late 2011, with a length of 826 kilometers and 
an initial capacity of 1 million passengers and 6.5 million tons of freight.  This will increase to 3 
million passengers and over 15 million tons of freight.376 Baku has been connected by railway 
since 1883 and by pipeline since 1907 to the Black Sea port of Batumi, Georgia, the main outlet 
of oil exports in the early years.377 
The implementation of transportation infrastructure among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey is highly linked to the further informal integration of these three states.  The building of 
the BTK railroad may enable the three countries to “vary the basis of their political cooperation” 
beyond energy transit and ancillary processes, “orientating it towards good transportation, but 
also towards higher circulation of people between the three states.”378  Because of political 
friction over the BTK railroad’s bypass of Armenia, Azerbaijan has taken a prominent role in 
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financing the railroad out of the country’s energy revenues, the first time a transnational project 
is proceeding without the involvement of third countries or international organizations.379   
Turkish President Demirel was warmly received in Tbilisi in January 2000, where he held 
discussions on possible construction of a Kars-Tbilisi railway, rehabilitation of the Batumi 
airport, and the opening of a fourth border gate between the two countries.380  The railroad will 
be the first direct rail link connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey, and given that the bulk of the 
railroad’s length is in Azerbaijan, the country will benefit the most in tariff revenues.381  The 
more prominent role taken by Azerbaijan as financier of the BTK railroad has likely tempered 
the desire of Georgia and Turkey to reopen the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi railroad, which runs through 
Armenia, and will likely further encourage the isolation of Armenia within the South 
Caucasus.382  Because Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey are closed, Armenia is 
entirely dependent on Georgia for foreign trade with Russia or Europe, despite high Georgian 
tariffs.383  Consequently, Armenia’s economy suffers when the Georgian economy suffers, as it 
did during the Russian-Georgian War in 2008 that led to the bombing of the Gori-Tbilisi railroad 
and the blockade of Georgian ports on the Black Sea.384  The 2008 bombing also damaged 
Georgian ports that are fed by the rail line, particularly after the bombing of Poti, which, along 
with Batumi, is the key port facility for the entire region.  The Poti bombing also briefly closed 
the Georgian port of Kulevi, which is owned by the Azerbaijan state-owned oil company 
SOCAR, underscoring the risks of integration when relations with Russia sour.385 
The idea of building a railway connecting the Black and Caspian Seas was first proposed 
in the 1830s upon the realization that a railway from Poti on the coast to Tbilisi in the interior 
could carry a great deal of trade between northern Iran and Europe, and only half as long as a 
railway through Turkey.  Construction of the first Trans-Caucasus line started in 1865 and the 
first passenger train from Poti arrived at Tbilisi on October 10, 1872, covering the journey in 15 
hours.  By 1890, an extension through western Georgia, including the double-track Tsipa Tunnel, 
was completed.  In 1883, the line was opened between Tbilisi and Baku to carry oil from the 
Caspian oilfields to Batumi, and the last major line between Georgia and Armenia opened in 
1899.  As Georgian industry rapidly developed between 1924 and 1940, new branch lines of 
Georgian railways opened throughout the country, with a connection to the Russian railway 
network opening in 1946.  Completion of the network between Baku, Tbilisi, and Batumi had a 
positive effect on the economies of Georgia and the South Caucasus.  In the 1870s, Batumi was a 
major exporter of wool, cotton, lumber, and manganese.  In addition, a tourist line was built in 
1894 to Borjomi, a summer resort town, and in 1901 to Bakuriani, a winter sports resort.  
Another line was completed in 1915 through the famous Georgian wine-producing region of 
Kakheti.386 
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Georgia's mountainous terrain presents difficult challenges for railway engineering, with 
over 1,500 kilometers of track through 45 tunnels and 1,716 bridges.  Poti sits at only 6 meters 
above sea level, while the Marabda-Akhalkalaki section rises to over 2,200 meters above sea 
level.  In total, 5,000 major engineering structures, including breakwaters, flood banks, snow 
fences, and embankment protection, characterize the Georgian Railways.  Today, Georgian 
Railways includes 115 freight stations, eight locomotive depots, four wagon repair depots, 11 
track branch depots, seven power substation depots, five communication centers, locomotive and 
carriage works, railway police offices, 250 electric locomotives, about 200 diesel locomotives, 
and over 15,000 wagons.  The existing track and rolling stock can handle 60 trains each day, 
corresponding to 40 million tons of freight each year.387 
Construction of the Tbilisi to Kars rail line will help revive the economy of southern 
Georgia, and both Turkey and Georgia place a high priority on the opening of the rail line.  
Georgia has signed agreements with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan on freight 
transport and with Ukraine and Azerbaijan on transit passage.  Georgian Railways is developing 
infrastructure for container and bulk freight in accordance with international requirements.  
Terminals at Batumi, Poti, and Tbilisi have been modernized for 20- and 40-foot containers and 
the yards can handle up to 10,000 units per month.  In general, the system specifications of the 
new modernized container terminals match European requirements due to EU technical 
assistance through TRACECA.  In April 1999, a railway ferry opened between Poti and Batumi, 
Ilichevsk, and Varna.388  The EBRD provided a $6 million grant to rehabilitate Georgian 
Railways' signaling and communications systems with fiber optic technology.  Some 
modernization of cargo handling systems is still required.  The container yards at Poti and Tbilisi 
are being expanded and rebuilt due to the growth in container traffic.  Rehabilitation of signaling 
systems will be financed with $20 million from the EBRD and $5 million from the EU.  The EU 
is also providing $1.2 million towards infrastructure on the Georgian-Azerbaijan railway, as well 
as $0.7 million to support rehabilitation of rolling stock and $1.5 million for establishing 
international timetables and tariffs.  Georgian Railways is presently moving toward automatic 
gauge-changing axles.389 
The Asian Development Bank-funded Masalli-Astara Highway project is part of the 
Southern Road Corridor Improvement project, focusing on construction, upgrade, and 
rehabilitation of 3,570 km of 64 state roads and 5,928 km of 58 secondary roads.390  Azerbaijan 
joined the Asian Development Bank in 1999.  This particular project includes not only 
construction of the 59-km long, 4-lane Masalli-Astara Highway, but also rehabilitation of local 
roads in the project area and installation of a vehicle weighing station.  Forty-five percent of total 
cumulative lending to Azerbaijan from the Asian Development Bank was allocated to the 
transport sector (about $810 million in November 2009), with 95% of that amount directed to 
road and highway improvement and development projects.391  The Kuwait Fund and the Islamic 
Development Bank financed the upgrade of 40 kilometers of the east-west road from Alyat to 
Gazi Mammad, and the EBRD considered a proposal to finance 80 kilometers of road from Gazi 
Mammad to Khurdamir.  Road safety is still poorly developed.392 
                                                 
387 Gorshkov and Bagaturia, “Developments at Georgian Railway,” 43-44. 
388 Gorshkov and Bagaturia, “Developments at Georgian Railway,” 46. 
389 Gorshkov and Bagaturia, “Developments at Georgian Railway,” 47. 
390 Irshad Abbasov and Elnur Ahmadov, "Mainstreaming Climate Change Impacts of Construction of 59-km long 
Masalli-Astara Highway Project," Bankwatch: NGO Forum on the Asian Development Bank (2010). 
391 Abbasov and Ahrnadov, “Mainstreaming Climate Change Impacts.” 
392 “Azerbaijan Highway Project: Project Initiation Document,” Azeravtoyol, March 27, 2001. 
 95 
Georgian transit renovations have also benefited from donor financing.  The EBRD 
funded a rehabilitation program at Tbilisi airport, which generally meets international standards 
on passenger and cargo carriage, but not in servicing.  The internal air market of Georgia is 
highly monopolized, with 91% of the market share being dominated by a single company, as the 
entire market is contracting due to lack of competition.  The American company Northrup 
Grumman has financed an upgrade of the air navigation system, which has increased transit 
flight capacities through Georgian air space.393  The upgrading of the Batumi airport with some 
Turkish financing has also improved cooperation between Greece and Turkey.  By constructing a 
complementary terminal in the town of Hopa, on the Turkish side of the border, Turkish citizens 
in the border regions are now able to travel to the rest of Turkey via the Batumi airport.394 
Finally, in addition to physical transport, at least some progress has appeared in 
information technology and internet access, in part on the similarities between developing 
transnational rail linkages and developing transnational physical fiber optic and other cable 
networks.  The "East-West Information Superhighway" project will bridge two developed 
information networks in Western Europe and the Pacific and will pass through the Caucasus and 
Central Asia.  The project aims to encourage development of internet, electronic information 
resources, and a knowledge-based economy in approximately 20 regions.  In 2008, regional 
ministers signed the Baku Declaration on the Trans-Eurasia Information Superhighway.395  
Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia lie on the Trans-Asia-Europe fiber-optic cable network.  An 
underwater fiber optic cable connects Poti in Georgia to Rize in Turkey, and additional cable 
follows the Georgian railway from Poti to the borders with Azerbaijan and Armenia.  The 
European Union has contributed to the financing of the project.396  Similarly, Georgia has the 
infrastructure to be able to export electricity to neighboring countries, and is connected via 220, 
330, and 500 kW electric transmission lines.397  In 2005, Georgia adopted a new law on 
electronic communications that harmonizes the country with European and International 
Telecommunications Union standards, and the telecommunications sector is undergoing a rapid 
expansion in the country.398  Similarly, a series of electronic commerce and privacy legislation in 
Azerbaijan show great promise for economic development and harmonization with international 
standards.399  Azerbaijan has the greatest internet penetration rates among the South Caucasus 
countries, while Georgia has growth rates of over twenty percent per year.400 
As with increasingly close cooperation in information technology transfer and 
development, Azerbaijan in particular is leading the region’s integration into the global 
telecommunications sector.  Azerbaijan has launched two telecommunication satellites 
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(Azerspace), with range covering a greater part of Eurasia, and transmitting television, radio, 
internet, international telephone, and other services.401  Financing for Azerbaijan’s first launch of 
a satellite, expected in late 2012, came from the Export-Import Bank of the United States.402  
Only twenty percent of the satellite’s telecommunication services will be reserved for 
Azerbaijan; the remainder will be sold on the international market.403  Both Azerbaijan and 
Georgia have affirmed the SilkSat proposal of the East-West Space Science Center to create a 
comprehensive telecommunications satellite network for all of the Caucasus and Central Asia.  
Telecommunications infrastructure has deteriorated in the region since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, and difficult terrain hampers traditional physical telecom networks.  SilkSat would 
augment the fiber-optic network developing in the region, and would boost trade among 
Caucasus and Central Asian states and boost foreign investment.404  The governments of the 
region support a comprehensive regional satellite system. 
 
Evaluation 
 
Integrating transport policy among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to the exclusion of 
their neighbors appears to be a slightly different and more decentralized process than energy 
integration.  Whereas energy integration appeared to be a top-down phenomenon, facilitated by 
transnational actors and relatively insulated from popular pressures and other legal and 
regulatory frameworks, transport policy is a more complex phenomenon.  Transport policy may 
have an impact on other legal and regulatory frameworks in a way that the insular nature of 
energy policy may not.  Unlike energy interests in the three countries, for instance, transport 
policy seems more influenced by environmental issues, taxation and tariff structures, and visa 
and immigration policies.  Similarly, communications and transactions among populations are 
considerably more important as a variable with regard to transportation policy as compared to 
energy policy.  Passenger rail, for instance, has an effect on tourism, and the increasingly 
accessible nature of transnational highways and air passage reaches a broad segment of the 
population (or, in Deutsch’s terms, at least politically relevant elites).  The integration of 
telecommunications policy, even more so than rail, road, and air transit, has a strong impact on 
popular self-identity and perceptions of neighboring countries and peoples.  At the same time, 
however, Transnational Extra-regional Actors, such as international institutions, are not at all 
irrelevant.  Many of the most prominent transportation projects amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey have received financing and political support from international institutions.  The 
European Union in particular views transportation policy in the South Caucasus and Asia Minor 
as a critical element of its foreign policy toward the countries on the European periphery. 
Ultimately, unlike energy integration, transport integration amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey requires a hybrid theory that draws elements of neo-functionalism, security 
communities theory, and neo-liberal institutionalism. Unlike energy policy, transport integration 
is generally not isolated from other legal or regulatory processes.  As a consequence, the 
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entanglement of regulatory structures across borders may be expected, particularly as elements 
such as railroad gauge, air traffic controls, environmental precautions, and road safety are 
relatively internationalized.  Similarly, security communities theory is relevant because transport 
policy affects ordinary citizens as well as small and medium-sized business interests, and it 
shapes public perceptions and expectations of state capacity and relations with neighboring 
countries.  As with energy policy, transnational transport and telecommunications policy in the 
South Caucasus and Asia Minor is facilitated to some extent by supranational actors such as the 
European Union, which perceives of a transit corridor through the three countries as a central 
element of its wider Eurasia policy.  Measuring the extent of integration among Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey with respect to transport policy will have to account for all three variables: 
regulatory entanglement, popular communications and transactions, and facilitation by 
Transnational Extra-regional Actors. 
 
Transnational Extra-regional Actors 
 
  The European Union appeared soon after independence in the South Caucasus 
with the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program 
initiated in December 1990.  As relations with the former Soviet republics moved higher on the 
European agenda in the succeeding years, the TACIS program spawned TRACECA (Transport 
Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), 
the primary manifestations of the EU as a Transnational Extra-regional Actor, or TERA, in the 
energy and transport spheres amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  TRACECA, launched in 
1993, aims to facilitate the region’s access to world markets by developing a transport corridor as 
an alternative to route though Russia.  INOGATE, launched in 1995, aimed to create a favorable 
environment for private investment in the oil and gas sectors, including rehabilitation of existing 
infrastructure.405 
 The European Union’s separate interactions with both Georgia and Turkey has 
contributed to de facto cooperation between the two countries on issues of trade, taxation, 
energy, and transportation, through the two separate mechanisms of accession negotiations and 
the so-called European Neighborhood Policy.406  With a number of foreign policy tools in its 
arsenal, including accession and partnership levels, as well as support for policy reform, the 
European Union has managed to bring about gradual social, political, and economic change to its 
immediate periphery.  The EU’s role as a constitutive agent is especially visible in the areas of 
trans-border relations, energy, and transportation, due to EU driven policy reforms in these areas.  
Similarities in these policy reforms facilitate interactions between the two countries as they 
eliminate technical issues that increase transaction costs.  In addition, Mutlu writes, association 
with the EU creates a sense of belonging as to European practices on both sides of the border, 
creating a social capital that contributes to improved relations.407  Although Turkey has a long 
history of cooperation with the EU, a formal agreement as to the EU membership process only 
began in 2005.  Georgia’s increasingly close EU relationship is even more recent: the country 
signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1999, and the more recent European 
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Neighborhood Policy and Partnership Instrument in 2006 and 2007, respectively, which aim to 
develop deeper economic integration.  The EU is tasked with providing expertise and guidance 
to the Georgian government on judicial and legislative matters, including prosecution and 
organized crime and standardization of consumer goods.  The Rose Revolution led to the 
“Europeanization” of Georgia’s socio-political and economic landscape, and this rapid 
transformation has closed the gap between Turkey and Georgia on many issues.408 
 Although neither Georgia nor Turkey are full-fledged members of the EU, their 
commitment to important European projects, such as the BTC oil pipeline and the Southern Gas 
Corridor (often casually called Nabucco), has demonstrated that they “belong” to Europe in 
certain issue areas, as Europe represents higher standards and good governance to political elites 
in those countries.  “Regardless of the form of connection, this sense of belonging, when 
combined with the other economic, social and political factors contributing to improved 
relations, can be seen as strong enough of a motivator to accelerate the emergence of a complex 
interdependence structure.”409 
After TRACECA's launch in Brussels in May 1993, the European Union-led technical 
assistance program has resulted in closer cooperation and dialogue among government 
authorities, and has led to agreements to keep transit fees at competitive levels and to simplify 
border crossing formalities.  The TRACECA corridor is the shortest and likely the fastest and 
cheapest transit route for large volumes of cargo from Central Asia to deep water ports linked to 
world markets.  TRACECA's technical assistance program has helped attract large investments 
from international financial institutions, including the EBRD's commitments for capital projects 
on ports, railways, and roads along the TRACECA route.410  Likewise, the World Bank has 
made commitments for new capital projects on roads in Armenia and Georgia totaling over $40 
million, and the Asian Development Bank has also committed substantial funds to road and 
railway improvements.  The technical assistance has included setting up working groups to 
analyze the current system of border crossing procedures; to determine unified rates of road 
transit, port, and maritime fees; and to harmonize technical standards for road vehicle 
characteristics and operations.  In the first ten years, TRACECA financed thirty-nine technical 
assistance projects and fourteen investment projects for the rehabilitation of infrastructure, 
totaling about 110 million euro.411  The integration and harmonization of the region's transport 
regulatory environment with European and international norms is an ongoing process. 
The EU-supported TRACECA program is seeing high growth in container shipping.  
Mitsubishi is building a modern container berth at Poti to handle up to 300,000 containers per 
year.  The most effective way of shipping freight between Tashkent in Uzbekistan to Poti in 
Georgia would be to run regular container services across the Caspian to Azerbaijani and 
Georgian rail networks.  Poti is also a site of close linkages to railway ferries across the Black 
Sea to Ilichevsk, Ukraine, bypassing the Bosporus straits.  TRACECA was instrumental in 
establishing ferry services between Poti and ports in Bulgaria and the Russian Federation.  Poti 
also has container shipping services to ports in Istanbul, Italy, Greece, and Western Europe. 
The building of the BTC Pipeline was an important goal of foreign donors in the region, 
and international financial institutions contributed handsomely to the project.  Companies 
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involved in the BTC pipeline project needed United States intervention to secure support from 
local governments and funding from international financial institutions.  With American 
encouragement, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World 
Bank, agreed to participate in the BTC project in November 2003.412  The Pipeline no doubt 
aligns with the broader regional goals of the international financial institutions and has led to 
significant regulatory reform at least in the energy sectors (and in pipeline security, taxation, and 
tariff structures) among the three countries.  Despite its lack of a common energy security policy, 
the European Union has always understood that Georgia would become a key transit country for 
European oil and gas imports, and included the country in the EU’s 1997 Black Sea Strategy, 
which stressed among other issues the need to connect trans-European transportation networks 
with Caucasus infrastructure.413  The European Union has sought to provide a collective legal 
framework for cooperation in oil and gas infrastructure sectors under INOGATE.414 
The EU is by no means the only TERA operating in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), of which Georgia has been a 
member since 1992, has participated in a long-term observer mission and mediation efforts in 
South Ossetia.415  Since the mid-1990s, the OSCE gradually intensified its activities promoting 
liberal norms in Georgia through the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights, which provided support in rewriting the Georgian constitution.416  The OSCE, with 
support from the EU and other international organizations, assisted in preparing and conducting 
parliamentary and presidential elections and organized international monitoring efforts.  
Although none of the polls conducted during Shevardnadze’s presidency met international 
standards, by 2003 the OSCE had established in Georgia one of the largest and longest in 
duration election observer missions that ultimately revoked legitimacy from the election and 
from Shevardnadze’s government.  After the Rose Revolution, the OSCE turned its attention to 
strengthening democratic institutions in the realms of election capacity, legislative and local 
government reform, free media, and rule of law promotion.417  Given the high interest of donors 
after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the risk is high of overlap, failed expectations, or 
overstraining of political institutions.  International donor agencies have only partially succeeded 
thus far in consolidating Georgian democracy. 
TERAs have had a better track record in integrating the highly regulated transit and 
energy sectors than they have in integrating political institutions and promoting deep governance 
reforms.  One reason may be that highly regulated sectors lend themselves to transnational 
standardization; an international organization may have more success, for instance, in improving 
customs and tariff procedures than in promoting judicial independence.  Another reason may be 
that the energy and transit sectors have market incentives to internationalize, and the EU, OSCE, 
and other actors are simply promoting these market incentives.  The European Commission’s 
transit program for the South Caucasus has been especially successful.  As export routes were 
being planned in the South Caucasus, the Commission began a new initiative: an alternative, 
temporary oil railway system between Azerbaijan and across TRACECA.  Through a 
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multilateral technical agreement, this system is designed to link European transportation 
networks to Central Asia and the Caucasus and export extra Caspian oil that is not transported by 
pipeline.418  As part of the TRACECA program, Azerbaijan Railways restructured and improved 
its control system in line with the TRACECA project in 1999, and constructed a new service 
depot funded by the European Union in order to upgrade 300 km of the Baku-Beiuk-Kjiasik rail 
line.  In addition, the EBRD provided Georgia with a credit line of $20 million to modernize 
railway technology and the EU provided $6 million to lay an optical fiber network.419 
A goal of all eight Caucasus and Central Asian states is to expand the capacity for trade 
intra- and inter-regionally.  TRACECA has worked with the EU and international lending 
institutions to obtain technical assistance for highway construction, port rebuilding, railway 
modernization, and other projects to shore up regional transportation infrastructure.420  The 
TRACECA project received financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) at the World Bank.  TRACECA has provided a forum 
for regional cooperation; for instance, five working groups have been held since the inception of 
the program, and a major conference held in Baku in 1998 called for ensuring access to the world 
market by road, rail, and commercial navigation.  It also encouraged cooperation on traffic 
safety, environmental protection, legal transport regulation, and related goals.  TRACECA has 
served as a bridge between the Caspian and the rest of the world around Russia, such as through 
a major rail link from Kazakhstan to China that can cut off several days compared to old Soviet 
routes.421 
TERAs play a particularly important role in facilitating integration among Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey to the exclusion of Russia, Armenia, and Iran.  By funneling money to 
projects that align with the supranational agency’s strategic goals, the agency can alter public 
perceptions and spur legal and regulatory reform.  The European Union, for instance, has 
supported a series of projects that align with its broader strategic goals of creating a Southern 
Gas Corridor and transit route through Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey.  This has not led 
to political integration, as Turkey is not yet an EU member and Georgia is having difficulty even 
getting on track for membership.  But public perceptions have no doubt changed as a result of the 
European Union’s visible presence in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  And perhaps just as 
importantly, the influx of donor money has led to increased pressure for administrative 
transparency, impartial legal oversight, and state-sponsored security for the projects. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has aimed to provide an introduction to integration amongst Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey, with consideration of the three major theories of nation-state integration.  
Security communities theory, buoyed by the constructivist revolt against realism in international 
relations, holds that countries form bonds based on social perceptions of individual and 
collective self-identity.  Communications and transactions among populations help to alter 
patterns of behavior and change expectations.  Neo-functionalist theory identified a different 
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mechanism for integration: the expansive nature of rational bureaucracy that would lead to 
regulatory and administrative intertwinement between countries.  Although neo-functionalist 
theory has walked back from the original concept of “spillover,” in which regulatory integration 
in one sector would place pressure on other sectors, encouraging integration, neo-functionalism 
is still a deterministic or progressive theory in the sense that regulatory or administrative 
intertwinement creates its own momentum encouraging further integration.  Neo-liberal 
institutionalist theory, by contrast, holds that supranational actors will facilitate integration on 
their own terms and eventually alter state behavior and public perceptions as the integration 
deepens. 
 Among the countries of the South Caucasus, a heterogeneous region heavily shaped by a 
long period of Russian rule followed by a tumultuous independence, regional integration is a 
means for Georgia and Azerbaijan to overcome the downward economic spiral faced by both 
countries for much of the 1990s.  Turkey is a willing partner, in part because its own energy 
needs make investment in Azerbaijan particularly attractive, and in part because its strategic 
location on the fringe of Europe gives it the advantage of being a Eurasian “bridge” of sorts.  The 
integration, at least in the energy and transport sectors, is possible because of a division of labor 
amongst the three countries.  Azerbaijan, as an energy producing and exporting country, has a 
particularly powerful voice in regard to regional energy policy, and its preferences favoring 
Georgia and Turkey over Armenia and Russia have sharply determined the course of energy 
integration in the region.  Georgia, as a “transit” country with deep water ports, a relatively well-
developed rail and road infrastructure, and common borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, 
has great say over regional transportation policy, including regulations on tariffs, freight, 
customs, and passenger mobility and safety.  For its part, Turkey is a “donor” country, a financial 
sponsor for Georgia and Azerbaijan, and it has deep and important links to the European Union, 
international financial institutions, and the United States.  Integration is possible amongst 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey in part because each of the three countries possesses leverage 
over the other two that has made cooperation in policy easier and more successful.  Each of the 
three countries will benefit from cooperating with the other two. 
 Political, security, and socio-cultural integration have lagged far behind energy and 
transport integration in the region.  This is not accidental.  Energy and transport are both highly 
regulated sectors with involvement by multinational corporations and supranational institutions.  
The explanatory variable, illustrated in the two forthcoming chapters, is the role of Transnational 
Extra-regional actors in integrating the energy and transport sectors.  As between the two of 
them, however, integration in the energy sector and in the transit sector have not proceeded in the 
same manner.  Energy integration is highly facilitated from the top down and is removed from 
other realms of policy making and state regulation.  Public perceptions play a comparatively 
smaller role than in transport policy.  As a consequence, major energy decisions are often opaque 
if not secretive, and occur outside of the formal political sphere.  Transport integration, by 
contrast, is highly public, and it impacts other closely related fields such as immigration, 
customs, tariff and trade policy, and public infrastructure finance such as selling government 
bonds.  The differences between the two fields determine which integration theory is most 
appropriate for explaining why integration is occurring and the course it might take.  Neoliberal 
institutionalism is particularly relevant for energy integration, because it best explains how a 
highly facilitated, top-down integrative process is helping to change state behavior with 
relatively little input from the general population.  Transport integration is best explained by a 
hybrid theory, because it encompasses elements of bureaucratic and regulatory entanglement, 
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popular perceptions as manifested in communications and transactions across borders, and by 
financing and leadership from supranational institutions, the three essential cores of the theories 
explained in the last chapter.  The following chapters will continue to review and refine these 
theories, complicating the original models while retaining the essential core. 
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Chapter 3 – Transnational Extra-regional Actors: The World Bank 
Group 
 
 The role of international financial institutions (IFIs) in promoting development of the 
energy and transport sectors of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey presents an illustrative example 
of Transnational Extra-regional Actors as the key variable in the integration of the sectors in the 
three countries. Although a number of financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) have key roles to play in the Caucasus and Caspian region, this chapter 
has chosen to primarily focus on the regional activities and attendant integrative effects of the 
World Bank Group. The following three sections provide an overview of the major development 
projects directly implemented or otherwise financed by the World Bank Group in Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey, with a particular focus on the development of the oil and gas sectors.  The 
final sections of the paper discuss two particular characteristics of the Group—its unparalleled 
ability to coordinate with other extra-regional actors, such as donor and financial institutions and 
its promulgation of various ranking mechanisms—that provide harmonized benchmarks for the 
energy and transport sectors in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  Because governments that 
accept funds from the World Bank must comply with a complete package of reforms, and cannot 
choose ‘a la carte’ from a menu of reform options, the World Bank’s activities promote 
harmonization that allows for regional integration in these sectors.422   
 
Overview 
 
 The World Bank Group and its International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Bank Group’s 
private-sector investment arm, produce regular Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) reports and 
periodic updates on Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey that outline completed and anticipated 
Bank projects and the disbursements allocated for their implementation.  A significant portion of 
each of these CPS reports concerns the Bank’s considerable involvement in the transport and 
energy infrastructure sectors of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey and the critical linkages 
between them.   
 The Bank’s early support for two major pipeline projects lends insight into the value-added 
the organization provides on multiple levels to advance integration between the three countries in 
their energy sectors.  BTC consortium and international financial institution officials concur that 
the BTC and Baku-Supsa pipelines, two critical energy transit projects in the region, were made 
possible by the early funding and support provided by the World Bank Group.423 The IFC 
provided a $200 million dollar loan for the construction of the Baku-Supsa pipeline and a $250 
million dollar overall investment in the development of the BTC, which was completed in July 
2006 and required over $2.6 billion in public and private sector investments.  In Azerbaijan 
alone, the IFC provided loans of over $92 million dollars to help realize the BTC project and its 
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attendant infrastructure.  
 Oversight by the World Bank ensured that the pipelines were built and are operated 
according to harmonized and integrated standards and environmental guidelines, and the Group’s 
presence was critical in attracting commercial financiers to provide the follow-on funds for the 
pipelines’ completion. The World Bank Group also assumed the role of international arbiter to 
ensure that the BTC consortium’s production sharing agreements with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey were carried out in an equitable manner.  The Group’s commitment to the BTC and 
Baku-Supsa projects also helped mitigate political risk factors that otherwise would have 
contributed to private sector liabilities and consequently hindered the financial commitment of 
major international extraction companies. Above all, the legitimacy and supervision provided by 
the World Bank were critical to securing public recognition and support from the U.S. and EU 
governments and international NGOs for the project.  The above cases provide just a brief 
glimpse of the ways in which Bank, or Transnational Extra-regional Actor support for key 
energy infrastructure projects has helped to physically integrate the energy sectors Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey. 
 As discussed earlier, the World Bank Group’s major stake and financial involvement in the 
development of the energy and transport sectors of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey has been, 
and continues to be, contingent upon the implementation of a number of good governance and 
integrative measures in the three countries. In order to secure financing for the development of 
lucrative energy-related infrastructure projects, the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey must participate in the same World Bank Group programs that promote good 
governance, rule of law, and financial transparency. This harmonization allows for integration.  
The potential social and environmental impact of energy-related projects is extensively reviewed 
by the Group as a pre-condition for receiving financing, and the Bank itself is regularly reviewed 
by independent authorities to ensure that it mitigates the downside risks of extractive industry 
projects on local communities and aligns with good governance practices and the overall 
poverty-reducing mission of the organization.424  The presence of—and partnership with—the 
Group also helps ensure that domestic and foreign private sector companies operating out of the 
region adhere to the same standards, respect environmental guidelines, and provide secondary 
benefits to the local community.  As one senior World Bank official put it, the Group’s programs 
in any one country represent a package “more than the sum of its parts.” As the official 
explained, providing financing “opens up a lot of other areas that we [the World Bank Group] 
need to be involved in if we are to be assured that our money is well-used.”425  
 
Azerbaijan 
 
Energy Sector Development and Local Community Outreach 
 
 Since the late 1990s, the World Bank Group has been intensively involved in the energy 
and transport-related sectors in Azerbaijan and has served as a catalyst to ‘crowd-in’ private 
investment. With respect to the BTC project, the Group worked closely with the Azerbaijani 
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government on an economic reform program designed to ensure an adequate level of 
transparency and accountability necessary to attract the international financing for such a 
mammoth undertaking.  In addition to the completion of the BTC, the Group’s ongoing Railway 
Transport and Trade Facilitation Project works to improve the efficiency and modernization of 
the national railway company, Azerbaijan Dovlet Demir Yolu (ADDY).  Railways are an 
important component of the infrastructural connections amongst Azerbaijan Georgia and Turkey, 
particularly as an ever-increasing amount of oil is transported across rail links in the country.426  
This project complements the Group’s parallel efforts to improve railways in Georgia and 
upgrade integral energy transit routes from Baku to Georgia’s Black Sea ports.   
 Although complex, high-risk infrastructure development initiatives like the BTC pipeline 
make up a relatively small fraction of the IFC’s overall project portfolio, such projects tend to 
receive the most outside scrutiny from concerned parties and civil society organizations whose 
aim is to ensure an adequate level of social and environmental supervision.  Aside from 
providing funding and facilitating an enabling investment climate, the Group has convened 
forums for affected local communities and stakeholder organizations that would like to voice 
concerns and receive further information about the project.  In many ways, the BTC pipeline 
became a test case for the World Bank’s ability to achieve sustainable development outcomes 
through effective mobilization of diverse stakeholder interests.  Prior to final consideration of the 
project by the IFC’s Board, the Group embarked on an extensive Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessment (ESIA) report that was among the most comprehensive and voluminous the 
Bank had ever produced—spanning 46 volumes and 11,000 pages—and included a 120-day 
public comment and disclosure period. The IFC worked with the BTC consortium to ensure that 
there was no physical displacement of households along the pipeline route, and to provide 
guidance on temporary land resettlement and compensation during the project’s multi-year 
construction.  
 With regard to the longer-term benefits to be harvested from the completion of the 
pipeline, the IFC has worked with the BTC consortium and partner NGOs to develop a 
Community Investment Programme (CIP) for Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.  The CIP is 
intended to help local communities reap the secondary socio-economic benefits from the project 
and develop successful ‘linkage projects’ related to energy efficiency, community healthcare, 
microfinance, and local infrastructure support. 427  The IFC also collaborates with private sector 
partners like BP to magnify the positive impact of the construction of the BTC pipeline on local 
businesses and suppliers by providing grants to the Micro Finance Bank of Azerbaijan to expand 
its branch network in communities where BP conducts economic development operations.  As 
one IFC official has noted, such an initiative is a “good example of how IFC can work to 
increase the value-added that large projects in the oil and gas sector can bring to host countries, 
their businesses, and local communities.”428 
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State Oil Fund and Resource Revenue Transparency 
 
 In order to optimize Azerbaijan’s management of its resource wealth, the Group advised 
the Azerbaijani government on the creation of the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ).  
SOFAZ was established in 1999 by presidential decree429 and incorporates the best management 
practices of other natural resource funds such as Norway’s Government Petroleum Fund and 
Kuwait’s Reserve Fund for Future Generations.430 The oil fund is used to save energy-related 
windfalls for future generations and serve as a sterilization mechanism to prevent the onset of 
Dutch disease (for a more complete discussion of Dutch disease refer to the following section). 
Annual audits and quarterly financial reports are issued regularly and contribute to transparency.  
Like many other sovereign funds, SOFAZ maintains a conservative investment strategy, 
investing primarily in high-quality, low-risk securities outside of Azerbaijan.431  A portion of the 
country’s total energy revenues flows to SOFAZ, with the rest flowing directly to the 
government’s budget.432  
 To promote broad-based and internationally recognized practices of disclosure and 
transparency in the management of Azerbaijan’s energy revenues, the World Bank Group 
facilitated the country’s participation in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).  
EITI is a coalition of governments, investors, and civil society groups that endorse improved 
governance in resource-rich countries by calling for full publication and independent verification 
of company payments and government revenue streams from natural resources.  The initiative 
was launched at the behest of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair at the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development and was piloted by the UK’s then development agency DFID 
(Department for International Development).  The government of Azerbaijan signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with a coalition of NGOs and major oil and gas companies in 
Baku in 2004, a first step toward Azerbaijan’s becoming an EITI-Compliant country. The 
National Committee on EITI is chaired by SOFAZ and oversees the implementation of EITI 
principles.  Over the course of the past five years, 90 NGOs have been able to monitor energy 
revenues in Azerbaijan and develop a dialogue with the government about how such revenues 
are disclosed. Since 2007, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) has been subject to 
audit to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as part of the EITI criteria.  To 
facilitate Azerbaijan’s preparation for this auditing process, the Group has cooperated with the 
European Union’s Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program 
to implement financial accounting and reporting reform.  In 2008, Ernst and Young published 
SOCAR’s first internationally accepted audit report.  These efforts represent an important step 
forward in SOCAR’s gradual transformation from an opaque Soviet-era company into a more 
transparent, modern state-owned oil and gas company along the lines of Norway’s StatoilHydro 
and Brazil’s Petrobras.433  Both the United Nations and the Open Society Institute have 
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commended Azerbaijan in recent years for its leadership role within the EITI and its achievement 
of being recognized as the first EITI-compliant country.434  
 
Non-Oil Sector Development 
  
 The World Bank has noted the recent energy bonanza remains particularly problematic for 
Azerbaijan. The country’s oil reserves are known to be more limited than is the case for many 
other oil exporters, and therefore despite extreme fluctuations in the price per barrel of oil on the 
world market in recent years, the resource boom is likely to be more short-lived. In a 2005 
report, the World Bank predicted that Azerbaijan’s oil production could peak as early as 2010 at 
an estimated 71 million tons435.  Furthermore, most proven and potential oil resources in 
Azerbaijan are located offshore which tends to exacerbate the difficulty of their extraction.436  
The global financial crisis, which began in 2008, compounded Azerbaijan’s vulnerability in this 
respect, as commodity prices plummeted with a slowdown in global demand.  
 In light of these realities and the looming specter of Dutch disease, a significant portion of 
the Group’s activities is geared toward developing Azerbaijan’s non-oil sector.  Dutch disease, 
also known as the “resource curse,” is a classic economic problem that afflicts resource-rich 
nations, wherein the national currency severely appreciates as a result of the resource wealth and 
results in attenuation of the manufacturing and non-resource related industries of a country.  To 
ameliorate these effects, SOFAZ serves as the main instrument of sterilization for the influx of 
foreign exchange flows resulting from the oil boom that, if left unmanaged, could precipitate 
rapid appreciation and overheating of the economy.437  Moreover, the oil revenues accumulated 
in SOFAZ represent an important source of financing for development of the non-oil economy.   
 In addition to the role of SOFAZ, the IFC has partnered with the private sector to spur 
foreign direct investment in non-oil related industries such as financial services, utilities, and 
agri-business. Development of Azerbaijan’s non-oil sector is integral to achieving greater 
poverty reduction and job growth in Azerbaijan, since expanded petroleum output tends to have 
very little direct impact on employment.  In 2001, the energy sector accounted for 30 percent of 
GDP but only one percent of employment, a discrepancy which has only been further 
exacerbated in recent years with new petroleum exports coming online and higher oil prices.438  
The IFC’s strategy for the non-oil sectors in Azerbaijan focuses on promoting competition in the 
banking sector, providing technical assistance to private local banks, improving access to credit, 
and creating the right enabling environment for private provision of public services.439  The IFC 
works to achieve these objectives through specific initiatives like the Supplier Finance Facility 
(SFF) that provides capital to small and medium-sized enterprise suppliers.440  The SFF is 
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implemented through the Micro-Finance Bank of Azerbaijan—the first of its kind in the country 
and established with the help of the IFC—and in June 2006 provided its first loan to Azmetco, a 
local BP supplier that specializes in metering services.441  
 
Governance and Rule of Law 
 
 Corruption and government inefficiency remain one of Azerbaijan’s most significant 
problems and continue to hinder efforts to attract greater international investment.  Through the 
efforts of its International Development Association (IDA) and IFC arms, the World Bank Group 
has made improving governance and combating corruption one of its primary areas of focus in 
Azerbaijan.  Despite some marginal improvements in past years, Azerbaijan has consistently 
ranked low on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (158th out of 180 
countries surveyed in 2008).442 In 2005, the Group’s Board approved a Poverty Reduction 
Support Credit (PRSC) to expand anti-corruption efforts and improve the accountability and 
transparency of public finances.443  The IFC’s Corporate Governance Project offers ongoing 
technical assistance to banks and joint-stock companies in Azerbaijan that are interested in 
improving their corporate governance practices. The Bank and the IMF have also teamed up to 
assist the Azerbaijan National Bank with the drafting and passage of an anti-money laundering 
law consistent with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidelines and the creation of a 
financial intelligence unit to monitor illicit money flows. 444  The World Bank’s E-Government 
and Public Sector Reform program supports the ‘modernization of public sector administrative 
systems’, while the Judiciary Reform Project focuses on ‘strengthening the management capacity 
of judicial institutions, upgrading court facilities by building and rehabilitating courthouses and 
providing technology and equipment, strengthening the professionalism of judges and judicial 
sector staff by providing training and upgrading training facilities, and improving citizen access 
to information’.445  
 
Georgia 
 
Energy and Transport Sectors 
 
 Since Georgia’s entry as a member of the World Bank in 1992, the Group has bolstered the 
country’s role as a transit economy and in recent years supported the reform-oriented policies of 
the post-Rose Revolution government.446 Since the early nineties, Georgia has borrowed over $1 
billion from the World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA) and remains one of the 
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largest borrowers in the Europe and Central Asia region.447  Although the Group’s assistance to 
Georgia with its decades-long transformation from a Soviet command economy to a market-led 
one has been multi-faceted, the results have been particularly striking in integrating its energy 
sector with its neighbors: Azerbaijan and Turkey.  In this and in other crucial industries, the 
World Bank acts as a catalyst to attract the necessary donor and private financing for a 
burgeoning transit corridor.  In 1997, the Group agreed to fund an Oil Institution Building 
Project that supported the newly created Georgian International Oil Company (GIOC) in its 
overall objective of maximizing the potential benefits from accelerating oil and gas development 
in the Black Sea-Caspian Region. The Bank credit financed a feasibility study for the Baku-
Supsa export pipeline, as well as provided a set of trained international financial and legal 
advisers to assist with the pipeline negotiations.   
 In 1998, the IFC’s Board approved a $200 million loan for the Early Oil Project, a 
commitment to aid with the construction of Black Sea terminals and the Baku-Supsa pipeline in 
Azerbaijan and Georgia.  The project represented the first major oil development in the region 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and was part of a larger phased project that integrated 
staged development of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field operated by BP for a larger consortium 
of oil companies that held the licensing rights to exploration.  The $200 million dollar IFC 
financing went to five major foreign oil firms in the consortium ‘to mobilize necessary funds, 
reduce their exposure to a project with significant political risk, and lay the groundwork for 
future financing for related projects in the region’.448 In terms of the transit fees collected by the 
Georgian government from these and other projects like the BTC, the IMF estimates such 
revenues could top $50 million annually by 2011, a significant figure for an economy the size of 
Georgia’s.449  The early support of the World Bank helped underpin other legal reforms, 
supported by the 1999 Energy Sector Adjustment Credit (ESAC), that encouraged private sector 
investment in the Georgian oil and gas industry as well as facilitated Georgia’s ratification of key 
international treaties related to the management of oil spills.450 In recent years, the Group’s 
International Development Association (IDA) has also partnered with the U.S. Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) to fund and oversee the rehabilitation of Georgia’s Soviet-era gas 
pipelines and to help structure a UNDP-sponsored Carbon Facility so that Georgia can benefit 
from carbon financing. 
 Above and beyond specific pipeline projects, the World Bank has been a central player in 
Georgia’s larger energy infrastructure and transport sectors.  Through the Transport 
Rehabilitation Project, the Group has aided the government in reforming Georgia’s railways, a 
key mode of energy transport from Baku to Georgia’s Black Sea ports. The World Bank is one of 
the only development organizations apart from the MCC, with whom Georgia signed a Compact 
Agreement in 2005, involved in helping the country rebuild its dilapidated highway network.  
The Roads Project is aimed at upgrading and improving major sections of the East-West 
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highway, augmenting road maintenance programs, and exploring promising public-private 
partnerships to attract other sources of financing through the Bank’s Pre-Investment 
Infrastructure Facility.  In 2005, only an estimated five percent of Georgia’s road network 
supported the transit economy and foreign trade.  According to the Bank, “the long transit times, 
despite the relatively short distance and poor road conditions, add to transport costs and deter 
usage of the Georgian transit route.” Highway rehabilitation remains one of the key modes of 
exploiting ever-higher transit volumes arriving from Central Asia and the Caucasus. 451  In 
parallel with these efforts, the IFC helped finance construction of new terminals at Tbilisi and 
Batumi Airports.452 
 Georgia’s energy infrastructure is among the worst in the former Soviet Union and the 
unreliability of the country’s power supply and inadequate gas transmission systems continue to 
inhibit private sector growth.  To address these challenges, the World Bank has begun in recent 
years to work with the governments of Japan and Germany, the EBRD, and USAID to upgrade 
the electricity sector and gas networks in the country.453   
 
Crisis Response 
 
 Since the Rose Revolution, the government of Georgia has made remarkable progress in 
reforming outmoded and inefficient Soviet-style governance practices.  The World Bank ranked 
Georgia 15th out of 181 economies in its annual Doing Business report in 2009454; the Bank’s 
annual reports compile a set of globally recognized benchmarks that in combination measure the 
relative ease of doing business in a country.  As a testament to the magnitude of recent progress, 
when Georgia embarked on a major set of reforms in 2004-2005 it was ranked 112th.  Despite 
such progress, the global economic crisis and the August 2008 war with Russia acted as a set of 
twin shocks to the Georgian economy; their combined effects led to a 3.2% contraction of GDP 
in the second half of 2008 and prompted the need for a $750 million Standby Arrangement 
(SBA) with the IMF to avert a potential balance-of-payments crisis.  
 The World Bank played a key coordination role alongside other Western partners in 
managing the crisis response to the August 2008 conflict.  The Bank and the United Nations 
Development Group collaborated on a Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) methodology to determine 
the extent of the damage and the amount of financial assistance necessary for rehabilitation.455  
Building upon these efforts, the World Bank co-hosted a Donors Conference with the European 
Union in October 2008, wherein 38 countries and 15 organizations pledged an estimated $4.5 
billion in international assistance over the period of 2008-2010 to help Georgia rebuild and meet 
urgent post-conflict humanitarian needs.  To help channel and manage a portion of these new 
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funds, the government of Georgia asked the World Bank to assist with the establishment and 
administration of a multi-donor trust fund called The Phoenix Fund.  The Phoenix Fund adheres 
to World Bank standards for financial management and procurement and is intended to attract 
debt and equity financing for large infrastructure projects.456 The crisis illustrated not only the 
breadth of the World Bank’s convening power, but its larger integrative effect with respect to 
other Western organizations. 457   
 Among the more serious consequences of the 2008 conflict has been the impact on long-
term investor confidence in Georgia’s potential as a transit route for transcontinental energy 
flows and trade.  Although direct damage to energy infrastructure as a result of the conflict was 
relatively modest, the temporary suspension of oil shipments and gas supply interruptions that 
resulted underscored both Georgia’s strategic geographic location and its attendant 
vulnerabilities.  To prevent further such obstacles to the realization of thriving energy and 
tranport links amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, the Bank has begun to address some of 
these new urgencies that have surfaced as a result of the Russian incursion—the need for greater 
security of energy and infrastructure via improvements in the reliability of power transmission 
and gas storage facilities to cushion potential interruptions of imports in the future.458  Above 
and beyond dealing with short-term supply disruptions, the Group concluded in its JNA, 
‘Georgia needs to enhance its energy security by continuing to develop domestic energy 
resources’.459  Under the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)-
enclave Energy Project, the Group has funded a feasibility study for the development of a 
hydropower resource at Khudoni that could significantly improve the security of Georgia’s 
energy supply.  The Group estimates such a project upon completion could generate an estimated 
20 percent of current hydropower production and would be structured ‘as an export-oriented sale 
of power to neighboring countries’ and thereby ‘enhance Georgia’s role in the regional energy 
trade’.460    
 
Building Institutional Capacity 
 
 Unlike Azerbaijan, corruption is much less of a hindrance to growth and development in 
Georgia.  However, significant lack of capacity means that in terms of supporting energy and 
transport sector integration with its neighbors, there is ample opportunity for achieving even 
greater impact.  As of January 2008, the IFC’s portfolio in Georgia stood at an estimated $93 
million.461  The World Bank Group has supported national reform of major institutions, such as 
the judiciary, and facilitated reductions in barriers to commercial activity and the privatization of 
key enterprises. The Judicial Reform Project provides for the ‘attestation of judges; publication 
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of laws, decrees, and court decisions; and establishment of a training center for judges’. The 
Enterprise Rehabilitation Project (ERP) is ‘helping strengthen management of privatized 
enterprises as well as pre-privatization restructuring of state-owned enterprises’.462  One of the 
IFC’s main advisory projects in Georgia is the Business Enabling Environment Project, which 
involves conducting surveys of small and medium-sized enterprises and providing guidance on 
licenses, permits, and inspections.463   
 The Group also works closely with other institutions that complement the World Bank’s 
efforts to expand institutional capacity and secure adequate capital financing, such as USAID, 
the EU, and the EBRD.  To help mitigate the effects of the global credit crunch, the IFC recently 
announced it would partner with the EBRD and the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) to provide the Bank of Georgia, the largest and most systemically important bank in the 
country, with enough capital to continue lending to Georgian companies and small enterprises.  
The IFC also helped establish the ProCredit Bank of Georgia, the country’s first bank to 
specialize in the provision of capital to micro and small enterprises. Lastly, the Group facilitated 
the post-Rose Revolution government’s implementation of a decentralization project to increase 
local government capacity throughout the country in accordance with the European Charter on 
Local Self-Governance. 464  
 
Turkey 
 
Energy Sector and Risk Mitigation 
 
The World Bank Group’s assistance to Turkey has been broad-based and diversified across many 
sectors, aimed at supporting Turkey’s development as a sub-regional anchor in the Caucasus, and 
as a major middle-income partner of the Bank and a globally significant emerging market.465  In 
past years, the country has been among the largest borrowers in the Bank’s Europe and Central 
Asia Division466 and Turkey presently represents the IFC’s fifth largest exposure after the so-
called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China, respectively).  As of September 2007, 
the IFC’s committed portfolio in Turkey totaled $1.6 billion and the IFC is committing a similar 
amount during the 2008-2011 budgeting period.467  In terms of promoting Turkey’s crucial 
strategic and geographic role in the formation of transit routes through the Azerbaijan-Georgia-
Turkey sub-region to the West, the World Bank envisages substantial future Bank Group 
financing in the energy sector, ‘which reflects the importance of energy security and energy 
efficiency’. The World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 
founded to promote foreign direct investment and provide political risk guarantees to potential 
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investors, is very active in Turkey and helps support infrastructure projects.468  Overall, the 
Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy for Turkey projected up to $6.2 billion in new 
commitments from the Bank for the years 2008-2011.469   
 The Group financed the initial feasibility study for the Turkish portion of the BTC route 
terminating at Ceyhan, and its early support for the transnational pipeline project played an 
important role in securing the requisite diplomatic heft and financial backing from other extra-
regional actors and private sector companies for its completion.  The IFC’s investment in the 
BTC project consisted of a loan of up to $125 million dollars for its own account ($76 million for 
the portion of the pipeline built in Turkey) and another $125 million dollar loan in commercial 
bank syndication.470  According to a senior World Bank official, the Group also held discussions 
with the Turkish government ‘about complying with good international environmental standards, 
safeguard issues, resettlement of peoples, [and] dealing with the Kurds’ during BTC and SCP 
construction.  Other examples of Bank-sponsored projects that promote and emphasize common 
environmental standards throughout the region include the Caspian Oil and Gas Dialogue and the 
Strategic Partnership on Black Sea and the Danube Basin, a joint effort between the World Bank 
and relevant UN agencies to address environmental degradation of these crucial water systems.  
 The World Bank is likewise committed to gas sector development in Turkey over the next 
few years, to increase the ‘reliability and stability of gas supply in Turkey by implementing 
critically needed gas storage and network infrastructure, and strengthen the Turkish Pipeline 
Cooperation in its operations as a financially stable and commercially managed corporation’.471  
In light of the August 2008 explosion along the BTC pipeline, for which the breakaway 
Kurdistan Peoples Party (PKK) took responsibility, and the similar route traversed by the South 
Caucasus gas pipeline, such World Bank-administered projects could help mitigate future gas 
supply disruptions by providing underground storage facilities should political and ethnic 
tensions result in sabotage along the energy and transport linkages amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey.  Lastly, Turkey’s unique vulnerability to natural disasters—particularly 
earthquakes—is of related concern to the safety and security of its transit pipelines.  The BTC 
pipeline alone travels through seven active earthquake faults in Turkey, and between 1992-2008 
Turkey experienced 130 earthquakes of 5.0 or higher on the Richter scale.472  The Bank supports 
disaster preparedness through a variety of different avenues, including the WBI’s Disaster Risk 
Management (DRM) Program and the Bank’s Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency 
Preparedness Project (ISMEP).473  
 
Coordination With Other Extra-regional Actors 
  
 The World Bank Group partners with a number of international financial institutions, 
bilateral donor governments, foundations, and private sector corporations to promote regional 
integration, development, and good governance on multiple levels.  As a result of its 
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considerable resources, near-universal membership, and global reputation, the World Bank is in 
a singular position to bring other organizational actors with specialized technical expertise and 
funding together to address the full range of development needs for Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey and thereby support the Western integrative process.  The Group has worked alongside 
efforts of the EBRD, the IMF, DFID, USAID, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency 
(USTDA), and the U.S. Treasury, as well as the European Union via its European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP).  As in other member countries, the World Bank and the IMF country teams 
regularly coordinate their policy advice, particularly in such overlapping areas as tax policy and 
financial and banking sector reform.  More specifically, the two organizations collaborate on the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) reports of member countries, a joint World Bank 
and IMF effort launched in 1999 to promote the soundness of financial systems worldwide.474   
 
Azerbaijan 
 
 In Azerbaijan, the World Bank has taken the lead on donor coordination in the energy and 
transport sectors.  Beginning with the Azerbaijan Highway Project, the EBRD and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) have come to an agreement with the Group to supplement its 
technical assistance program in large-scale infrastructure and transport.  The Group works with 
the Islamic Development Bank to strengthen capacity building in various areas, and with the 
EU’s TACIS program on taxation modernization.  The USTDA and EBRD were critical partners 
working with the Group on SOCAR restructuring, and the UNDP worked with the Bank on 
integrating the Millennium Development Goals into the government’s official poverty reduction 
program.  The U.S. Treasury and the World Bank have jointly endeavored to modernize the 
budget preparation process, and the Group has worked alongside USAID on utility regulatory 
reform.  The Bank also relied on Canadian and Swiss-sponsored Consultant Trust Funds to 
enhance programs that support improved financial reporting across government ministries, 
regulatory agencies, and private sector corporations in Azerbaijan.  Regarding judicial reform, 
the Bank is one among many organizations working with the Ministry of Justice and the courts 
system on rule of law reform, training of judges, and the improvement of legal education.  In this 
arena, the Bank’s IDA collaborates with the American Bar Association, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, and the Soros and Eurasia foundations.475  
 
Georgia 
 
 In Georgia, the Group has played a key role coordinating numerous extra-regional efforts 
and donors.  In the energy sector, the World Bank took the lead in bringing together a number of 
key partners including USAID, the EBRD, and KfW, a German government-owned development 
bank.476  MCC and the World Bank have worked together in Georgia to improve municipal 
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services and infrastructure support programs.  The Georgia Donor Framework Group, which 
aims to ensure coordinated development assistance, is facilitated by the World Bank and the 
UNDP and includes the IMF, the EU, the United States, the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, and 
the Netherlands as members. The World Bank Group works closely alongside a number of US-
sponsored projects in Georgia, as the country ranks among the top world states for American aid 
per capita (in the fiscal years 1992-2006 Congress approved an estimated $1.76 billion total in 
funds)477 and the U.S. is Georgia’s largest bilateral donor. The Group has also collaborated on 
several EU-sponsored projects under the ENP.  Through its IFC development arm, the World 
Bank is uniquely positioned to seamlessly integrate the efforts of the public and private sectors.  
The IFC has worked closely with BP and its Oil and Gas Partners on the Regional Development 
Initiative (RDI), discussed in Chapter 5, and designed to bring socio-economic benefits to 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.  The RDI constitutes a number of discrete projects in all three 
countries and includes the Georgia Corporate Governance Project, which brings together the 
IFC, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and BP and partners to improve 
corporate governance practices of Georgian companies and banks.478  The Public Sector 
Management Reform Support Project represents a pooled funding arrangement between the 
Bank, DFID, the Netherlands, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) to improve public sector management in Georgia.479  
 
Turkey 
 
 In addition to its extensive collaboration on EU-related initiatives in Turkey, the Group has 
partnered with the IMF and Germany’s GTZ international development organization in 
implementing municipal and public sector reform.  As it does in Azerbaijan and Georgia, the 
Bank works with the IMF in Turkey to facilitate financial sector reform, collaborate on regular 
FSAP reports, and contribute to macroeconomic monitoring.  The IMF and the World Bank also 
work together in the arena of social security reform, particularly as social inclusion and adequate 
safety nets for the poor are key aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession.480  To 
further improve and monitor the business climate in Turkey, the Bank has been a driving force 
behind the creation of the International Advisory Council (IAC), a group comprised of key 
members of the Turkish Cabinet, CEOs of major companies, Turkish business association heads, 
and senior representatives of international financial institutions that convene regularly to advise 
the government on future priorities for reform.481  The Council of Europe Development Bank 
and the EIB work together with the Bank on earthquake risk mitigation, ecological and natural 
disaster preparedness, as well as environmental and infrastructure projects. 482  The UN and the 
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World Bank have also identified areas where stronger collaboration in Turkey is a priority, 
particularly in the arenas of poverty alleviation and local development.483   
 
World Bank Group Rankings 
 
 Senior World Bank officials have highlighted the effect of World Bank Group rating and 
ranking reports on integrative reforms in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Highly publicized 
and universally recognized rankings such as the World Bank-IFC annual Doing Business Report 
can motivate reform in various member countries, particularly as these sets of benchmarks are 
closely monitored by investors and donor governments. Although the World Bank administers 
multiple ranking reports across various categories, Doing Business is among the best known 
globally and ranks 178 countries on ten core dimensions of business regulation.  The Azerbaijani 
government has in recent years begun to make a concerted effort to improve its traditionally low 
scores, and in 2009 the country was named Doing Business’ top regulatory reformer worldwide.  
The country’s overall rank for the ease of doing business jumped from 97th place to 33rd 
between 2007 and 2008, the biggest one-year jump in Doing Business history.484 Georgia was 
named the top reformer among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 2006 and 
listed among the top ten reformers globally that same year and in 2008.  During his time in office 
as Georgia’s prime minister, Zurab Noghaideli publicly cited the desire to improve the country’s 
World Bank rankings as an impetus for implementing further economic reform.  A 2008 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)485 report affirmed that policymakers across many different 
countries tend to use Doing Business (DB) rankings a ‘tool’ in developing policy reforms.486 
Furthermore, the DB rankings can have a multiplier effect when implemented and promoted by 
other development aid agencies.  The MCC uses DB rankings as a basis for resource allocation, 
which continues to add to the prestige and press attention associated with this particular set of 
indicators.  Ultimately, the IEG analysis concluded ‘the DB exercise has demonstrated that a 
cross-country ranking exercise can be effective in spurring dialogue and motivating interest and 
action’.487   
 The World Bank Institute also publishes its annual Governance Matters Index, the most 
comprehensive set of indicators measuring various components of governance available488, and 
the Group collaborates with the EBRD on a set of Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Surveys (BEEPS) that includes all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
former Soviet Union, and Turkey.  According to the BEEPS sponsors, ‘the objective of the 
survey is to provide feedback from enterprises on the state of the private sector in countries of 
operation by assessing the constraints to private sector growth and creating statistically 
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significant business environment indicators that are comparable across countries through 
interviews with firms in the manufacturing and services sectors’.489  Each of these respective sets 
of rankings and surveys includes Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey and provides common 
incentives for their harmonization of standards and integration in the energy and transport 
sectors.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The World Bank Group would most likely be a critical development player in Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey even if their energy and transport sectors were not integrating.  But, the role 
of a TERA in this case has provided focus and a coordinating mechanism around those sectors 
which has provided impetus for their integration. Because the World Bank’s commitment to an 
infrastructure project is a signal to the private sector about the legitimacy of a proposed initiative 
(the so-called ‘crowding-in’ effect), and because of the lucrative nature of many of these energy 
and transport infrastructure initiatives, the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey have 
been accepting of the same World Bank Group-mandated governance and rule of law reforms 
that are necessarily tied to its financial support.  This harmonization of standards allows for 
integration.  Had international financial institutions not been key facilitators of such major 
transnational projects, it is not only unlikely they would have been completed in a timely 
manner—if at all—it is highly unlikely they would have been accompanied by a much broader 
and more consequential set of integrative measures. These achievements are compounded by the 
coordinating role that the World Bank Group continues to play with other extra-regional actors in 
the region, a role that has made the work of other international institutions all the more effective 
driving integration amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey’s energy and transport sectors. 
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Chapter 4 – Transnational Extra-regional Actors: TRACECA and 
INOGATE 
 
Two main EU-pioneered programs, the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia 
(TRACECA) and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) emerged in the 1990s 
to integrate the EU, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Turkey and Central Asia.  In so doing, they 
served as tools with which the EU, the Transnational Extra-regional Actor in this case, was able 
to contribute to the integration of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkeyin the sectors of transport and 
energy.  This chapter will examine the activities of TRACECA and INOGATE, in their full 
scope, as well as in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  A clear example of how integration is 
achieved in the transport and energy sectors through the involvement of TERAs should emerge.  
It should also become apparent that integration in the transport sector is due to a variety of 
processes, taking from security communities, neo-functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism, 
whereas integration in the energy sector is a neoliberal institutionalist dynamic. 
 
TRACECA 
 
As part of the European Union’s TACIS technical assistance program, TRACECA is 
rooted in a 3 May, 1993 conference in Brussels, where representatives of the EU and ministers of 
transport and commerce of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia  (Turkey joined the project later) signed an agreement to develop an EU-
funded ‘transport corridor on the West-East direction from Europe’.490  The corridor sought to 
develop ‘an East-West axis from Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, through the Caucasus, 
across the Black Sea to Europe’.491  A sharp economic decline and serious backlogs in out of 
date transportation systems after the fall of the Soviet Union brought the governments of the 
TRACECA participating countries and the European Commission together as they sought more 
active incorporation of post-Soviet markets into ‘the international economy by improving and 
enhancing trade and transport’.492  INOGATE’s integrative objectives were similar: facilitating 
secure energy supplies to the EU through the updating of post-Soviet energy infrastructure and 
dissemination of best practices for its operation.  The TRACECA and INOGATE programs 
seized on the opportunity for participant countries to expand their economic ties with Europe and 
integrate more closely amongst themselves in the transport and energy spheres. 
TRACECA’s transportation routes pass through territories rich with raw materials and 
energy resources, in need of modern functional outlets for delivery to Western consumers.  Not 
surprisingly, a significant portion of the transported goods are ‘oil and oil products, minerals, 
metals, construction materials, chemical products, and consumer goods’.493  Accelerated 
development of oil and gas fields in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan since the end of 
the Cold War is the key contributing factor to the constant increase of volumes of hydrocarbon 
cargo transits via TRACECA routes.  According to a TRACECA representative, between 2005-
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2007, merely sea transportation through the Caspian accounted for over 13.5 billion tons of oil 
and oil products, with transit volumes increasing ten fold since 1996.494  In 2006, the volume of 
trade among TRACECA member countries rose 22% and reached close to 300 billion Euros, 
while trade with the EU accounted for 200 billion Euros.495    Furthermore, the proximity of 
Central Asian countries to China’s booming economy makes them an attractive region to serve 
as transit conduit to the West.  This is a particularly important point in view of the increasing 
trade turnover between Asia and Europe, which exceeds $2 billion, while the transportation 
expenses make up approximately $200 billion.496  One of the main visions behind TRACECA 
was that the project would serve as a stabilizing factor in Eurasia by way of stimulating the 
economies of its participants and integrating them into the global economy and amongst 
themselves.    
Indeed, given newly opened borders in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the 
geopolitical location of the TRACECA participants, and enhanced trade between Europe and 
Asia, ‘the rise of freight flows on the one hand and logical reverse freight flows on the other 
hand’, the development of transport and communications links between the two regions made 
simple economic sense. 497  Thus far, TRACECA has focused on ‘trade facilitation and 
harmonization of the legal basis, with inter-modal transportation [as well as] the transport modes 
such as road, railway, civil aviation, and maritime transportation’.498  After its central 
multilateral agreement was signed in September 1998 in Baku, TRACECA has progressed from 
one project to another: 61 technical assistance and 15 investment projects between 1996 and 
2006, developed within its Action Program framework, in agreement with TACIS rules and 
regulations.499  As Demchenko and Kaminsky put it: 
 
Considering the TRACECA route in the context of developing trade relations between Europe and 
Asia and location of main commodity producers in Asia and consumers in Europe on the one hand, as 
well as the flow of goods of potential major cargo owners on the other hand, it can be concluded that 
the delivery of goods to Europe through TRACECA looks much more attractive than other alternative 
routes.500 
 
With 13 members and three observer countries potentially interested in joining the 
program, TRACECA’s expansion may eventually include Afghanistan.  TRACECA’s secretariat 
also plans for links with the EU’s Trans-European Networks (TENs) program, a similar 
integrative mechanism that emerged in the late 1980s to link ‘various regions and national 
networks [in Eurasia] by modern and efficient infrastructure’.501   
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To date, the EU has financed TRACECA with an annual allocation of 9-11 million Euros.  
However, since 2004, the participating countries have been encouraged to contribute 15% to the 
general budget, with the EU continuing to provide financial assistance on a smaller scale. 502   
EU institutions have now concentrated their efforts on ‘consulting and investment projects for 
the TRACECA program’.503  Brussels has laid out the main directions of TRACECA’s strategic 
development until 2015, including the formation of modern infrastructure, cooperation with 
Trans-European Networks, guarantee of naval and aviation security, as well as energy transit 
routes.  As TRACECA’s mission has expanded over the years, investment in its projects from 
international financial institutions and European private investors has increased.504   
 
The Nuts and Bolts of TRACECA 
 
TRACECA is at the core of the main trade route linking Europe and Asia.  The idea to 
restore the ancient Silk Road, linking East-West trade and transport, can be traced to the 
September 1990 Vladivostok International Conference when the then Soviet Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze (later president of independent Georgia) voiced his support for 
more open collaboration ‘between the countries of Eurasia’.505  The idea was favorably received 
by the countries of the Caucasus and the EU, resulting in the formation of TRACECA in May 
1993 in Brussels.  Its initial members included Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  In 1996, Ukraine became a full member 
of TRACECA, while Moldova was granted membership in 1997 and Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey in 2000.  In 2002, Afghanistan, China, Iran and Greece expressed interest in joining 
TRACECA,506 while several other countries participate in the project as observers.  With 
Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007, TRACECA became inextricably tied to 
EU institutions.507   Given its mandate, TRACECA’s goals are perhaps unsurprisingly 
ambitious: 
 
 Strengthening the political and economic sovereignty of CIS countries in the TRACECA region to 
enable their effective participation in the world economy; supporting regional cooperation between 
TRACECA countries; promoting regional investment by international and private financial resources; 
and linking the Eurasian transport corridor with European and world transport systems.508 
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TRACECA’s ultimate objective is to extend a railway from the Chinese port of Lianyungang 
along the Yellow Sea to the Georgian seaports of Poti and Batumi along the Black sea, as well as 
to Turkey’s railroad network and the Marmara Tunnel under the Bosporus, which will then 
access Western Europe.  Designed to promote closer collaboration and dialogue among 
participant countries, TRACECA has aimed to sustain transit fees at a competitive level and to 
professionalize procedures at trans-border crossings along internationally standardized lines.  
The program’s participating countries have concluded agreements on the transportation of large 
cargoes via the TRACECA route, demonstrating that the ‘route is the shortest and potentially the 
fastest route from Central Asia to deep-water ports linked to world markets’.509  Realization of 
this potential has been a key driving force for TRACECA partner states to attract investors from 
the public and private sectors.  That said, Transnational Extra-regional Actors such as the EU 
and international financial institutions, as well as the integrative effects their involvement brings, 
have been central to most of TRACECA’s projects.  As Abid Sharifov, Vice-Premier of 
Azerbaijan noted at an anniversary conference of TRACECA in Baku on 4 December, 2008, to 
date, the European Commission has provided funding of $157 million for TRACECA’s 61 
technical and 15 investment projects.510  In fact, the EU’s central support has provided the 
reputational backing needed for other international organizations to participate in eliminating 
non-geographic barriers to transport goods: 
 
TRACECA has helped to attract large investments from the development partners, that include the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that have committed funds for capital 
projects on ports, railways and roads along the TRACECA route, the World Bank (WB) that have 
financed new capital projects on roads in Armenia and Georgia, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
that have allocated substantial funds for road and railway improvement and the Islamic Development 
Bank (IDB) that had invested into development of the transport sector in the TRACECA countries.  
The EU is supporting the program with other European Commission projects to further enhance 
regional co-operation and economic sustainability in the region such as the Southern Ring Air Routes 
project and the Oil and Gas Pipeline project (INOGATE).511  
 
According to the program’s estimates, to date, international financial institutions have invested 
over 1.3 billion Euros into various TRACECA projects.512   
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TRACECA’s program portfolio has grown significantly since its inception.  Its ongoing projects 
include: development of coordinated national transport prices; improvement of maritime links 
between TRACECA Corridors and Trans-European Network Corridors; creation of perishable 
goods licensing and certification centers, training of operational air transport staff of South Ring 
states; analysis and forecasting of traffic flows for TRACECA countries and interregional 
Transport Integration, including organization of the Transport Dialogue between EU and NIS in 
the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy; strengthening of transport training 
capacity in post-Soviet countries; development of the port at Aktau, on Kazakhstan’s Caspian 
coast, including a master plan and feasibility study.513 
Although TRACECA projects have faced various challenges in their implementation stages as 
well as inherent issues with the program’s weak overall strategy, they have been relatively 
successful.  New roads and railways are under construction along the entire span of the 
TRACECA corridor.514 According to Svante Cornell, Research Director of the Central Asia 
Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University, the EU's new Eastern European members are 
interested in injecting renewed momentum into the program.515 
Construction of ports, bridges, and other transportation infrastructure is underway in conjunction 
with the renewal of old roads, railways, bridges and ports.516  Investment projects to build 
terminals in the ports of Ilyichevsk, Poti, Batumi, Turkmenbashi, Baku and Aktau have already 
been implemented, opening regular railway and ferry communication lines along Varna-
Ilyichevsk-Poti-Batumi and Baku-Aktau, tying Azerbaijan and Georgia together.517  The 
construction of a railway tunnel under the Bosporus, which will connect the continents of Europe 
and Asia across the straights, is to be finalized in 2009.518  According to a TRACECA 
representative, the average annual turnover of goods for the past five years along the route 
increased by 10-15%.519  In 2005, about 50 million tons of goods were transported from Asia 
through the Caucasus to Europe and vice versa, while 30 million tons of goods transited through 
the same route within the seven months of 2008.520   
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The TRACECA secretariat plans to develop the Samarkand-Termez highway as an integral part 
of the trans-Afghan corridor, which was solidified by an agreement between Uzbekistan, Iran 
and Afghanistan.  The modernization of the Kungrad-Beineu-Aktau, as well as the construction 
of the Andijan-Kashgar railway via Kyrgyzstan has received support from TRACECA.521  Even 
Tajikistan, Central Asia’s most remote country, is bound to benefit from EU-backed TRACECA.  
The country’s ‘transcontinental highway Tashkent-Dushanbe or Termez-Dushanbe passing 
through the territory of Gorny Badakhshan via the Kulma passing with access to the Karakum 
highway allows it to reach China and then Japan and the Asian-Pacific region, as well as 
Pakistan and India’.522  While isolated Turkmenistan has until recently ignored TRACECA, 
burgeoning ties with the EU and Western countries at the diplomatic level may lead to eventual 
participation in the program.  All of these projects in Central Asia would have to connect to 
Europe through the Caucasus and Asia Minor, which in turn further integrates the transport 
infrastructure of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. 
Azerbaijan Railways upgraded its ‘control system in line with the TRACECA project [in 1998-
1999 and] an oil depot and new station were constructed in 1998 in Diubendi to handle transport 
of domestic and Kazakhstan petroleum’.523  TRACECA seeks to improve 60% of Kazakhstan’s 
railway tracks.  Modernization of the country’s Caspian Aktau Port has received $54 million 
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development with the capacity “to handle 2 
million tons of dry cargoes and 6 million tons of oil.”524  The same year, Ukraine opened the 
Poti-Ilyichevsk transport center and “the completed rehabilitation of 1870 kilometers of track 
infrastructure.”525  Railway modernization in other member countries also received significant 
funding from the EU and international financial institutions.     
Since 2000, the volume of cargo transit along the TRACECA route has increased between 6 to 
10 times, depending on the area.  According to the General Secretary of TRACECA’s Permanent 
Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Commission, Rustan Jenalinov, turnover of goods over the 
past five years has reached on average 10-15%, with hydrocarbons making up 70% of that 
figure.526  Jenaliev is convinced that the volumes of cargoes transiting through the TRACECA 
corridor is bound to increase with increased transportation integration between China and 
Western Europe, especially given that the annual growth of turnover of goods among TRACECA 
member states exceeds 20%.  Moreover, China’s booming economy elevates the role of the 
region as a key transit hub.  China accounts for 50% of trade turnover between Asia and Europe, 
while it is estimated that by 2010 China will occupy a second role in the trade turnover in the 
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world, making the Caucasus and Turkey a vital global transit route.527  Ever since the Trans-
Caucasian trunk-railway took effect on May 13, 1996, cargo transportation across the 
TRACECA region has grown steadily.528 
At a May 2007 meeting of TRACECA’s Inter-Governmental Commission, which seeks to unify 
member country efforts, ‘centered on the formation of sustainable, effective and integrated multi-
modal transport systems’, participants adopted a strategy to run through 2015.529  According to 
the General Secretary Jenalinov, the Strategy’s main priorities until 2015 are, ‘provision of 
security and safety of freights, [which requires] strengthening of institutional and legislative 
bases as well as increasing the potential of the transportation personnel, and improvement of 
transport infrastructure via defining viable projects, optimal use of investments and raising them 
from various sources’.530  It is worth pointing out that the strategy gives a special role to 
forwarding agents and operators of cargoes as they optimize a complex process.531  Such an 
endeavor will incorporate ‘harmonization of laws, usage of modern logistical technologies, 
strengthening of non-state regulations, and increasing professional standards [including] training 
of cargo forwarding agents in 10 countries [which] is currently in the final stages’.532 
The key component of TRACECA’s efforts so far has been simplification and unification of laws 
to streamline cross-border trade.  An accord to regulate ‘transit traffic signed by Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 1996 in Sarakhs (Turkmenistan) and joined later by 
Turkey goes a long way towards coordinating railway business activities.  It was the first 
example of legislative changes towards promoting the project’.533  Integration and harmonization 
of transportation legislation in the region is a continuous process.  The program’s presence in the 
region is evident as there have been ‘frequent regional conferences and seminars, close 
partnerships with international financial institutions, TRACECA’s technical assistance and 
investment projects, and an increasing number of those using the corridor, particularly in the 
Caucasus’.534     
                                                 
527 Anna Nezhinskaya’s interview with General Secretary of TRACECA’s Permanent Secretariat of the Inter-
Governmental Commission Rustan Jenalinov , “ТРАСЕКА открыт для всех?” (TRACECA is Open to Everyone?), 
RZD Partner, November 9, 2007, http://www.rzd-partner.ru/interview/2007/09/11/310945.html   
528 “Назад – в будущее, или в поисках евразийского транспортного консенсуса” (Back - to the future, or in 
search of the Eurasian transport consensus).   
529 “Проблемы использования международного коридора ‘ТРАСЕКА’” (Problems of Using the International 
TRACECA Corridor), Presentation of Deputy General Secretary of KazATO A.A. Denisenko at a roundtable 
dedicated to “State and Private Sector Partnership to Solving Transportation Problem of Countries with No Access 
to Sea,” Batumi, Georgia, May 19, 2007. 
530 Anna Nezhinskaya’s interview with General Secretary of TRACECA’s Permanent Secretariat of the Inter-
Governmental Commission Rustan Jenalinov , “ТРАСЕКА открыт для всех?” (TRACECA is Open to Everyone?), 
RZD Partner, November 9, 2007, http://www.rzd-partner.ru/interview/2007/09/11/310945.html   
531 Ibid.   
532 Ibid.   
533 Teimuraz Gorshkov and George Bagaturia, “TRACECA – Restoration of Silk Route,” Japan Railway & 
Transport Review 28, September 2001, p. 53. 
534 “Обзор TRACECA и достижения проекта гармонизации процедур переcечения границ,” (Review of 
TRACECA and the Achievements of the Project’s Harmonization of Border Crossing Procedures), Asian 
 125 
A document entitled “Visa TRACECA” has been in the works for several years.  Its adoption 
will allow for the lowering of various transport-related duties and tariffs to increase the 
competitiveness of goods transported via TRACECA.  Currently, various duties levied on a car 
going from across the Caspian to Turkey via Azerbaijan and Georgia reach up to $400 just to 
cross the borders.  As a result, the price of the goods increases significantly.  The incentive for 
TRACECA member countries to adopt integrative measures such as Visa TRACECA, is clear.535 
TRACECA’s Evolution 
Since its inception in 1993, the TRACECA program grew significantly with EU support.  That 
said, because TRACECA was established in an atmosphere of haste, a common strategy among 
the participating countries to identify priorities was not developed in detail.  As admitted by a 
TRACECA representative, the program's potential has yet to be fully met.536  Coordination of 
actions to develop and implement transport, tariff, customs and tax policies among TRACECA 
member countries as well as procedures to cross borders, and development of transportation 
infrastructure remain open for discussion.537  According to the EU’s 1998 evaluation of 
TRACECA projects, ‘any notion of strategy appears to have been superimposed after the 
decisions have been taken.  There is no evidence that there has been a focused strategy that has 
guided decisions.  This is particularly evident at the present time when most of the technical 
assistance projects have come to an end, with varying degrees of success’.538   
Some of the criticisms lodged at the EU regarding TRACECA centered on its steadily fading 
interest in the program and its lack of a guiding vision.  According to some reports, EU officials, 
appeared increasingly unenthusiastic about these programs and tried to subsume regional 
transport issues to the EU-Russia dialogue.539  According to Bakyt Kakchekeev, Kyrgyzstan 
Country Director for the consulting firm Task Force Innovations International, TRACECA has 
lost its identity among other organizations that also seek to improve transportation routes such as 
the Eurasian Economic Community, ADB transport initiative, Eurasian Continental Bridge, and 
others.540  In Kakcheev's view, TRACECA’s progress was not particularly distinguishable from 
that of other transportation-related organizations.541  Similarly, TRACECA participant 
countries have also been criticized for absence of interest in advancing the program after the EU 
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pass on the mantle, particularly as some countries raised transport duties, while other key 
countries in the region, such as Turkmenistan have still not joined.542   
That said, despite the challenging political and economic environment in many of TRACECA’s 
member countries, the program has been moderately successful in Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey and has contributed to the integration of their transport sectors.   The difficulty in 
measuring the success of the projects has been mostly due to the lack of comprehensible norms 
and standards as TRACECA’s initial goals have changed and ‘are not sufficiently definitive to 
make measuring the effectiveness of the program easy’.543   
As the initial goal of the TRACECA program was to boost the efficacy of the transportation 
sector, it involved fact-finding of conditions in the transportation sphere, provision of practical 
solutions and professional training.  These efforts produced mixed results as some projects were 
more successful (for example the Policy and Regulatory Framework projects) than others (such 
as the Traffic Forecasting and Dolphin projects).544  Technical assistance from the EU was key to 
sustaining many projects, which raised a question about the continuing viability of TRACECA 
once the EU reduced it funding. 
The EU continues to grant financial assistance to TRACECA through the TACIS program.  Up 
to 2006, TACIS funded ‘62 technical assistance projects worth 105 million euros and 14 
investment projects worth 52 million euros’.545  However, since early 2000, the EU began 
reducing its funding to the program as TRACECA’s member states assumed a greater financial 
role to support the activities of the permanent secretariat, its working groups and relevant 
operations.  The gradual transfer of responsibilities has allowed TRACECA member countries to 
become more involved in advancing the projects.  This has partially been a product of greater 
integration of their transport sectors. 546  According to EU evaluations, TRACECA has 
succeeded from its early stages in “demonstrating the potential for regional cooperation in 
transport and has achieved a significant level of awareness at the political level.”547  With EU 
support, TRACECA was able to improve the quality of transportation services, created a 
foundation for future actions as well as ‘visibility for TACIS and for the EU assistance to the 
region generally’.548   
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The gradual handover of TRACECA from the EU to the program’s member states has continued 
its development.  Realizing the program’s promising future, the TRACECA participants 
continue to hold regular discussions on the improvement of the transport corridor and its 
integration with other corridors.  They have also pursued concrete measures to implement 
investment projects and raise money to fund them.  When Kazakhstan took over TRACECA’s 
chairmanship in 2007, the country’s Minister of Transportation, Serik Akhmetov, stressed 
Astana’s commitment to “integration initiatives in the transportation sphere.”549   
Member countries have also made significant individual investments in some projects.  For 
example, Azerbaijan ‘invested $200 million in development of sea transport and seven new 
tankers have been bought through these means.  Some $500 million has been invested in 
development of air transport’.550  Further, the member states have also exerted effort to increase 
training and professional development of staff in their transport sectors.  One such project, 
launched in 2008, seeks to improve the preparation and training of students in the transportation 
field in higher education institutions within the framework of TRACECA.551  The program’s 
participating countries are reportedly determined to keep the program running and they are 
exploring ways to find more funding.     
INOGATE 
 
The Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe program, or INOGATE, was established in 1995 
as TRACECA’s counterpart with a more narrow focus on the development of oil and gas 
transportation and transit systems.  With its Technical Secretariat based in Kyiv, which is the 
official representation of the program, and a regional office in Tbilisi, INOGATE’s members 
include 21 countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, as well as Albania, Armenia, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  The EU, 
several international financial institutions and international organizations are the program’s 
observers.552 
 
As noted earlier, similar to TRACECA, INOGATE has sought to promote regional 
integration in the Caucasus and Asia Minor via its technical assistance by connecting 
transportation infrastructure in those regions with that of EU member states.  The ultimate goal 
of the program is to facilitate ‘secure energy supply for the EU […] while acting as a catalyst in 
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attracting private investors and international financial organizations to finance such projects’.553  
INOGATE hopes to improve pipeline systems and transportation of oil and gas, aiming at 
restoring and modernizing the energy infrastructure in the program’s participating states, 
providing technical training to staff, as well as evaluating the feasibility of different 
transportation routes for energy from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe.  The program is 
considered an important tool to improve ‘the safety and security of energy supply in both 
INOGATE participating countries and the EU’, as well as a platform for collaboration and 
discourse. 554  It is well-recognized in Europe and was well received by its 21 member states.  
From its inception, the program has reached out to garner investment in order to enhance energy 
supply networks and has served as a conduit for bringing together private investors and 
international financial institutions for energy infrastructure projects.      
Formed as INOGATE’s institutional pillar, the Umbrella Agreement on the Institutional 
Framework for the Establishment of Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation Systems, which took 
effect in February 2001, is termed, 
 
an interstate agreement that sets out an institutional system designed to rationalise and facilitate the 
development of interstate oil and gas transportation systems and to attract the investments necessary 
for their construction and operation. INOGATE intervened at a moment when all the interstate 
agreements reached under Soviet times were cancelled and no legal agreement or rules for co-
operation existed between the newly-independent states.555   
 
The Umbrella Agreement, which seeks to facilitate the development of energy 
transportation systems and investments needed for their construction, calls for more efficient 
construction and use of transportation systems tying the Caucasus and Asia Minor to Central 
Asia and the EU on either, side and seeks to help reduce international risks in cross-border oil 
and gas pipeline projects.  All 21 countries are signatories to this agreement.  As stated in a 
TACIS report evaluating the INOGATE program, 
 
there is evidence that INOGATE has contributed to regional cooperation, especially through the 
Umbrella Agreement.  Through this Agreement, INOGATE has helped to replace a command and 
control model of development within the region based in central planning by a market model based in 
business law, contract negotiation and common technical standards.556   
 
INOGATE has also coordinated its actions with other ‘initiatives such as the EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue, the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum (the ‘Barcelona Process’, which 
includes the southern Mediterranean countries), and the EU Energy Community’.557  It was 
predicted in 2007 that INOGATE’s technical assistance program would be incorporated into the 
European Neighborhood and Partnership Policy, although such a change has not been officially 
promulgated yet.  
Similar to TRACECA, INOGATE’s track record has been mixed.  The program has gained 
support from high-profile political circles in its participating countries and has served as a 
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platform for dialogue and collaboration.  Further, INOGATE has played a role in pre-feasibility 
and feasibility studies of new energy transportation routes, particularly those passing through the 
Caspian Sea to Central and Eastern Europe.  It also seeks to give ‘advice on technical, financial 
and legal issues related to project preparation’.558  One of the immediate ways that the 
INOGATE program has assisted its participating states is via funding of important small 
investment projects in ‘hazardous interstate infrastructures, based on the need to improve the 
safety, security and transparency of the gas networks’, under the Umbrella Agreement.559   
Serving as a platform for greater collaboration, the program’s progress in gaining recognition 
and attracting investor attention has met some success.  According to INOGATE’s website, 
 
over the period of 2003-2004, the INOGATE Technical Secretariat carried out the first coordinated 
investment attraction activities of the INOGATE Programme. The Investment Attraction Campaign 
culminated in an Investment Round-table on March 31, 2004, where 12 projects were presented to 
international financial institutions and potential private investors. Interest was expressed in several 
projects by financial representatives and currently follow-up actions are in progress.560   
 
The EU has played a key role in INOGATE’s projects by way of financing studies and 
‘preparing applications for project finance from international financial institutions, training of 
staff, designing the regulatory framework for creating a sustainable regional and export market, 
and implementation of small-scale investments in hazardous cross-border infrastructure (such as 
pipelines) as demonstration projects for interstate transport’.561  However, as it has been noted 
above, the EU has been steadily reducing its funding to both TRACECA and INOGATE and 
encouraging greater financial contribution from participating countries.  It is expected that the 
member states of both programs will take greater responsibility for them.  In the case of 
INOGATE, they will increase their ownership of it by providing more contributions and 
‘together with other regional energy co-operation programmes, INOGATE […] will form an 
important pillar’.562   
Although the ideas behind the INOGATE and TRACECA programs have been sound and 
served as grounds for mutually beneficial economic integration between the member states via 
streamlining key transportation sectors, the implementation phase has been at times been 
difficult, and the outcomes of many projects were not as effective as expected.  While 
TRACECA appears to have made noticeable progress in improving some transportation routes 
and increasing cross-border cargo transit, coupled with greater recognition of its goals and 
projects in the region, INOGATE is at least a few steps behind its transportation counterpart.  
Most of INOGATE’s efforts have concentrated on feasibility studies and evaluations of projects, 
while the actual implementation of most of its projects has received less than favorable 
assessments, particularly from one of its main funding sources, TACIS.  INOGATE has had little 
effect on some of its members, for example Kyrgyzstan, which is tied with bilateral deals on 
energy products with Kazakhstan and Russia, but in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, a number 
of energy projects have been successfully completed under the INOGATE aegis.563 According 
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to Svante Cornell, the main issue with INOGATE is that it was never built to be an actor, that is 
to say, it had no real structure from the beginning and its purpose was to provide technical 
assistance, while having no mandate to design and implement a comprehensive set of projects, 
which would require significant political will.564  Frederick Starr shares these views, stating that 
INOGATE has been quite passive, especially in Central Asia, but that it has contributed to 
regional integration in the energy sector amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey due to their 
proximity to the EU and importance in the so-called East-West or Southern Energy Corridor.565 
INOGATE’s technical assistance focused on four areas: ‘market-related studies, resource 
evaluation studies, project feasibility studies and institutional studies’, all aimed at 
standardization across all member states.566  As the TACIS assessment of the INOGATE’s 
activities in 1997 indicates, the program began supporting regional integration via technical 
assistance of institutional development, which has helped ‘to turn potential projects into realistic 
investments, identifying relevant finance for these projects, carrying out financial analysis 
assessing business risk, and raising the required finance’. 567  Importantly, the parties involved in 
INOGATE supported the implementation of small size projects, with the potential to add to the 
more efficient use of pipelines and other energy infrastructure.  The 1998 and 1999 programs 
covered issue areas such as,  
 
Preliminary engineering studies for oil and gas transport across the Caspian Sea; diagnostic and 
preliminary engineering studies for the renovation of critical oil pipelines identified by the 1996 audit; 
preliminary engineering studies for the renovation of critical gas pipelines identified by the 1996 
audit; preliminary engineering studies for the renovation of critical gas pipelines identified by the 
1996 audit; further priority investments in gas and oil infrastructure.568 
 
INOGATE has executed its projects in two phases: the feasibility studies phase from 1996 
to 2000, and the implementation phase since 2004.  Some projects, assessed in the TACIS report 
issued in the year 2000, were not effective; nor had they met initial goals as planned.  It is worth 
examining in greater detail which projects proved ineffective.  The Regional Oil and Gas 
Management Project launched in 1994, designed to assist the countries to handle their energy 
transmission systems has garnered attention of senior officials but proved ineffective in 
accomplishing many of its initial goals.569  The Feasibility Study for Oil and Gas Pipelines 
through the Caspian Sea aimed at evaluating the feasibility of building additional energy transit 
routes via the Caspian met a similar fate as it was evaluated as inefficient.570  The Rehabilitation 
of Crude Oil and Oil Products Transportation Networks project, seeking to restore, ‘modernize 
and rationalize oil and oil pipeline projects in the countries participating in the INOGATE 
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program’ and to implement an audit of major crude oil routes to Europe was assessed by TACIS 
as ‘being poorly performed’.571   
As specified in the TACIS evaluation, other projects such as the Rehabilitation, 
Modernization, and Rationalization of Existing Gas Transmission Networks – Audit of Existing 
Infrastructure Central Asian Gas Transmission System (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan); Rehabilitation, Modernization, and Rationalization of Existing Gas 
Transmission Networks – Audit of Existing Infrastructure in Caucasus; Rehabilitation, 
Modernization, and Rationalization of Existing Gas Transmission Networks – Audit of Existing 
Infrastructure in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine; Rehabilitation, Modernization and 
Rationalization of Existing Gas Transmission Networks – Audit of Existing Infrastructure from 
Central Asia to the Caucasus, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, have received low scores.  
Although overall efficiency of these projects were satisfactory, they were mostly ineffective, 
except for their training elements.572  The Institutional Issues and Strengthening of Regional 
Cooperation project was ranked as more successful in terms of performance, cost-effectiveness 
and management and having an impact on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan negotiations.573  Criticisms of 
INOGATE have further focused on the necessity to develop a more focused institutional 
structure for regional collaboration instead of ad-hoc meetings.    
INOGATE’s track record is, however, not altogether negative and there has been some 
significant progress in its projects completed between 2004 and 2007.  These include: 
‘development of maintenance excellence in NIS gas companies; emergency priority actions for 
security and improvement of exploitation conditions for gas transportation systems in Central 
Asia; feasibility study for a satellite monitoring and accident prevention system for the security 
of gas transport and storage infrastructures; financing small-scale investments for regional oil 
and gas infrastructure in three Caucasus countries, Turkey and Central Asia; gas pipelines 
diagnostic mobile laboratory; IFI Technical Assistance Support Fund for facilitating investments 
in oil and gas projects; gas security of supply to Armenia in the framework of the closure of the 
Mezamor Nuclear Power Plant; pre-feasibility studies and facilitation for developing the North-
South; reform of Ukraine Gas Transit Network operations Phase III; supply of IT equipment and 
training for development of maintenance practices in NIS gas companies; supply of a pipeline 
network information systems to the Central Asia gas companies’.574  
In its most recent efforts to engage the INOGATE participants and improve the 
environmental conditions surrounding the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the region, the 
EU announced in December 2008, the launching of a ‘two-year project to deliver improvements 
to the environmental impact of oil and gas activities in Central Asia’.575  As part of INOGATE, 
the $3.63 million project would be a key player in ‘developing a sustainable and secure energy 
supply between Europe and the Central Asian region’, between which Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey serve as a bridge.576  The EU will provide technical assistance to monitor and control the 
environmental influence of oil and gas transportation operations.  As Transnational Extra-
regional Actor, the EU’s push to link its energy networks with those of Central Asia has led to 
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regional integration amongst the countries geographically in-between in the Caucasus and Asia 
Minor. 
Despite the fact that INOGATE’s projects by and large have proven less effective than 
hoped, the overall approach of INOGATE to serve as a catalyst of integration of energy transit 
routes has assisted in building functional links between the former Soviet states and Europe, with 
the Caucasus and Turkey as a major conduit in that process.  Looking back at the problems that 
INOGATE has faced, such as the lack of leadership to steer its goals and mission, lack of proper 
coordination of actions and duplication of efforts, poor training, and an attendant lack of 
investment, assessment of its role as an integrative mechanism should center on how it could 
improve to further its original goals of integrating the energy transportation of the post-Soviet 
states, with an eye on the real impact of the overall program.   
In a clear reference to regional integration, the EU’s assessment of INOGATE pointed out 
that the program ‘has an important political dimension’ and is recognized by high level 
government officials in the region. 577  Further, the program has encouraged an active political 
dialogue among the participating countries and the EU.  International energy companies are also 
familiar with this dialogue.  But one of the main accomplishments of INOGATE is that it has 
successfully endorsed ‘the ideas of international business law and project assessment among 
senior officials and politicians, creating a common language of debate and negotiation; the small 
investment projects have been generally welcomed by beneficiaries and often cited as concrete 
achievements on environmental issues’.578  Its future success largely hinges on better leadership, 
clearer vision and achievability of goals, and better program management. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Both the TRACECA and INOGATE programs have been necessary components of the 
larger EU strategy to engage Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  Although they have had a mixed 
track record of success, their presence has been an additional impetus to regional efforts on 
integration in the transport and energy spheres.  The efforts to connect the transportation routes 
of Eurasia with Europe have born some fruit, as evidenced by increased willingness to cooperate 
on mutually beneficial economic matters.  Both the TRACECA and INOGATE programs have 
provided first hand experience to the countries of the Caucasus and Asia Minor on how to 
operate more closely, by lowering economic barriers such as tariffs, opening borders, pursuing 
mutually beneficial goals and capitalizing on trade opportunities.   
TRACECA in particular has proven successful compared to INOGATE as the cargo 
transit and trade turnover between TRACECA participating countries has steadily increased over 
the years.  TRACECA is much better recognized in the region than INOGATE, largely due to its 
track record of tangible impact on the development of transportation routes.  TRACECA’s 
Executive Secretary of the Permanent Secretariat in 2003, Ambassador Zviad Kvatchantiradze, 
emphasized at the time that the growing volume of cargo transit via TRACECA is clear evidence 
of the program’s overall success.579  According to the General Secretary of TRACECA’s 
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Permanent Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Commission, Rustan Jenalinov, in 2005, about 
50 million tons of cargo were transited through the countries of the South Caucasus from Asia to 
Europe and vice versa, while it was close to 54 million tons in 2007.580  As a result of these 
activities, new projects and plans to attract more investment have accentuated TRACECA’s need 
in the region.  Svante Cornell and Hikmet Hadjy-zadeh consider both TRACECA and 
INOGATE as important and promising programs.581  According to Cornell, as the need for 
these programs is still there and the member states have put forth a vision and financial support 
to various projects, the missing link is political will and better coordination of efforts.582  
However, Bakyt Kakchekeev holds that the future of both programs is vague and it is likely they 
may not accomplish much in their current state, while continuing to maintain their formal 
existence.583 
While its accomplishments are evident and the participating countries realize the 
potential for further collaboration, TRACECA has yet to develop a focused strategy, boost its 
funding capability, and improve coordination of joint actions.  As Rustan Jenalinov points out, 
‘differences in economic development and in technological advances of the member states’ 
infrastructures, as well as an interest of other countries in the corridor, require attendant 
institutional changes’.584  These efforts will also depend on further collaboration with 
international organizations and international financial institutions.  In addition, a regional 
information exchange system among the TRACECA, as well as INOGATE member states will 
be essential to increased harmonization of efforts.585  The transportation development strategy 
until 2015, which envisions the boosting of transit capabilities of TRACECA members, will be a 
further litmus test of the program’s success as an integrative mechanism.  While INOGATE has 
clearly facilitated integration amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, the program’s viability is 
less measurable compared to TRACECA, due to unclear implementation of its goals, as well as 
because of comparatively decreased recognition among business and government circles in the 
participating countries.  Both programs, however, serve as illustrative example of how a TERA, 
the EU, operates on the ground to foster integration. 
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Chapter 5 – The China-Central Asia Pipeline: A Counterfactual on 
the Role of TERAs 
 
 Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey are becoming increasingly intertwined with one another 
to the exclusion of their neighbors.  This pattern of integration has two overriding characteristics.  
First, the integration that has occurred so far seems to be limited to the most highly regulated, 
discrete, and mobile sectors, such as energy and transport without spilling over into far more 
fundamental areas such as the political and security spheres.  Second, the integration that has 
occurred has been, in some sense, a top-down process, or even cultivated by supranational bodies 
– Transnational Extra-regional Actors – such as the European Union and international financial 
institutions.  Emblematic of that integration are the major highway projects and oil pipelines that 
run through all three countries.  The process is symbiotic, and each of the three countries benefits 
more from cooperation than they would otherwise.  Each of the three countries had something to 
contribute to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, for instance: Azerbaijan possessed a high-
value natural resource; Georgia possessed the necessary transit corridor through a relatively 
stable and democratizing ally; and Turkey possessed access to world markets, especially the 
European Union. 
 Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey each at least formally commit to the European 
integration project and are benefiting from the European Union’s Neighbourhood Policy, an 
agenda of policy reforms directed at the countries on the EU periphery.  In this package of policy 
reforms is significant technical assistance in the energy and transport sectors through programs 
such as INOGATE (oil and gas) and TRACECA (transport), which aimed at rehabilitating 
existing infrastructure and harmonizing regulatory and administrative frameworks among the 
member countries.  Standardization would improve predictability, which itself would improve 
the attractiveness of the region to foreign investment.  The combination of the European Union’s 
Neighbourhood Policy toward Georgia and membership accession negotiations toward Turkey 
have helped improve cooperation between the two countries on taxation, trade, customs, rail and 
sea transport, and other issues.  The European Union is by no means the only TERA at work in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey: the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the 
Asian Development Bank, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and 
a host of others have been actively providing financing and technical assistance to projects in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey with broader, overarching agendas in mind. 
 While other external actors such as Russia have attempted to widen a sphere of influence 
in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, not all external actors operate as TERAs.  This point 
deserves some emphasis.  Russia could in theory engineer an integrative process in the region, 
attempting to harmonize the regulatory and legal frameworks of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey 
with its own, and as a consequence exert more influence or even control over the energy and 
transport sectors of the three countries.  What is happening with regard to the European Union is 
qualitatively different.  The EU is only partially engaged in the integrative process in order to 
reap material rewards such as a stable natural gas supply.  The EU agenda is much broader than 
this, and seeks to export norms of democratization, human rights, economic development, and 
the rule of law to countries on the periphery.  TERAs, unlike other external actors such as 
Russia, are spurring a process of integration in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey that is bringing 
the three countries closer together amongst themselves to the exclusion of their neighbors.  In 
other words, while Russian-led integration, for instance, could technically lead to harmonization 
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of administrative and regulatory frameworks in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey (hegemonic 
integration, as Keohane recognized), integration would occur only secondarily and in one 
direction.  Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey would each be integrating with Russia and only 
indirectly with each other even though a region-wide harmonization process would be taking 
place.  
 This point is subtle, but it has important implications for a counterfactual case study, 
which can help in more specifically isolating TERA involvement in infrastructure projects as an 
explanatory variable for why integration has occurred – at least in the energy and transport 
sectors – around these projects in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  The creation of a pipeline 
from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and on to Xinjiang Province in the 
People’s Republic of China, bears certain similarities to the pipelines through Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey running from Baku through Tbilisi to Ceyhan (BTC) and Erzurum (BTE).  
First, the geographic motivations behind the pipelines are similar: a bypass of existing Russian 
avenues for land-locked resources to reach world markets.  Second, the pipeline traverses several 
international borders and requires sophisticated contractual, regulatory, and taxation agreements 
among those countries, as well as a mechanism for dispute resolution.  Finally, and not 
insignificantly, like the oil and gas pipelines in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, the so-called 
China-Central Asia gas pipeline is extremely large, traversing nearly 1,200 miles at a cost of 
over $7 billion.586  Nonetheless, the natural gas pipeline through Central Asia lacks a central 
feature of the BTC and BTE pipelines: the participation of TERAs.  While the natural gas 
pipeline in Central Asia is driven by China and may place some pressure on Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to bargain in good faith, to reach agreement on tariffs and fees, 
customs and pipeline security, China does not possess the broader agenda of TERAs active in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  In addition, while Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan 
all reached agreement on contract terms with China, they are not integrating amongst one 
another to the exclusion of their neighbors.  The example of the China-Central Asia pipeline 
allows for an answer to the question: would a major pipeline project through three countries like 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey contribute to the integration of their energy sectors were it not 
for the involvement of TERAs in its development? 
 
The China-Central Asia Pipeline and Energy in Central Asia 
 
China, a country with a rapidly diversifying energy portfolio, has naturally seen the 
producer states of Central Asia as a partial solution to its energy needs.  Since 2006, Xinjiang, an 
autonomous region of China bordering Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, has become a leading 
producer of natural and oil-associated gas.  In 2007, Xinjiang produced 21.2 bcm of gas, up from 
less than 5 bcm in 2002, and is on target to produce 30 bcm in 2010; likewise, the region’s share 
in China’s total domestic gas production rose from less than 3% in 1990 to 31% in 2007.  With 
proven reserves at 1.3 tcm, it holds a quarter of China’s total gas reserves.  China plans to 
increase the share of gas in its energy balance to 5.3% by 2010, and gas consumption is expected 
to reach 140 bcm/year with at least 90 bcm produced domestically, 20 bcm imported by pipeline, 
and 30 bcm as liquefied natural gas.  Domestically, China is building a series of west to east 
pipelines from producing areas to the south and east of the country.  In 2004, a 4,000 kilometer 
long pipeline started delivering gas from Xinjiang to ten provinces, and in 2007, construction 
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was approved on a second pipeline to stretch 5,000 kilometers.587  The Chinese government 
anticipates a 7 percent annual growth rate in natural gas use between 2000 and 2020.  Total 
energy use will double in that period, with natural gas fueling much of the growth.  China has 
also built an extensive network of internal pipelines, stretching 22,000 miles by 2010.588 
In line with China’s rapid economic growth, the country’s energy imports have doubled 
in the past five years.  As Central Asia is comparatively close to rapidly developing Xinjiang, it 
is logical that China would seek to participate in the sharp global competition over central Asian 
hydrocarbon resources. China imports about 10 to 20 million tons of oil from Kazakhstan every 
year, which is more than ten percent of China’s total oil imports, and operates a pipeline running 
from Atyrau in western Kazakhstan to Alashankou in Xinjiang region, which connects to the 
Kenjiyak-Atyrau pipeline.  Even though the volume of energy imports from Central Asia to 
China may not be strategically significant yet, it is growing at a rapid rate and projections are 
more than optimistic.  Besides being the largest economy of Central Asia, Kazakhstan has 
proven oil reserves of 2.7 billion barrels.  In 1997, China pledged $10 billion in investment for 
oil exploration and construction of infrastructure.  In December 2005, China bought 
Kazakhstan’s flagship oil company PetroKazakhstan for $4.8 billion, and also invested $700 
million in building a pipeline from Kazakhstan to China via Kyrgyzstan.589 
Observers have dramatically referred to China’s growing interest in Central Asian energy 
and the international competition that has followed as a new “Great Game” and a new “Silk 
Road.”590  By 2007, intense competition in Central Asia existed between three gas pipeline 
projects: (1) expansion of the pipelines to Russia; (2) the Trans-Asia gas pipeline to China; and 
(iii) the United States and European Union-sponsored Trans-Caspian pipeline.  It is unclear 
whether there is enough Central Asian gas for all three proposed routes.  Russia aims to 
modernize the Central Asia Center pipeline with assistance from both Kaztransgaz and Gazprom, 
and assist with construction of a Caspian Littoral Pipeline, which could cost up to $1 billion.  
Provisional agreements between Kazakhstan, the Chinese government, and the state-owned 
Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) set out a provisional agreement that would 
consist of two trunk pipelines: first, the Kazakh portion of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, 
running through southern Kazakhstan and primarily transporting Turkmen gas, and second, a 
pipeline from resource-rich western Kazakhstan to western China.  The latter proposed pipeline 
could be an important interconnector by linking Kazakhstan’s main gas routes into a unified 
system and provide flexibility in exports by linking the Central Asia Center and the Bukhara-
Ural gas trunk pipelines.591  The growing rivalry among Russia, China, and the European Union 
via a Trans-Caspian pipeline has boosted the bargaining position of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
and Uzbekistan. 
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As with Kazakhstan, China is also providing energy assistance to Uzbekistan, and Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov visited China in May 2006 and yielded Beijing’s first serious pledge of 
investment to the Uzbek energy sector.  China is helping develop the modest oil fields in the 
Fergana Valley and both countries signed a framework agreement worth $1.5 billion in July 
2005.  The two countries have since signed an agreement for a $950 million long-term loan and 
an additional $350 million soft loan.  Although China’s oil needs are expected to grow, from 6.3 
billion barrels per day to 10 billion in the next twenty years, oil’s share of total energy 
consumption will decline as natural gas increases, at a rate of 7.8% per year.592  In general, 
however, Chinese energy companies have expressed less interest in Uzbek natural gas because 
the country’s oil potential is dwarfed by Kazakhstan’s and its gas potential by Turkmenistan’s. 
Chinese outreach to Central Asia in fields other than oil and gas is almost as significant.  
China is responsible for building a vast network of rail and road links through Kyrgyzstan, a 
transit state, in order to connect China and Uzbekistan.  In 2005, China pledged an investment of 
$900 million in Kyrgyzstan for telecommunications infrastructure, which is almost half of the 
country’s GDP.  While Uzbekistan is not a major exporter of oil, the country sits on vast reserves 
of uranium, which has drawn attention not only from China but also from India and even Russia, 
whose reserves of uranium have declined.593  As a secondary player in the gas game, Uzbekistan 
has sought to maximize returns from its strategic geographical location for Turkmen gas to be 
delivered to China.  Moreover, if new gas deposits are found in Uzbekistan, they could be linked 
to a Turkmenistan-China pipeline.594 
The ultimate center for natural gas exploration and production, however, and the laserlike 
focus of China’s Central Asian outreach, is Turkmenistan.  In a search for export routes around 
Russia, and with a path through Iran blocked by Western donors, Turkmenistan President 
Niyazov visited China in April 2006 to negotiate a contract for a pipeline stretching deep into the 
Chinese interior under which Turkmenistan would deliver to China 30 bcm of natural gas 
annually for thirty years.  The Amu Darya deposits, with prospective reserves of 1700 bcm, were 
chosen as the resource base of the pipeline, and in November 2006, Turkmenistan invited the 
participation of the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) in development of the 
Gunorta Yoloten deposit.595  The pipeline stretches 2,500 miles from Turkmenistan’s 
northeastern border, through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and into China.  China provided a $25 
million low-interest loan to Turkmenistan in U.S. dollars for purchasing Chinese drilling 
equipment.596  The pipeline built on existing infrastructure, including a parallel oil pipeline from 
Kazakhstan to China, completed in 2005.  China also suggested an addition pipeline that would 
reach Kazakhstan’s western gas fields.  The most realistic plan, however, is to create a single 
pipeline that would service all three Central Asian states and connect with the domestic Chinese 
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network.597  As of 2012, China is also pushing forward a second pipeline from Turkmenistan 
through Tajikistan, which will also benefit northern Afghanistan.598   
Pre-construction estimates for construction of the pipeline from Turkmenistan to China 
ran as high as $20 to $30 billion.  CNPC announced an investment of about $2.16 billion in the 
pipeline, which will connect to China’s second West-East gas pipeline at Khorgos in Xinjiang 
province.599  CNPC has signed natural gas purchase agreements with Turkmenistan and a 
production-sharing agreement to develop the right bank of the Amu Darya River.  CNPC and its 
Turkmen counterpart, the state-owned Turkmengeologiia, planned to drill twelve test wells to a 
depth of 5,000 meters at Gunorta Yoloten, at a cost of $152 million.600   
The deal with China benefits Turkmenistan’s foreign policy goal of reducing dependence 
on Russia and Gazprom.  With China’s agreement to pay for the thirty-year supply of gas in U.S. 
dollars, Turkmenistan can reduce dependence on Russian export routes and can start to demand 
higher prices from Russia for gas exports.  Since Moscow resells Turkmen gas at two to three 
times the price that it paid, the deal with Beijing may seriously impact Russian foreign currency 
earnings and reduce the strategic value Gazprom plays in the region.601  However, since the 
Turkmen portion of the pipeline, running 188 kilometers from the Malai gas field to the Uzbek 
border, was built by Stroitransgaz, a Russian firm, China feared that the company would stall 
development of the pipeline.  The 1300-kilometer Kazakh portion of the pipeline was built by 
Kaztransgaz.602 
Turkmenistan is a natural target for Chinese investment as the second-largest gas 
producer and gas exporter in the former Soviet Union, after Russia.  The country’s gas 
production runs about 47 to 67 bcm/year, and is thirteenth in the world in proven gas reserves, 
amounting to about 2.67 trillion cubic meters (tcm), although authorities claim that potential 
reserves are nearly ten times higher.  Geological study of Turkmenistan is not highly advanced, 
so it is highly probable that new reserves will be found in addition to the current 139 gas deposits 
on the mainland and 10 on the Caspian shelf.603  Natural gas profits contribute substantially to 
overall GDP, but export revenues are also redistributed to other sectors, stimulating economic 
growth. 
As of 2009 before the opening of the pipeline to China, Turkmen exports amount to about 
35 to 52 bcm/year, most of which was bound for post-Soviet markets and a small amount to Iran.  
Although the agricultural sector accounts for most of the country’s employment, the gas and oil 
sectors dominate the economy.  Natural gas became dominant in the 1970s, with gas output 
reaching 70.5 bcm/year (16.2% of total Soviet production) by 1980, peaking in 1989 at 89.9 
bcm/year.  Under the Soviet system, Turkmenistan provided natural gas to the Soviet network of 
pipelines, and the gas was resold to other Soviet republics at subsidized rates, depriving the 
country of the profits it may have earned.  At independence, Turkmenistan was the fourth largest 
gas producer in the world, but political and economic turmoil led to severe cuts in the gas sector 
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and drove down GDP.604  Deterioration due to neglect, underinvestment, and insufficient 
protection from corrosion by sour gas means that the country’s transmission grid is in need of 
significant renovation.605  However, Turkmen domestic demand is modest: only 14 bcm/year in 
2006, and 19 bcm/year predicted by 2020.  Even with the uncertainty about the total size of 
Turkmen gas reserves, including an audit commissioned by President Niazov that was never 
released to the public despite pressure from Gazprom, the proven reserves available for export 
are still substantial.606 
Turkmenistan’s geographical position, and the pipeline network inherited from the Soviet 
Union, profoundly influences the country’s gas trade.  The country has no export outlets to 
foreign markets of its own, with the partial exception of the internationally-sanctioned regime in 
Iran, and until the new pipeline, it has had to rely on Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and especially 
Russia for transit.  The pipeline to Iran, which transports about 8 bcm per year, is too 
insignificant in relation to total gas production to reduce Turkmen dependence on the former 
Soviet transport system and markets.  In addition, Turkmenistan is dependent for transit and 
export on gas producing competitors, which further boxes in its ability to pursue an independent, 
profit-maximizing gas policy.607  Turkmenistan’s main gas producing area is in the southeast 
region of the country, with the largest single gas reserve being Turkmengaz-owned Dauletabad, 
which accounts for most of the country’s production and provides gas exports to Iran.  
Dauletabad produced about 78 million cubic meters per day in 2006.  In 2003, a giant new gas 
field, Gunorta Yoloten, was discovered in eastern Turkmenistan, and in 2006 the nearby Osman 
Yoloten was discovered, and the two fields may be a single supergiant field.  Turkmenistan’s 
second, and much smaller, onshore gas producing area is in the far west of the country, which 
produces about 2.7 million cubic meters per day.  The Turkmen government is also encouraging 
investment in the Caspian offshore deposits, with about 32 blocks available for licensing.  Rich 
gas fields also exist in a portion of the Caspian Sea whose ownership is disputed with 
Azerbaiijan.608  
Like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan bears the strong imprint of Soviet rule even while its 
resource base increasingly interests China.  Soviet administrators viewed Kazakhstan, which 
lacked its own economically viable gas resources, purely as a transit corridor for central Asian 
gas.  The pipeline system was designed accordingly, failing to cover the whole of Kazakh 
territory and not linked into a single complex.  The Kazakh Soviet republic, unlike the Turkmen 
and Uzbek ones, did not control the pipelines within its borders. As a consequence of this 
historical development and Kazakhstan’s own technical limitations, the country is now entirely 
dependent on Russia for access to major gas markets and its domestic gas infrastructure is 
inadequate.609  The geography of Kazakhstan and the location of the gas fields also complicate 
the country’s potential as a natural gas exporter.  The gas reserves are substantial, and certainly 
exceed the country’s expected domestic demand, which is estimated to reach about 20 to 30 
bcm/year by 2020.  The major gas fields are poorly located for a planned pipeline eastward to 
China, but well-positioned for export across the Caspian Sea to Europe, being only a few 
hundred kilometers from existing pipelines through other former Soviet republics.610 
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According to official Kazakh figures, domestic hydrocarbon reserves contain about 3.3 to 
3.7 tcm of gas, of which 2.5 tcm are proven.  The country’s total gas potential could reach 6 to 8 
tcm with further development of resources in the Caspian Sea, which may well exceed 
Turkmenistan’s supply.  Kazakhstan’s gas sector has achieved considerable production growth, 
from 4.34 bcm in 1994 to probably over 34 bcm in 2008.  The ministry of energy and mineral 
resources predicts production around 80 bcm by 2015 and 114 bcm by 2020.611  Due to the 
relatively sour quality of the gas from a number of Kazakh fields, only about 45% of the total gas 
volume produced in Kazakhstan is saleable, with the remainder left over after reinjection, flaring, 
and shipment for further purification.612  Kazakhstan’s gas reserves are almost all (97%) located 
in four western provinces, which are the home to the country’s largest hydrocarbon fields and a 
number of smaller ones.  All of these fields are close to the existing pipeline infrastructure on the 
traditional Russian route.  Indeed, five hydrocarbon fields, all in the western provinces, contain 
79% of Kazakhstan’s total proven natural gas potential.613 
Perhaps less ideal for China is the geography of Kazakh deposits: about forty percent of 
Kazakh gas reserves are at Karachaganak, near the country’s northern border with Russia.  
Virtually all of Karachaganak’s production is processed and marketed across the border in the 
Russian town of Orenburg, to which it is connected by pipeline.  In addition, the country has 
significant and underdeveloped deposits in the southeast near the border with Kyrgyzstan.  The 
remainder of the country’s gas deposits is associated with the main oil deposits.  Kazakhstan 
continues to import gas, however, since there are no gas pipelines connecting the western gas 
deposits with the consumer areas in the north and east.  The southern region imports gas from 
Uzbekistan, and the northern region from Russia.614 
The Karachaganak gas field, the cornerstone of Kazakh gas production, was discovered 
in 1979 and began production in 1984.  The gas was fairly deep and included significant amounts 
of impurities, which required treatment even before transport to refineries.  In 1992, the Kazakh 
government established the state enterprise Kazakhmunaigas, which was responsible for 
exploration, production, and transport of natural gas.  The government sought foreign investment 
early on in the Karachaganak gas field, but Gazprom was excluded from the tender, withdrew 
from the project, and prevented shipment of gas through its pipelines starting in the mid-1990s.  
The consequence was severely delayed production at the site, and Kazakhstan’s gas production 
only increased after that time due to the growth in oil production.  Gazprom sold its shares in 
Karachaganak to Lukoil, the Russian state-owned oil company, which invested in $5.5 billion in 
pipelines to connect the oil field to existing Russian pipelines.  The oil field also suffered from 
the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, which caused production to drop by about two-thirds as 
customers failed to pay for gas.  Work continued on a production plant and an associated 
pipeline, which were completed several months early in 2003.615 
Unlike Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan is unusual among large gas producers: 
until very recently, the lion’s share of its production was consumed domestically and only a 
small fraction of it was exported.  Between 2000 and 2007, only 16 percent of Uzbek natural gas 
production was exported, compared to 73% for Turkmenistan and 32% for Russia.  Potential for 
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Uzbekistan to become a major supplier of natural gas to world markets is limited because of 
geological, technical, and infrastructural obstacles, as well as high domestic demand.616  
Domestic demand is already around 40 bcm/year and could reach as high as 75 bcm/year by 
2020., which would not allow the country to export reserves in a volume that would make a 
pipeline profitable.  By 2007, the country had already committed almost all of its exportable gas 
surplus to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, or Russia.617  Uzbekistan has a much larger population and 
economy than Turkmenistan does, ensuring that the country will export a smaller proportion of 
its natural gas production.  Uzbekistan also has a much lower GDP per capita, with only about a 
quarter of Kazakhstan’s and half of Turkmenistan’s GDP.618  By 2020, Uzbekistan plans to 
decrease the share of gas in its domestic fuel mix from 88% in 2005 to 77% by 2020, in part by 
partially replacing natural gas with coal to increase the amount of gas available for export.619 
Importantly for China, however, Uzbekistan’s gas reserves are not negligible, and the 
country also possesses an additional resource, like Georgia in the South Caucasus: transit 
potential.  In 2007, Uzbekistan, with a gas output of 58.5 bcm, was the fifteenth largest gas 
producer in the world, and its share of total world production has been declining since 1999.  
Uzbekistan’s proven gas reserves are an estimated 1.87 tcm, nineteenth in the world.  Oil and gas 
operations in Uzbekistan are not separated from each other.  The monopoly operator is the 
majority state-owned holding company Uzbekneftegaz, which was established in 1998.  While 
Uzbekistan has allowed limited foreign participation in gas exploration projects, Uzbekneftegaz 
still accounts for 95% of total gas production.620  As of 2005, Uzbekistan’s potential gas reserves 
were estimated at 5.9 tcm.  In total, 193 hydrocarbon fields have been discovered, of which 93 
are under exploration, 67 prepared for exploration, and 33 undergoing prospecting and 
infrastructure development.  Recoverable reserves are thinly spread over a large number of 
small, and occasionally tiny, deposits.  Just three deposits account for about 75% of total gas 
production, but even the largest deposits are relatively small.  In addition, Uzbek gas is of 
relatively poor quality, and about 90% of gas produced contains hydrogen sulfide, which can 
cause rapid corrosion of pipelines.  Production consequently has high processing costs.  The 
largest functioning deposits have already started to decline in production and at least one second-
tier deposit has been depleted.  Far more than Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan’s gas 
production is limited by geological and technological challenges, which is a large part of the 
reason why the country is able to produce (at least at present) a comparatively high amount of 
gas but relatively little trade.621 
 
Similar Energy Sectors 
 
 The China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline shares important commonalities with the oil 
and gas pipelines through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.  Like this thesis’ three countries of 
focus, especially Azerbaijan, the countries of Central Asia have large state sectors, including 
state monopolies (or near-monopolies) over the energy sectors in each country, and consequently 
the energy sectors are not immune from political pressure and even arbitrary government action.  
                                                 
616 Zhukov, “Uzbekistan,” p. 355. 
617 Stern and Bradshaw, “Russian and Central Asian Gas Supply,” p. 261.   
618 Pirani, “Turkmenistan,” pp. 271, 274. 
619 Zhukov, “Uzbekistan,” p. 386. 
620 Zhukov, “Uzbekistan,” p. 357, 359. 
621 Zhukov, “Uzbekistan,” p. 360-61. 
 142 
As a corollary, in Central Asia and in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, the energy sectors are not 
fully legal-rational.  They are not entirely governed by objective regulations in which private 
energy actors have a significant role, and as a result, they do not fully lend themselves to 
harmonization on a functional basis since they are still driven, in part, by personality. 
 The power of the national energy sector may well be another similarity between 
Azerbaijan, Turkey and the countries of Central Asia.  In each country, the state oil company and 
state energy sector generally played driving roles not only in pipeline development but also in 
exploration, production, and transit of gas and oil more generally.  The state oil companies own 
controlling shares in the largest projects and have close relationships with the branches of 
government that redistribute oil revenues elsewhere in government, making them enormously 
powerful players. 
Although Azerbaijan and Georgia have made more progress than Central Asia, the 
former Soviet states lack a fully legal-rational governance structure of their energy sectors that 
can capitalize on international investment in lieu of the state energy monopoly.  Turkey’s state 
oil, gas and pipeline companies dominate its energy sector.622  In Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey, this increasingly rational regulatory regime is cultivated and encouraged by TERAs such 
as EU programs and international financial institutions.  As has been examined in previous 
chapters, TERAs are highly involved in the development of projects such as the BTC and BTE 
pipelines.  However, apart from the involvement of TERAs, the energy sectors of Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are strikingly similar to those of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. 
The Turkmen gas sector is a state monopoly, exercised through the state-owned oil and 
gas companies Turkmenneft and Turkmengaz, the ministries of oil and mineral resources, and 
the state agency on foreign investment.  In reality, however, all crucial decisions are made by the 
president.  In August 2008, a new law on hydrocarbon resources came into force, which 
formalizes direct presidential control over the gas and oil sector.  The law created a state agency 
on the management of hydrocarbon resources under the president himself, and the agency 
received exclusive prerogatives in formulating energy policy and dealing with foreign investors, 
including conducting tenders on licenses and signing contracts.623  Again, this seems to differ 
from Azerbaijan in particular only in a matter of degree. 
Like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas governance regime is not fully legal-
rational, and foreign investors have had their share of difficulties with local and national 
authorities.  The country’s general prosecutor charged that Agip, the Italian oil company, and 
British Gas had underpaid taxes by about KZT 5 billion after an audit revealed that $178 million 
had allegedly been concealed.  The matter was resolved only with the intervention of Prime 
Minister Balgimbayev.  In 2001, the Karachaganak consortium became embroiled in a tax 
dispute in which both Kazakhstan and Russia demanded VAT payments, which shut down 
production until the two governments agreed on a resolution.  More recently, the consortium has 
been pressured to increase the number of Kazakh companies involved in gas development.624   
 Similarly to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, Central Asian states have unresolved 
territorial disputes, wrangling over Caspian Sea access, or contentious issues of environmental 
hazards, terrorism, or the drug trade, despite their cooperation in some large-scale energy 
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projects.  Environmental concerns have also been raised, with claims of periodic release of 
airborne contaminants.  Kazakh gas is known for its sourness, and the main fields have 
particularly high levels of poisonous hydrogen sulphide and other sulphates.625  Soil tests from 
around Karachaganak indicate contamination with hydrogen sulfide, reducing grain yields in the 
region and, according to a local university, leaving much of the soil in the area deprived of 
micronutrients.  Two human settlements need to be moved due to the pollution.626  The one 
glaring difference between the energy sectors of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and those of 
the three Central Asian states discussed in this chapter is the involvement of TERAs in the 
development of pipeline projects in the former.  The Chinese government and CNPC are not 
TERAs and as has been discussed, seem to have done little to promote integration amongst 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
 
A Lack of Integration Amongst the China-Central Asia Pipeline Countries 
 
 The natural gas pipeline through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China has 
not resulted in the same level of energy and transport integration as in Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey, and it is not clear that it will.  As has been discussed in previous chapters, the building of 
the BTC and BTE pipelines contributed to the integration of the energy and transport sectors of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  The building of the China-Central Asia gas pipeline, at the 
broadest level, has not resulted in similar integration, even in those limited sectors.  Although 
like all large transnational projects, the Central Asian gas pipeline placed some pressure on the 
member countries toward considering the effects of infrastructural linkages to neighboring 
countries, the project’s development was conducted on a bilateral basis between China and each 
transit country separately.627  In general, there are three underlying reasons why the integrative 
process does not appear to be occurring in Central Asia, despite the presence of an emerging 
power, China, which could potentially act as a hegemonic integrator.628  TERAs, or rather their 
lack of involvement, play a role in all three areas. 
First, decision-making authority in the Central Asian energy sector is highly personalized 
and only weakly governed by legal-rational rules.  This is, in part, a function of the weak 
foothold that private foreign investment has in the natural gas sectors of each country, and the 
correlated weakness in contractual protections and objective regulations for natural gas 
producers.  Certainly, Azerbaijan’s oil sector is arguably dominated by personalized decision-
making outside ordinary parliamentary governance,629 but the involvement of TERAs limits the 
ability of the state to act arbitrarily.  Not so in Central Asia.  Personalized control and the 
absence of objective regulatory authority do not lend the regimes to standardization across 
national boundaries and do not lead to integration. Harmonization of trade, customs, and 
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administrative policies requires a transparent regulatory regime that is enforced against all actors 
and provides business operations with predictable legal environments and mechanisms for 
dispute resolution. 
Second, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan are competitors in the global energy 
marketplace.  Each of them produces significant volumes of natural gas, and each seeks the most 
profitable export routes.  They do not have the natural compatibility that Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
and Turkey do, and they are only cooperating because, at the moment, it is profitable to do so 
with a sponsor in China.  This does not provide a strong basis on which to integrate energy or 
transport sectors to the exclusion of the surrounding countries because it does not fundamentally 
change expectations about state behavior.  The three countries vary in foreign policy orientation, 
particularly in their relationships with Russia, and they are not to the point where they may fully 
“trust” one another’s motives.630  TERAs have not been involved in the development of energy 
sector projects, such as the China-Central Asia pipeline, in such a way that might contribute to 
the building of trust, even in this limited sector.  More sustained and frequent contacts among the 
three countries, to the exclusion of their neighbors, will be required to see real integration take 
place.  As Chung writes, “the economic benefits of trading with China seem to have so far 
accrued more favorably to China than to the Central Asian countries, considering the differential 
terms of trade between China’s export of consumer durables, foodstuffs, fertilizers, electric 
appliances, and machines to the region, and its import of mineral, agricultural, and animal 
products from there”.631 
Third, as both a cause and a consequence of the first two observations, TERAs such as 
supranational agencies and international financial institutions have been largely absent from the 
rapidly-expanding natural gas sector in Central Asia and played not part in the development of 
the China-Central Asia pipeline.  This may be due in part to the shadowy, extra-regulatory nature 
of decision-making in the natural gas sector, and it may be due in part to the fact that China and 
Russia are crowding out these multilateral institutions.  China and Russia may also fill some of 
the role played by TERAs, such as providing funding and technical assistance for large-scale 
projects, without the “strings” attached in terms of harmonization and professionalization of 
standards.  In fact, it seems clear that China succeeded in building the China-Central Asia  
pipeline because it did not blend energy ventures with support for fundamental change in the 
modes of operation of regional energy sectors.632 
 These three explanations reflect the three integration theories outlined at the beginning of 
this thesis.  The absence of an objective regulatory regime precludes integration from a neo-
functional standpoint.  Likewise, the failure to develop common expectations about state 
behavior contradicts a security communities theory or constructivist explanation for integration.  
Finally, the absence of multilateral institutions in the building of the natural gas pipeline network 
in Central Asia, reflects neo-liberal institutionalist theory.  Unlike the other two theories, 
however, neo-liberal institutionalism has an explanation for all three of these observations.  In 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, integration of regulatory regimes is often “cultivated” or 
directed by supranational agencies.  Emerging integrative networks change societal expectations 
and eventually change identities.  But international institutions are reluctant to go into countries 
that are credit risks, in which decision-making is highly personalized and opportunities for 
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redress in the event of expropriation, corruption, or contractual violations are limited.  
Integration breeds integration, but the incapacity for integration is also self-sustaining. 
 As Keohane explained in his theory of neoliberal institutionalism, supranational 
institutions reduce transaction costs of further cooperation and allow the spread of information 
more easily.  Supranational organizations establish rules for the distribution of gains, monitor the 
behavior of other states, and mutually sanction non-compliance.  Because of the absence of 
supranational institutions in natural gas pipeline development in Central Asia, as well as the non-
mutually reinforcing goals of the participants in the pipeline project, the risk of “defection” is 
greater than it would be in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  That is, the cooperation of the 
Central Asian states, cultivated by China, does not spread benefits or reduce transaction costs 
equally among all of the participating states, and as a consequence, it does not necessarily 
guarantee sustained and repeated future cooperation.  If a worthwhile alternative appears—
rehabilitation of Russia-bound Soviet-era pipelines, for instance—the three countries 
participating in the pipeline project in Central Asia could turn away from China.  The absence of 
TERAs in the Central Asian pipeline network contributes to a failure to “institutionalize” and 
regularize the contacts and transactions that have taken place amongst Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan. 
According to neoliberal institutionalism, states form collective arrangements to better share 
information, regularize contacts and communications, and eventually to alter state behavior and 
enforce norms.  The institutions may take on a life of their own and cultivate further integration, 
institutionalizing reciprocity and making defection more costly.  Institutions help states reach 
more mutually beneficial goals because they allow for closer, more predictable relationships 
among states and can set expectations accordingly.  The existence of international institutions in 
financing and technical assistance in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey has helped to curb 
arbitrary government interventions and to encourage regulatory reform, encouraging integration 
of the three countries’ energy sectors.  The absence of international institutions in the 
development of the China-Central Asia pipeline has stunted opportunities for technical 
development and regulatory harmonization. 
Unlike Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, Central Asian countries have not benefited as 
much from international technical assistance in natural gas production.  Rivalries between 
Kazakhstan and Russia, for instance, have dampened private sector interest in the region.  In 
2000, Kazakh authorities established Kaztransgaz, a gas subsidiary of the national oil 
transportation monopoly Kaztransoil, which took over operations of gas pipelines from a Belgian 
firm in a bid to regain control over the gas infrastructure.  Because of periodic cutbacks in supply 
due to non-payment by Russian and other customers during the financial crisis, the Belgian firm 
was unwilling to subsidize Kazakh gas without any governmental reforms.633  Another 
consequence of the growth in production of natural gas at Kazakhstan’s oil fields has been the 
government’s increasing pressure on oil companies to use the gas productively, which may have 
benefited from coordination and technical assistance.  Associated gas constitutes more than 45% 
of the gas produced in Kazakhstan.  Aside from Karachaganak, natural gas is produced at the 
country’s major oil fields, Tengiz, Uzen, Zhanazhol, and Kumkol.  In 1999, the government 
passed a law requiring the inclusion of natural gas utilization projects in oil field development 
plans.  Projects so far undertaken have included an electric power plant at Kumkol, a gas 
reinjection scheme at Tengiz, and a gas processing facility at Uzen.  Production was only 13 bcm 
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per year in 2002, but the government hoped to reach 47 bcm per year by 2010 and 57 bcm per 
year by 2015.634  
The absence of international institutions has also failed to assist countries like 
Turkmenistan develop sound business regimes that invite foreign development and build 
creditworthy reputations.  Although the Turkmen government has sought to provide a legal 
regime that would attract investment in oil and gas, the government provides no real protection 
for investors.  Investment laws passed shortly after independence at least in theory protects 
foreign investments from nationalization or requisition, grants concessions for between five and 
forty years, and adheres to principles of non-discrimination between foreign-owned firms and 
national ones.  However, hydrocarbon resources are also national property and managed by the 
Cabinet.  Although a presidential decree provided for a body that would create rules and 
regulations to govern the development of hydrocarbon fields, in reality the president himself 
makes these key decisions.635   
Regulatory inefficiencies prevent any real harmonization without information sharing and 
regular interaction among Central Asian nations (and the lack of objective legal-rational 
governance of the energy sectors).  One of the risks faced by international gas companies is 
double taxation, since although production-sharing agreements or joint-venture agreements with 
the government of Turkmenistan control for taxation, exported gas can face a VAT on exports.  
Foreign investors are guaranteed the right of international arbitration, but national legislation 
curtails these rights.  None of the legal frameworks governing oil and gas exploration explicitly 
provide for enforcement of international arbitration awards, nor do they permit a waiver of 
sovereign immunity in the event of asset seizure or forced transfer.  The government of 
Turkmenistan has a history of capricious and arbitrary expropriation of property, and a number 
of projects (such as the Trans-Afghan pipeline projects) have faced actual or threatened 
expropriation in the past.636 
Finally, the lack of institutionalization in the Central Asia region reduces transparency 
and information sharing and engenders resistance from segments of the population.  Uzbekistan 
suffers from the lack of public input into its energy development.  Some local commentators 
believe that Uzbek authorities, in order to increase the supply of gas for export, are decreasing 
deliveries to the residential sector, which has sparked a media interest in gas supply shortages.  If 
such a policy is being pursued, it could endanger the political and economic foundations of the 
present regime.  The Uzbek economy is neo-patrimonial as it is based on an informal deal 
between the political elite and urban populations, resting on the redistribution of agricultural 
goods and natural resources in favor of urban populations to the detriment of rural residents.  
Authorities cannot cut off supplies of cheap energy and implement unlimited price increases 
without endangering political stability.637 
 
Less Foreign Investment 
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Foreign investment in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan is far more limited 
than in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, which means that natural gas sectors are driven by 
state-owned companies that do not necessarily operate under objective and legal-rational 
regulation.  State-owned oil and gas companies are understandably reluctant to share information 
with their counterparts in other countries, a gap that TERAs may help redress.  This is not to say, 
however, that they lack any foreign investment at all.  Like oil, the development of natural gas in 
Kazakhstan has been constrained by transport difficulties and the vagaries of Russian-Kazakh 
relations.  Development of the gas sector will depend on foreign investment, including both those 
investing in the natural gas fields and those investing in oil reserves that also contain gas 
deposits.638  International oil companies entered Kazakhstan on privileged terms at a time of low 
oil prices when Kazakhstan did not have a developed oil or gas sector, unlike Russia or 
Azerbaijan.  The country signed its first agreement with a foreign company in 1993, a joint 
venture with Chevron in the Tengiz oil field.  Unlike any other former Soviet gas producer, with 
the partial exception of Azerbaijan, international oil companies play a central role in the gas 
sector in Kazakhstan.  In 2007, two international consortia were responsible for more than 70% 
of Kazakhstan’s gas output.  In 2002, President Nazarbaev signed a decree establishing the 
national oil and gas company Kazmunaigaz, which became a vehicle for channeling the 
government’s influence into an energy sector dominated by foreign companies.  In 2004, 
legislation was introduced requiring that Kazmunaigaz have a minimum 50% share in new 
PSAs.639  The Kazakh government needs international oil and gas companies for their technical 
expertise in developing the geologically sophisticated Caspian hydrocarbon fields, but the 
government does have a strong say in influencing the shape and structure of export routes.  
Although Kazmunaigaz is only responsible for about 6-8% of domestic gas output, it controls the 
key export gas pipelines through the subsidiary Kaztransgaz.640 
The lack of foreign investment, and the strong involvement of the Russian energy sector, 
is also evident in Uzbekistan.  In 2007, only an estimated 5% of Uzbekistan’s total gas output 
was produced with participation by foreign capital.  So far, the largest foreign investors are 
Russian and offshore companies, although since the mid-2000s, Asian companies are increasing 
their presence.  The combination of an insular government, a large state sector, and the belief in 
Uzbekistan that the oil and gas sector is important for security reasons led to a preference for 
state self-reliance at the expense of foreign investment in energy.641  In 2006, the Uzbek 
government loosened its grip on the oil and gas sector and allowed foreign participation in the 
privatization of strategic enterprises.  The largest foreign investors in Uzbekistan’s gas sector are 
Russian companies, particularly Gazprom and Lukoil.  Lukoil is the largest foreign investor in 
Uzbek gas projects, including hundreds of millions of dollars in investments during the 2000s, 
and a controlling share in a gas field that will begin production in 2013.  Because Gazprom 
monopolizes the Russian gas pipeline network, Lukoil in particular has been expanding its stake 
in gas production and export in former Soviet republics like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan in order to resell its gas to Gazprom at higher prices.  The key investment roles 
played by Gazprom and Lukoil belie the overall lack of foreign direct investment in the energy 
sectors of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  These are in many ways “legacy” 
investors, due to links from the Soviet past, and generally not reliant on the role of TERAs.  
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Outside investment from elsewhere would be much more dependent on the “stamp of approval” 
that TERAs provide. 
 
International Organizations But Lack of Integration 
 
 While there is little evidence of integration amongst Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan’s energy sectors, in the context of this counterfactual, it is worth examining the 
various attempts at regional integration in Central Asia, at least one of which purports to be an 
energy-oriented grouping.  It is also worth looking at these attempts because they all take the 
form of international organizations that are similar, at least in their outward appearances, to 
TERAs.  It is worth noting from the outset, however, that Turkmenistan, due to its avowed 
neutrality, is not, nor has it ever been a member of any of these international organizations.  
While this immediately negates the potential role of these organizations in encouraging 
integration amongst Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it is still worth looking at 
attempts at integration in the region, to examine whether they have had any effect on the energy 
sectors of the three countries.   
The China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is probably the most prominent 
of these institutional attempts to bring integration to the region.  Members include Russia, as 
well as the four post-Soviet Central Asia states, excluding Turkmenistan.  While its official 
objectives do not mention “integration” as such, it brings members together for regular military 
exercises and coordinates counter-terrorism activities through a center in Tashkent.  In 2006, 
then Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that the SCO form an “energy club” due to the 
perceived complimentarity of Russian and Central Asian oil and gas resources with China’s 
demand.  By all accounts, this idea was not received favorably by other SCO members, mainly 
due to their desire to keep their energy sectors as independent as possible from Russian 
influence.642  The Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is as its name 
suggests almost exclusively focused on military and security issues.  Of the three Central Asian 
states in question, it includes Kazakhstan, but not Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan left and 
reentered the organization during this thesis’ time period.  The CSTO primarily serves as an 
umbrella for a number of bilateral security agreements between Russia and the other members, 
some of which allow Russian forces on their soil.  Some also participate in regular military 
exercises and high-level summits, although Uzbekistan has notably not been a regular participant 
in these activities.  The Treaty itself does not mention energy and although the Russian national 
security strategy considers energy and security issues to be closely linked, there have not been 
major discussions about energy sector integration under CSTO auspices.643  One might expect 
the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) to encourage linkages amongst energy 
sectors in Central Asia, but in general it is concerned with the trade of consumers goods and 
equipment.  One of its stated aims is to form a common energy market and it has within its 
institutions structures an Energy Council.  That said, of the Central Asia countries discussed 
here, only Kazakhstan is an active member; Turkmenistan has never been a member and 
Uzbekistan’s membership is “suspended”.  Uzbekistan only joined in 2006 and its leadership 
quickly became disillusioned with the project.  EAEC summits have discussed the possibility of 
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merging with the CSTO, which seems to support the general analysis that the EAEC is mostly a 
vehicle for Russia to maintain influence with Central Asian leaders.644 
As Roy Allison has termed it, these organizations provide a “protective integration”, tied 
to either China or Russia, prioritizing regime security, sovereignty and resistance to what is 
perceived by Central Asian leaders as “external values”.  Allison argues that “bandwagoning” 
with China or Russia, “has spelled the end of efforts by Central Asian states at regional self-
organization”.645  Indeed, it would seem that compared to the role of TERAs in Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey, which previous chapters have shown, encourage integration amongst the 
three countries, even if only in discrete sectors, the international organizations of Central Asia do 
exactly the opposite.  Moreover, the China-led SCO played no discernible role in developing the 
China-Central Asia pipeline.646   
The Chinese government also played a limited, even as a hegemonic integrator.  China’s 
negotiations with the three countries involved were not only bilateral, but the terms of the 
agreements were not disclosed to the other two pipeline transit states.  Construction of the three 
segments of the pipeline was undertaken as three separate projects, with separate Chinese-led 
consortia responsible.  The only time that the leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan met in relation to the China-Central Asia pipeline was when the project had finished 
construction and was officially opened for operation.  Apart from connecting the segments of the 
pipeline at border-crossings (some of which already existed due to Soviet-era links), there is no 
evidence to suggest that the China-Central Asia pipeline’s construction plans played any role in 
integrating the energy sectors of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The project did not 
go forward under the auspices of or with the support of any TERAs.  As discussed above, the 
TERAs active in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey – TRACECA, INOGATE and the World Bank 
– are also active in Central Asia, but none of them were involved in the China-Central Asia 
pipeline.  Other TERAs also active in the region, such as the Asian Development Bank, did not 
play a role in the pipeline’s completion.647 
 
Conclusion 
 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey are developing an increasingly intertwined energy 
sector in which technical requirements are standardized and regulatory instruments are 
compatible.  This is not occurring amongst Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the 
natural gas pipeline network, in which China has heavily invested for its own energy needs, is 
governed by a highly personalized and state-centric structure.  Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Kazakhstan lack the natural compatibility of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and are engaging 
in an arms-length pipeline project that is not changing the nature of their energy sectors on the 
ground.  This is in large part because of the absence of TERAs such as EU programs or the 
World Bank in the development of the China-Central Asia pipeline.  Although China is an extra-
regional power that is “encouraging” the development of the Central Asian pipeline network, it is 
doing so in a way that favors its energy balance.  It does not share the same priorities as TERAs 
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active in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and it has interacted with the three Central Asian states 
on a bilateral basis.   
Other contributing factors include the highly personalized decision-making authority in 
the energy sectors of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, only weakly governed by legal-
rational rules.  This absence of an objective regulatory regime precludes integration from a neo-
functional standpoint.  TERAs are not involved to play a role in limiting highly personalized, 
arbitrary decision-making. The three countries are also competitors in the global energy 
marketplace.  Their foreign energy policies could change rapidly and opportunistically, just as 
they did when they joined the China-Central Asia pipeline project. This failure to develop 
common expectations about state behavior goes against a major security communities theory 
explanation for integration.  TERAs have not been involved in the development of the China-
Central Asia pipeline in such a way that might contribute to the building of trust, even in this 
limited sector.  Also, relative to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, TERAs have been much less 
involved in energy sector development in Central Asia overall, not just with the China-Central 
Asia pipeline.  This relative absence of multilateral institutions reflects the key component 
identified by neo-liberal institutionalist integration theory. 
Despite the integrationist rhetoric of hegemon-driven international institutions in Central 
Asia, such as the SCO and the CSTO, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not all take 
part in these organizations and they have had little discernable impact on the development of the 
China-Central Asia pipeline.  TERAs active in Central Asia have not been involved in the 
pipelines development either.  This leads to the conclusion that while there are a number of 
important contributing factors as to why the three Central Asia states have not integrated their 
energy sectors the way that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey have, the absence of TERAs in the 
development of major pipeline projects such as the China-Central Asia pipeline is an important 
explanatory variable.  One can further conclude that the role of TERAs in Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey is also an important explanatory variable as to why integration has occurred in the 
energy and transport sectors, particularly as the role of TERAs fits into the three theories of 
integration employed in this thesis. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey are currently engaged in a process of integration in their 
energy and transport sectors, helping to harmonize regulatory regimes across borders, to develop 
common strategies of growth and development, and to improve the business climate by ensuring 
predictability and standardization across the three countries.  The integration currently underway 
in the energy and transport sectors has not placed pressure on other sectors to follow suit, the 
way that coal and steel integration in Western Europe in the 1950s reduced trade barriers and 
opened the door to broad economic integration across the continent.648  This may be because of 
the unique characteristics of these sectors.  First, energy and transport in the three countries are 
highly regulated industries that possess strong state presence, even monopoly or near-monopoly 
control, in which there are a finite number of actors and the means of ensuring high rates of 
compliance.  Second, given the political economy of the three countries and the geography of 
transporting oil and gas to world markets, actors in the energy and transport sectors in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey have strong financial incentives to lower transaction costs and 
produce rational, transparent regimes.  Third, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey possess a natural 
complementarity in which each possesses a comparative advantage as to the other two countries: 
Azerbaijan is well-endowed with a high value natural resource; Georgia has a transportation 
infrastructure that is necessary to bypass the closed borders with Armenia and Iran and avoid 
Russian export routes; and Turkey has deep, sustained access to world (especially European) 
markets and international investors.  These unique characteristics are helping to integrate 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey in a distinctive and limited way. 
Integration involves (a) at least rudimentary institutional structures among the countries 
involved; (b) at least some interdependence in policy formation and implementation; and (c) at 
least some collective sense of mutual identity and obligation.649  The more depth that the 
integration process achieves, the greater the penalties will become for defection, the lower the 
costs of cooperation, and the more predictable the state’s behavior will be to outside actors.  
More precisely, as used in this thesis, integration is the process by which a group of nation-states 
become interdependent as to one another to the exclusion of those not in the group.  Through 
legal and regulatory harmonization, political and social intertwinement, and the erection of 
institutions common to the three countries, the members of the group will become more peaceful 
as to one another and will reduce barriers to economic development.  Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey, to the exclusion of bordering neighbors such as Russia, Iran, and Armenia, are currently 
drawn into a reinforcing cycle of integration that is changing expectations about predictability, 
reducing economic barriers, and inviting foreign investment.650 
 The three traditional theories of integration that originally developed to explain the 
progressive unification of Western European in the decades following the Second World War 
attempted to fill a gap in traditional realist theory that had difficulty explaining why sustained 
and durable integration was replacing balance of power notions and shifting alliances.  As coal 
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and steel harmonization pressured other regulatory sectors toward harmonization, an enormously 
complex supranational regime developed that nearly spanned the continent.  As the supranational 
institutions grew, they developed their own center of gravity and cultivated further integration.  
However, outside of the European context, this pattern of integration was not repeated in the 
same way.  The Southern African Development Community, for instance, has not generated self-
sustaining momentum toward unification, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations still 
remains a highly state-centric organization that generally abides by principles of non-interference 
among member states.651  The inability to precisely reproduce the theoretical integration of 
Western Europe to other regions of the world led to continued refinements and layers to the 
traditional theories of integration. 
 The first of these theories, security communities theory, was originally conceived by Karl 
Deutsch in an influential book Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, first published 
in 1957.  Deutsch first observed clusters of states with relatively peaceful relationships despite 
the reigning balance of power, and he sought to isolate the variable making this possible.  
According to Deutsch, international relations was not solely limited to interactions among states, 
but as a world of overlapping communities, peoples, and identity groupings, making it an early 
forerunner to the constructivist revolt against realist theory following the Cold War.652  He 
proposed that transactions and communications among different communities, when considered 
in the aggregate, could eventually build levels of trust and interdependence that would change 
collective identity and create a “we feeling” among people across borders.  He referred to these 
emerging groups of countries as “security communities,” and successive scholarship defined in 
more precise terms the different stages or types of security communities.653  For instance, 
although the possibility that emerging security communities could be warlike as to other security 
communities, some scholars have shown that the more tightly-knit and integrated a security 
community, the more the community projects shared norms and common interests externally so 
that security communities ultimately produce more peaceful outcomes.  While Deutsch’s original 
theory contained methodological limitations, the essential core has remained unchanged: namely, 
that a state’s behavior is learned and could change as the shared norms of the community change.  
Security communities theory is generally able to import advances in sociology and human 
behavior into international relations theory, which helps provide additional variables to 
measuring the progress of integration. 
 The second traditional theory of integration is neo-functionalism, which posits that 
regulatory harmonization at low technocratic levels will place pressure on higher political levels 
and other regulatory spheres to progressively continue the integrative process (a process called 
“spillover”).  The theory used similar mechanisms to the prewar theory of functionalism as 
conceived by David Mitrany, which sought to create international technical institutions that 
would expand their power, engineer a shift in loyalties from nation-states to the international 
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institutions, and eventually form a peaceful community of interdependent nations.654  Neo-
functionalism, however, was conceived as a regional theory rather than a global one, and is 
considerably more complex.  According to the original theorists Ernst B. Haas and Leon 
Lindberg, who studied the integration of the coal and steel sectors in Western Europe and 
analyzed how that integration “spilled over” into energy integration through Euratom and 
economic integration through the European Economic Community.  The theory suffered a 
setback in the early 1960s as French President Charles de Gaulle succeeded in paralyzing the 
governing commission of the EEC and thereby slowing the process of European integration, an 
episode that underscored that non-functional politics could undermine the regulatory 
harmonization process and revealed that the integrative process was not unidirectional and 
deterministic.655  In addition, spillover does not seem to have occurred outside the European 
context, at least not as much.  Although neo-functionalist theory underwent several revisions, it 
survives in the present more as a hybrid theory or “lens” rather than a comprehensive 
explanation for integration.  The value of neo-functionalism is that it identifies actors and 
processes that are not identified in other theories, such as the role of supra-national elites, 
business organizations and trade unions, and regulatory harmonization. 
 The third traditional theory of integration, and the one most relevant to this thesis, is 
neoliberal institutionalism as conceived by Robert Keohane in his 1984 book After Hegemony.  
According to Keohane, nation-states set up supranational institutions in order to achieve 
common goals, but, once built, these institutions could alter state behavior by reducing 
transaction costs, establishing and enforcing norms, sharing information, and regularizing 
contact and communications.656  The institutions could cultivate their own growth and 
dominance, and engineer integration from the top, down.  Participation in such institutions can 
help a state build its reputation or creditworthiness among other members and can increase the 
costs of defection and reduce the costs of compliance.  Rooted in realist presumptions that states 
are the primary actors in international relations and will act in their own interest, neoliberal 
institutionalism departs from realism by positing that supranational institutions change state 
behavior over time by altering norms and expectations and consequently state interests.  The 
theory introduces a new mechanism for integration, with supranational institutions as the 
variable, although, like neo-functionalism, it recognizes that supranational elites often cultivate 
and encourage further integration in a self-reinforcing cycle.  As used in this thesis, 
Transnational Extra-Regional Actors (TERAs) refer to a specific kind of supranational 
institution: namely, those from outside the region that pursue broad-based agendas beyond 
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simple profit and influence for the benefit of states that are not core members of the 
institutions.657 
 The integration currently occurring amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey is limited 
in nature, restricted to the high value and heavily regulated spheres of energy and transport.  
Highly regulated sectors lend themselves to standardization across borders, and the integrative 
process increases the pressure for governments to ensure transparency of finances and to respect 
contracts with private partners and resist expropriation.  The organic integration that is occurring 
among these three countries is cultivated as a top-down process by TERAs operating with broad-
based agendas, which provide technical assistance and financial support to integrative projects.  
However, this integrative process has not led to integration in other sectors.  Politically, for 
instance, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey do not yet share common attitudes toward neighbors 
such as Armenia and Russia, nor do they share a common geopolitical orientation toward 
Europe.  On a cultural level, while two of the three countries share a common Turkic language 
(Azerbaijan and Turkey), two are secular and Islamic (Azerbaijan and Turkey), two are oriented 
toward the European Union (Georgia and Turkey), and two share a common history of Russian 
and Soviet domination (Azerbaijan and Georgia), the three countries together have very little 
common cultural threads as distinguished from their neighbors.  On a security level, the countries 
do not yet possess complementary goals, as evidenced by the 2008 war between Georgia and 
Russia during which Turkey was unable or unwilling to come to Georgia’s defense.658  Thus far, 
integration has been limited to technical realms and has not generated momentum toward 
broader integration in a manner similar to that of Western Europe. 
 The process of integration is not necessarily consistent or unidirectional, and even in the 
energy and transport sectors the integrative process has not progressed in the same manner.  The 
energy sector, particularly in Azerbaijan, is of a shadowy nature and largely outside the reach of 
parliament.  TERAs that wish to influence development of the energy sector must do so at the 
very highest levels of the executive branch, because it is the executive branch that negotiates 
concession agreements, divides and distributes state oil revenues, and makes important decisions 
about Azerbaijan’s foreign energy relations.659  By contrast, the transport sector is decentralized, 
accessible to the ordinary population, intertwined with other actors such as border control and 
customs, and dependent on local cooperation.660  TERAs operating in the transport and 
communications sector have multiple avenues and pressure points on which they can bring their 
influence to bear.  Because of the different makeup of these two sectors, the integrative processes 
in each are best explained by slightly different theories.  Undoubtedly, neoliberal institutionalism 
best explains integration in the energy sector, where public perception and expectations are much 
less relevant because of the closed nature of the sector.  For the transport sector, however, a 
hybrid theory is necessary.  Neoliberal institutionalism accounts for the top down nature of the 
integrative process, but public perceptions and expectations play some role as in security 
communities theory.  In addition, because the sector is accessible and decentralized, regulatory 
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harmonization has concrete results that affect a great number of actors.  While this is still a 
centrally planned process of integration, encouraged by international institutions, the 
mechanisms identified by neo-functionalism and security communities theory are not absent. 
 The thesis analyzed two TERAs that are contributing to integration amongst Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey: first, the European Union-sponsored projects Transport Corridor Europe 
Caucasus Asia (TRACECA), and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE), and 
second, the World Bank’s efforts at promoting harmonization and transparency in the energy 
sector.  In order to isolate TERAs as the variable promoting integration, the thesis proposed a 
counterfactual involving the natural gas pipeline network from Turkmenistan to China.  Like the 
oil and natural gas pipelines from Baku to Ceyhan and Erzerum, the natural gas pipeline was an 
extraordinary feat of engineering designed to link an immense reservoir of natural resources with 
world markets.  The Central Asian project, however, was driven almost solely by China’s desire 
to cheaply close its energy gap.  The project did not benefit from technical or financial assistance 
from TERAs.  The result is that very little integration has occurred amongst Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – the transit countries – where a lack of transparency and the 
overwhelming control of the state energy company ensure that energy is treated as sui generis to 
a greater degree than even Azerbaijan, outside normal political processes.661  As a result, the 
pipeline is unlikely to have any effect on integration in the energy sector or other sectors and is 
unlikely to spur cooperation among the countries in realms unrelated to the pipeline. 
 
Implications and Shortcomings 
 
 The explanatory variable used in this thesis, namely the presence of TERAs in cultivating 
and encouraging integration from the top down, emphasizes a strain of integration theory that 
holds that integration is not an organic, progressive, and deterministic process without 
orchestration from above.  In other words, the integrative process is not spontaneous and 
continuous; rather, it is directed by the agency of individuals and institutions.662  The thesis has 
suggested that integration has had a profound impact on the business climate for foreign energy 
companies, which has helped spur foreign direct investment and thereby promote economic 
development, but may have contributed to an over-emphasis on energy development to the 
detriment of other sectors of the economy and society.663  Integration of the energy sector in 
particular has helped solidify predictability of the government’s range of action and has reduced 
the potential for expropriation, as neoliberal institutionalism would predict: integration changes 
state behavior.  One way in which the proposed railway stretching from Baku to Tbilisi and then 
to Kars is helping produce positive consequences for the region is that it is revitalizing 
northeastern Anatolia, a long-neglected part of Turkey.  The railway may be considered a 
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“crucial lifeline” according to local officials.664  Although some scholars have termed this 
process “geographical spillover,” the expansion of economic development due to large-scale 
infrastructure construction is not solely a product of neo-functionalist theory.   
 One methodological limitation with using transnational extra-regional actors (TERAs) as 
a variable is that the distinctive quality of TERAs (namely, that they are “extra-regional”) is not 
essential to the variable itself.  In other words, an international institution based in the same 
region as the countries under study could potentially be capable of encouraging integration in the 
same way as TERAs, provided that it had similar access to technical assistance and donor 
funding or credit.  Similarly, although the TERAs under study here, namely projects of the 
European Union and the World Bank, possess broad-based agendas that aim to improve 
governance and transparency in client countries, a broad-based agenda is likewise not essential to 
the definition of TERAs or to the process of integration.  That said, a multinational corporation 
or a hegemonic neighboring state do not act similarly to international institutions in general or to 
TERAs in particular, because they do not cultivate integrative processes beyond transparency or 
security for their own resource extraction and profit goals, with the exception of occasional 
philanthropy.  To this end, TERAs fit comfortably in the theory of neoliberal institutionalism 
because they fit Robert Keohane’s model of international institutions as state-created 
organizations that possess an institutional agency and a legal personhood separate from their 
member states. 
 A second methodological limitation of the thesis is that it only identifies strong 
correlation between the presence of international institutions and integration amongst 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, and identifies a mechanism by which international institutions 
appear to be feeding the integrative process.  The study does not necessarily prove, or attempt to 
prove, causation, which is not possible at present because of the short span of time covered by 
the study.  The counterfactual case of the natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China 
possesses its own methodological limitations in attempting to isolate TERAs as an explanatory 
variable.  It is not, however, the only variable.  According to Transparency International’s 2011 
corruption index, for instance, Turkmenistan (177th out of 182 countries) and Uzbekistan (tied 
for 177th) rank far worse than Georgia (64th) or Turkey (62nd) and slightly worse than Azerbaijan 
(143rd).665  It is possible that the lack of structural institutional transparency has prevented 
TERAs from operating in the region, so it becomes difficult to prove that the absence of TERAs 
contributes to the lack of governmental transparency.  However, this thesis contends that TERAs 
are still an explanatory variable, as there is a strong correlation between their presence and 
integration in the sectors in which they operate.  One benefit of the “hybrid” nature of the theory 
used in the present study is that it incorporated a broad array of actors that were not reached 
exclusively by a single theory.  As an empirical matter, the study looked at communications and 
transactions among populations, at the role of business interests and supranational elites, and at 
external relations (e.g., common aversion to Russia, a neighboring regional hegemon) before 
settling on the role of international institutions as the explanatory variable. 
 
Summing Up 
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 Integration in the energy and transport sectors among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey is 
an organic process that is changing the relationships amongst the three countries, even if only in 
a limited way.  It is not, however, a spontaneous process, nor an inevitable one.  Rather, it is 
cultivated from the top down by international institutions that are providing technical assistance 
and financial support to large-scale, cross-border projects that are changing expectations and 
promoting a more predictable business climate.  Azerbaijan possesses significant reserves of 
highly valued natural resources; Georgia serves as a geographically crucial transport corridor; 
and Turkey has deep and sustained access to world markets and international partners.  
Integration amongst the three countries reinforces their existing complementarity.  However, 
outside of the energy and transport sectors, the three countries have not made significant 
progress toward integration.  The three countries do not share similar regional orientations, 
linguistic or religious backgrounds, or even common foreign relations toward neighbors such as 
Russia, Armenia, and Iran.  Most importantly, integration in the energy and transport sectors has 
not placed pressure on other sectors to integrate as well; rather these two sectors have been 
treated as distinctive from others precisely because they have integrated, in a self-reinforcing but 
limited process. 
 The explanatory variable for integration among the three countries is the presence of 
transnational extra-regional actors (TERAs), which include European Union and World Bank 
projects designed to improve transparency and governance in the energy sector and promote 
transport and freight capacity through the Caucasus and Turkey.  The role of TERAs in 
promoting and cultivating integration in the transport and energy sectors accords with neoliberal 
institutional theory, which posits that states join international institutions because it is in their 
national interest to do so, but over time their presence in the organization will start to shape state 
behavior by changing the risks and rewards of membership and increasing interactions amongst 
the members.  The role of TERAs is particularly notable in the energy sector, which has 
historically been a closed sector, accessible only to the highest levels of government.  By 
contrast, integration in the transport sector involves a much broader range of actors, as the sector 
is decentralized and accessible to the ordinary population.  Consequently, a theory that not only 
incorporates neoliberal institutionalism but also elements of security communities theory, 
namely sociological interactions amongst the general population, as well as neo-functionalism in 
the form of regulatory standardization, present additional variables that help explain multi-
faceted integration in the transport sector.  The three countries under study here—Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey—are forming a limited bond that unites the three of them to the exclusion 
of their neighbors.  While integration is not necessarily a unidirectional or progressive process, 
the complementarity of the three countries, as well as incentives to promote integration, 
undoubtedly have an impact on the tempo and depth of the integrative process currently 
underway.  Only time will tell whether the results are irreversible or transferable to other sectors 
or regions, but, although this pattern of integration thus far is distinctive to these three countries, 
the range of variables identified in this study undoubtedly have relevance to other contexts. 
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